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Marck Stanley of the University of Maryland School of Law. Tragically, Ryan Easley died in an
automobile accident before this article went to print. He is and will be missed dearly by everyone
who knew him.
1. Formstone is a kind of ersatz stone, a Portland-cement based mixture pasted on brick
(most commonly), and other exterior building materials, to make them look like stone. It would
not make a very good cornerstone because it has no structural integrity of its own. See MARY
ELLEN HAYWARD & CHARLES BELFOURE, THE BALTIMORE RoWHOUSE 181-82 (Jan Cigliano ed.,
1999) (discussing whether formstone is "friend or faux"); Michelle Trageser, Skin Deep, HousE
BEAUTIFUL, Nov. 1999, at 32, 38, 160, 225 (describing formstone as "a nonstructural skin, a
cementitious product applied by hand with a trowel . . . found most often on downtown row
houses," and once described by John Waters as "the polyester of brick," with only "one great
advantage. It's very helpful in giving directions"); Ron Pilling, Unmuddling . . . Removing
Formstone & Other Indignities, in THE OLD HOUSE JOURNAL NEW COMPENDIUM 185 (Patricia
Poore & Clem Labine eds., 1983) (describing formstone as temporary, damaging to a house, and
fundamentally ugly); Chris Kaltenbach, Baltimore Puts Up a Good Front, THE BALT. SUN, Sept.
17, 1997, at 1E (describing the making of "Little Castles: The Formstone Phenomenon," a film
about formstone); Nicole Lewis, Filmmaker Doesn't Take Facades for Granite, WASH. POST,
Mar. 11, 1999, at C05 (same); LITTLE CASTLES: A FORMSTONE PHENOMENON (Formstone
Foundation Inc. & Truckstop Motion Pictures 1998) (a film about the application of formstone to
the exterior of houses in Baltimore, with varying comments about formstone's aesthetic qualities).
Formstone was patented in 1937 by L. Albert Knight. See HAYWARD & BELFOURE, supra, at 181.
There is a Formstone Foundation of American, located in Baltimore, Maryland, the geographical
and spiritual center of the formstone universe, and the phenomenon has spread (at least nominally)
as far as Australia, where "formstone" is used to make "architectural and decorative stone pieces
[of] practically any shape or size." See Formstone Australia, Online Catalogue, Custom Made
Formstone, at http://www.formstone.com.au/productind.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2005).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The person I feel sorry for is John Ely. More than thirty years ago
he laid it all out.2 Painstakingly, if not clearly, he explained to anyone
with a mind to listen how thinking of the doctrine as a constitutional
"cornerstone of our federalism"3 was a mistake. Such a view, he
pointed out, "has served to make a major mystery out of what are really
three distinct and rather ordinary problems of statutory and constitu-
tional interpretation."4 He described the analytical and practical costs of
the mistake, showed how the analysis ought to proceed, explained why
academics and judges had failed to get it right up until then, and pro-
posed a minimally disruptive cure for straightening out the case law con-
fusion then in effect. Nearly every academic commentator of note
signed off on Ely's analysis, almost immediately,5 and acknowledged
the power of his analytical framework even when they disagreed with its
application to particular cases.6 Judges cited to his analysis routinely,
sometimes reverentially, as if to a shrine of our federalism, even as they
2. John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REv. 693 (1974). Sadly, John
Ely died a short time ago. Like many others in the legal academy, I had a tremendous amount of
respect and admiration for the man. I thought the best thing I could do to honor his memory was
to "renew his copyright" on ErielHanna analysis, as Janet Alexander so felicitously put it in an
email describing this article. For three recent symposium issues devoted to Ely's work, see
Symposium - On Democratic Ground: New Perspectives on John Hart Ely, 114 YALE L.J. 1193
(2004); Symposium in Honor of John Hart Ely, 57 STAN. L. Rav. 695 (2004); Tribute to John
Hart Ely, 58 U. MIAMI L. REv. 953 (2004). Ely concluded his distinguished career as the Richard
A. Hausler Professor of Law at the University of Miami School of Law.
3. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). The
"constitutional cornerstone" view is mistaken for reasons I will explain shortly, but "the prestige
of Justice Harlan" gave it a life it otherwise might not have had. See Ely, supra note 2, at 699,
701 (1974) ("the prestige of Justice Harlan" is "[slurely one reason" for the perpetuation of the
view of Erie as a constitutional doctrine).
4. See Ely, supra note 2, at 698.
5. See, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Bead Game, 87 HAv. L. REv. 741 (1974); Paul J. Mishkin,
Some Further Last Words on Erie - The Thread, 87 H~Av. L. REv. 1682 (1974).
6. See Chayes, supra note 5, at 741.
With [Professor Ely's] overall framework I have no quarrel. On the contrary, I
think his approach clarifies much that has mystified several decades of civil
procedure students - which probably means that their professors have been
mystified as well.... [However,] Professor Ely thinks that [Sibbach] was wrong...
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simultaneously misapplied its central tenets. While it was troublesome
that so many self-designated adherents seemed not to understand, it was
still early, with plenty of time for future generations of law students to
learn the doctrine accurately and to correct lingering doctrinal problems
when they became law clerks and drafted opinions for judges too busy to
do the research themselves. Ely even held out hope that the Supreme
Court would understand the full implications of the interpretive project
it had set in motion and take the first available opportunity to complete
its analysis.7 It must have been a very optimistic time.
I am talking about the Erie/Hanna "doctrine,"8 of course, and Ely's
well-known article, "The Irrepressible Myth of Erie,"9 what one might
think of as one of the Supreme Court's most interesting set of federalism
glyphs and its best English translation. But then the casebook authors
got hold of the project, and all bets were off. Many of these authors
would not have decided the Erie/Hanna cases in the same way as the
Court. They object most to the decision to replace the "sensible modera-
and that [Ragan] and [Hanna] were correctly decided. As it happens, I think exactly
the opposite ....
Id. passim; Mishkin, supra note 5, at 1682-83.
I . . . accept the general analysis advanced in [Professor Ely's] article and find it
sound and clarifying. . . .My disagreement can be simply stated: Ely treats the
Constitution as relevant only in terms of Congress' power to displace state
substantive law; he sees the Constitution as having no special view on the power of
the federal courts to do so. I maintain that the Constitution bears not only on
congressional power but also imposes a distinctive, independently significant limit
on the authority of the federal courts to displace state law.
Id. passim.
7. See Ely, supra note 2, at 737 ("shifts in the Court's perception of the interrelationship
between the" Rules of Decision Act and the Rules Enabling Act provide reason to think the Court
will complete its Erie/Hanna analysis).
8. Taken literally, the term "Erie/Hanna doctrine" is incoherent. There is no Erie/Hanna
doctrine as such, but instead only a line of Supreme Court cases, identified on one end by Erie
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and on the other by Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460
(1965). These cases interpret two federal statutes, the so-called Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1652 (2000), and Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000), which help to define the
operational relationship between state and federal courts. The cases also have something to say
about the constitutionality of the Decision and Enabling Acts, though more by implication than by
express statement. The cases do not announce a judge-made or constitutional rule, substantive or
procedural, about federalism or the application of state law in federal courts, and to think of them
in that way is a mistake. I will use the term "Erie/Hanna doctrine" nonetheless because just about
everyone else does, even Charles Alan Wright. See, e.g., CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS 374 (5th ed. 1994) (Professor Wright used "Erie doctrine," but I prefer "Erie!
Hanna" because Hanna contributes more to the Court's final view on the two statutes than Erie).
Professor Wright used the term because "lawyers commonly" do. Id. at 381. Professor Wright
also died recently, leaving gargantuan shoes to fill.
9. See Ely, supra note 2.
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tion ' " ° of the Byrd v. Blue Ridge" balancing test with the more difficult
to understand "refined outcome determination" test of Hanna v.
Plumer,'2 although some even deny that this has happened. 3 They also
object to the Court's failure to ground the doctrine more explicitly in the
Tenth Amendment of the Constitution, as a protection of a fixed enclave
of state power forever off limits to federal regulation, rather than a shift-
ing enclave of statutorily protected state power residual to the Constitu-
tion' s grant of federal power. For whatever reasons, and there are many,
the casebook authors seem more enamored with the ideological and rhe-
torical force of an argument for states' rights than one for enumerated
federal powers.
Scholarly disagreement over the meaning of case law is common,
of course. Legal academics often argue not only with the Supreme
Court, but also among themselves over the proper interpretations to be
given to doctrinal, constitutional, and statutory texts, 4 as well as the
proper sources of information to be used in making such interpretations.
What makes the Erie/Hanna dispute unusual is that the casebook authors
acknowledge the persuasiveness of Ely's analysis, often citing to it as
definitive, and yet do not use it to organize their treatment of the doc-
trine in their casebooks. 15 It is as if they are "persuaded" by Ely's argu-
10. See Ely, supra note 2, at 696; see also The Supreme Court, 1995 Term - Leading Cases,
110 HARv. L. REV. 256, 266 (1996) (criticizing the Court for abandoning the "useful analytical
framework" of the Byrd balancing test); WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 409 (same).
11. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
12. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 460.
13. See WRIr, supra note 8, at 409 ("Byrd v. Blue Ridge has not been overruled, nor its
interest-balancing technique repudiated, and, when faced with the typical, relatively unguided Erie
choice, its approach has been found useful."). But see Wade v. Danek Med. Inc., 182 F.3d 281,
289 n. 11 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding that only a "minority of the federal courts" still rely on Byrd's
balancing test).
14. According to Richard Posner, a common law doctrine is more like a collection of
concepts, which judges manipulate syllogistically in response to changing perceptions of public
policy needs, than a text. For Posner, this difference between concept and text distinguishes
common law rules from constitutional and statutory ones. See Richard A. Posner, Legal
Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 179, 182-86 (1987). It is true that common law rules are more easily changed by
courts than statutory or constitutional ones and that common law rules exist only in language,
whether on paper, a video screen, or in the head. However, language in any form is a text that
must be interpreted before it can be modified, ignored, or followed. No doubt, important
differences exist between doctrines, statutes, and constitutional provisions, but the difference
between concept and text is not one of them.
15. The newest generation of books may not have the same respect for Ely's discussion. See,
e.g., RICHARD L. MARCUS, MARTIN H. REDISH & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, CIVIL PROCEDURE: A
MODERN APPROACH 959-69 (4th ed. 2005) (questioning whether Ely's reading of Hanna is
"anachronistic"); STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 221-53 (6th ed. 2004) [hereinafter
YEAZELL (6th ed.)] (deleting all quotations from and references to the "Irrepressible Myth" article
in the fifth and sixth editions). MARCUS, REDISH & SHERMAN, supra, still quotes the
"Irrepressible Myth" article at length, see MARCUS, REDISH & SHERMAN, supra at 958-60, and is
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ment while simultaneously not agreeing with it. 6 Law students learn
one or another casebook version of Erie/Hanna, since casebooks are one
of a student's primary sources of information about the doctrinal uni-
verse.17 When the students become law clerks, as ultimately some must,
they draft Erie/Hanna opinions based on their slightly-off-track versions
of the doctrine because these are the only versions they know.'8 The
principal consequence of this exercise in what one might think of as
"casebook law reform,"19 is a major doctrinal disconnect between the
upper and lower branches of the federal judicial system, with the
Supreme Court on one page (pretty much), and the lower federal courts
on several others.20 As if playing an extended telephone game, the
one of the few books to do so, but it questions whether the article's analysis is "accurate." Id. at
960.
16. See infra notes 329-32 and accompanying text.
17. Some might argue that hornbooks and commercial outlines are students' principal sources
of information about legal doctrine. While this may be true for all students some of the time, and
some students all of the time, it is probably not as true with respect to the Erie/Hanna doctrine.
Erie/Hanna is usually taken up in the first semester of law school when students are still making
an effort to read cases directly, and before they have adopted an "expurgated" method of legal
research and study. However, it might not make a difference where students learn the doctrine,
since the authors of hornbooks and commercial outlines usually are the authors of casebooks as
well, where they communicate the same understandings of the Erie/Hanna doctrine.
18. This may explain the law review note by a student at Cornell Law School. J. Benjamin
King, Note, Clarification and Disruption. The Effect of Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.
on the Erie Doctrine, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 161 (1997). In the article, King argues that the Byrd
balancing test is still a viable part of the Erie/Hanna doctrine, even though the Supreme Court
repudiated balancing in Hanna. Id. at 183-87. For an analysis of how the court did not approve of
the balancing test, see infra notes 166-73 and accompanying text. King thanks Cornell Law
Professor Kevin Clermont for his assistance in helping to write the note; Clermont co-authored
one of the most well-known procedure casebooks which still seems to see Byrd balancing as a
viable standard. See RICHARD H. FIELD, BENJAMIN KAPLAN & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, MATERIALS
FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 379 (8th ed. 2003).
Does the Court's decision to respect the federal interests in controlling the standard
of appellate review in the federal courts of appeals [in Gasperini] prove that Byrd
lives . . . ? If so, did the majority perhaps reach its judge/jury holding also by the
same ad hoc balancing process, implicitly finding that the state interests in its own
new trial standard outweigh the net of federal interests minus the refined outcome-
determinative effect - and thus ... did not in fact resurrect the substance/procedure
test or preserve the outcome-determinative test?
Id. at 379.
19. For a friendly discussion of this phenomenon, see Jean Stefancic, Needles in the
Haystack: Finding New Legal Movements in Casebooks, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 755 (1998). See
also Thomas Hayes, A Goode Judge is Hard to Find: An Essay on Legal Realism and Law School
Casebooks, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 216, 220-22 (2004) (describing how casebooks change student
perceptions of law).
20. See, e.g., Darrell N. Braman, Jr. & Mark D. Neumann, The Still Unrepressed Myth of
Erie, 189 U. BALT. L. REV. 403, 467-74 (1989) (summarizing the differences between Supreme
Court and lower federal court Erie/Hanna decisions). "[O]f the many cases since 1974 involving
Erie disputes, only a handful have used an analysis that arguably tracks the Supreme Court's
standard ...." Id. at 405-06.
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lower federal courts report back a different version of the Erie/Hanna
doctrine than the one sent out by the Supreme Court, Ely's efforts to
provide an interpretive algorithm notwithstanding.
In this article I examine this episode of casebook law reform to
determine how and why it occurs, and whether anything can or should
be done about it. For the most part I do not discuss the wisdom of the
Erie/Hanna doctrine itself. That ground has been plowed, almost to
exhaustion, by many excellent commentators and I have little, if any,
new growth to tease from those well-worn furrows.2" Instead, I examine
the way in which the casebook authors codify the Erie/Hanna doctrine,
so to speak, for study by law professors and students, in order to suggest
ways in which the efforts of courts and authors could be better coordi-
nated. I do not doubt that what I say about Erie/Hanna also could be
said about other complicated statutory and constitutional doctrines. The
doctrine is not a unique instance of casebook law reform, just an inter-
esting one.
I organize the discussion in the following manner. Section II
describes the development of the Erie/Hanna doctrine, principally as
articulated in the four well-known Supreme Court cases associated with
it. Because of the contested meaning of these cases, I quote from them
extensively to make clear why I read them as I do. Given that I see the
cases as stages in a common project, in a sense successive drafts of the
same document, I emphasize the ways in which they build on and
improve one another, more than the ways in which they differ. Section
III describes the manner in which several of the most widely adopted
and highly regarded civil procedure casebooks present the doctrine, and
compares those presentations with what the Supreme Court has said in
the Erie/Hanna line of decisions itself. I focus generally on how
casebook authors have chosen to edit the cases for inclusion in their
books, as well as on the suggestions they make in the notes and com-
ments regarding how the cases might be analyzed. Finally, Section IV
asks why it matters that the casebook treatment of Erie/Hanna differs so
appreciably from the Supreme Court's views and offers modest sugges-
tions for getting Erie/Hanna instruction back on track. No doubt this is
a quixotic undertaking. Ely explained the doctrine thirty years ago and
look what happened then. Yet, I cannot get rid of the idea that Erie!
Hanna is an understandable doctrine, a relatively stable one,22 and
21. For an excellent summary and discussion of that scholarship, see Lawrence B. Solum,
Procedural Justice 9-22 (Feb. 23, 2004) (U. San Diego Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 04-02;
U San Diego Pub. Law Research Paper No. 04-02), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractjid=508282 (research paper on file with the Social Science Research Network
Electronic Library).
22. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Not Bad for Government Work: Does Anyone Else Think the
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something the casebook authors ought to be able to get right.
II. THE ERIFIHANNA DOCTRINE
The Erie/Hanna doctrine is not really a doctrine, but a set of rules,
mostly statutory,23 that coordinate the operation of state and federal
courts within a single geographical jurisdiction. The need for coordina-
tion arises from the fact that, left unregulated, state and federal courts
can work at cross-purposes by producing different substantive outcomes
for parties with essentially identical claims. As independent sovereigns,
state and federal governments are constitutionally entitled to judicial
systems of their own. They also are entitled, within the limits of their
constitutional authority, to design those systems to operate in whatever
fashion they choose. There is no overarching command authority bind-
ing on both levels of government that requires the legal systems of the
two entities to be identical. It is the essence of federalism, in fact, that
different levels of government are free to experiment with different insti-
tutional arrangements. In part, that is the theory of how innovation
occurs within a federal system. When legal systems are constituted dif-
ferently, however, it sometimes happens that lawsuits adjudicated in one
system are resolved differently from identical lawsuits adjudicated in
another. Differences in each system's rules of operation can and do
affect the way in which the systems define and protect the legal rights of
parties. Since legal rights within single jurisdictions ought not to vary
appreciably from one judicial system to the next, particularly if both
systems are not equally available to all litigants, some means is needed
to ensure that state and federal courts within the same geographical dis-
trict follow the same substantive rules. The Erie/Hanna doctrine is one
such means.
Sometimes the differences between state and federal judicial sys-
tems are merely procedural, that is, differences exist between the rules
the systems use to prescribe the "manner and mode" of filing and prose-
cuting lawsuits. Rules about the size of paper on which a complaint
Supreme Court is Doing a Halfway Decent Job in Its Erie-Hanna Jurisprudence?, 73 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 963, 966 (1998) ("[I]t seems to me that since the Court decided Hanna in 1965 it
has provided and maintained a reasonably stable, workable, and sensible structure for analyzing
issues in... the Erie-Hanna area of state-federal law choice for federal courts.").
23. See discussion supra note 8.
20051
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:475
must be filed 4 or the means by which service of process may be made, 25
serve as two well-known examples. With respect to federal and state
differences in these kinds of rules, nothing needs to be done. They exist
as a consequence of our federalism. They give judicial systems their
distinctive identities and make separate state and federal judicial systems
possible. Most of the time, these differences are of little consequence in
dictating the outcome of lawsuits. If such differences were not permit-
ted, neither government could exercise its sovereign prerogative to con-
struct a judicial system of its own. However, substantive rules of legal
liability, such as the duty of care owed a trespasser on land, or the ele-
ments of a cause of action for breach of contract, are another matter.
These rules create substantive rights which ought not to vary within sin-
gle jurisdictions. Whether one thinks of this as a requirement of equal
protection of the laws,26 or as a right to fair treatment generally, 7 claims
about substantive legal rights ought to be evaluated by the same stan-
dards in a single jurisdiction wherever those claims may be litigated. 8
This does not mean that all courts must agree about the strength of such
24. JONATHAN M. LANDERS, JAMES A. MARTIN & STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE
238-39 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter YEAZELL (2d ed.)], the predecessor book to YEAZELL (6th ed.),
supra note 15, at 233 n.2, was one of the first procedure books to use this example now in wide
use. See, e.g., JOHN J. COUND, JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, ARTHUR R. MILLER & JOHN E. SEXTON,
CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 385 (8th ed. 2001) (paper size example); MARCUS,
REDISH & SHERMAN, supra note 15, at 938 (brief cover color example). The example appears to
have come from Loya v. Desert Sands Unified Sch. Dist., 721 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding
that a complaint on long paper should be considered filed on the date received, even though local
rule requires use of short paper).
25. Whether to use the state or federal service rule was the issue in Hanna. See Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 461 (1965).
26. The Erie decision mentions the equal protection clause in its discussion, but does not
develop an equal protection rationale to any extent. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78
(1938). This is not surprising. As Ely explained, "the construction of a federal statute was in
issue, and Bolling v. Sharpe [citation omitted] had not yet been decided." Ely, supra note 2, at
713 n. 114. But even if it had, "[iut would not be irrational to fight bias against out-of-staters by
giving them access to a body of law, developed by persons beholden to no particular state,
unavailable in suits between cocitizens." Id. at 713. "The Erie opinion suggested a denial of
equal protection was involved, but surely that was a metaphor." Id. at 712-13; see also discussion
infra note 54.
27. This is Ely's view. See Ely, supra note 2, at 712 (arguing that Erie was concerned with
the "unfairness of subjecting a person involved in litigation with a citizen of a different state to a
body of law different from that which applies when his next door neighbor is involved in similar
litigation with a cocitizen").
28. Professor Henry Hart has given perhaps the most well-known explanation for the
importance of a single system of substantive law within a political jurisdiction. He wrote:
The law which governs daily living in the United States is a single system of law: it
speaks in relation to any particular question with only one ultimately authoritative
voice, however difficult it may be on occasion to discern in advance which of two or
more conflicting voices really carries authority. In the long run and in the large, this
must be so. People repeatedly subjected, like Pavlov's dogs, to two or more
inconsistent sets of directions, without means of resolving the inconsistencies, could
"A FORMSTONE OF OUR FEDERALISM"
claims when litigated, but that they should use the same substantive
standards in making such decisions.
The Black & White Taxicab29 case, one of the most well-known of
the pre-Erie cases to deal with the problem of "different standards,"
illustrates the unfairness produced when state and federal courts do not
play by the same substantive rules. In the case, the Black & White Taxi-
cab Company, a Kentucky corporation, contracted with the Louisville &
Nashville Railroad for the exclusive right to provide taxi service to and
from the railroad station in Bowling Green, Kentucky. Black & White
sought to enjoin a competitor, the Brown & Yellow Taxicab Company,
another Kentucky corporation, from providing taxi service to the same
station in violation of its exclusive rights contract with the Railroad.
However, Kentucky common law did not recognize the validity of an
exclusive rights contract and Kentucky state courts would have refused
to enforce it. Taking this into consideration, Black & White dissolved as
a Kentucky corporation and formed a new corporation under the same
name in Tennessee. Black & White then assigned the exclusive rights
contract to the new corporation, and the new corporation in turn sued
Brown & Yellow in Kentucky federal court, grounding subject matter
jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship. The Kentucky federal court held
that the issue of the contract's validity was governed by "federal general
common law," which enforced exclusive rights contracts, and not by
Kentucky state common law, and accordingly granted Black & White's
request for an injunction. By reincorporating in Tennessee, Black &
White was able to enforce its exclusive rights contract in Kentucky fed-
eral court under federal law, while an identical Kentucky corporation
would not have been able to enforce the same contract in Kentucky state
court, under Kentucky state law.
In deciding the Black & White Taxicab case, the court invoked a
federal statute designed to insure that federal and state courts apply the
same substantive legal rules. Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, or
the Rules of Decision Act, 3° provided at the time that "the laws of the
several states, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the
United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as
rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United
not fail in the end to react as the dogs did. The society, collectively, would suffer a
nervous breakdown.
Henry M. Hart Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 489-
90 (1954). Professor Ely describes the picture painted by Professor Hart as "frightening, but ...
overdrawn." Ely, supra note 2, at 711.
29. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276
U.S. 518 (1928).
30. See 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000).
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States in cases where they apply."3 Under the Act, the Kentucky fed-
eral court had to determine whether the Kentucky common law making
exclusive rights contracts unenforceable was a "law of the several
states" and as such, had to be regarded as a "rule of decision" in the
case. Over the years, the phrase, "laws of the several states," has proved
notoriously difficult to interpret,32 but at that time, the controlling prece-
dent was the 1842 Supreme Court case of Swift v. Tyson.33 In Swift, the
Court had held that "laws of the several states" referred to "state laws
strictly local, that is to say, to the positive statutes of the state, and the
construction thereof adopted by the local tribunals, and to rights and
titles to ... real estate, and other matters immovable and intraterritorial
in their nature and character."34
The phrase did not include:
questions of a more general nature, not at all dependent upon local
statutes or local usages of a fixed and permanent operation, as, for
example .... the construction of ordinary contracts or other written
instruments, and especially... questions of general commercial law,
where the state tribunals are called upon to perform the like functions
as ourselves, that is, to ascertain upon general -reasoning and legal
analogies, what is the true exposition of the contract or instrument, or
what is the just rule furnished by the principles of commercial law to
govern the case.35
Following Swift, the federal court in the Black & White Taxicab case
determined that the Rules of Decision Act did not command the applica-
tion of Kentucky common law. Instead, the question of the validity of
an exclusive rights contract was one of general jurisprudence, and as
such, the federal court was "free to exercise an independent judgment as
to what the common law of the state [was] - or should be . ... ""
31. Id. In a 1948 revision of the statute, the phrase "civil actions" was substituted for "trials
at common law."
32. In Charles Alan Wright's view "no issue in the whole field of federal jurisprudence has
been more difficult than determining the meaning of this statute." See WRIGHT, supra note 8, at
369 (referring to the Rules of Decision Act).
33. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842). There were earlier attempts to interpret "laws of the
several states," but as Professor Wright explains, these "decisions ... were neither consistent nor
considered.., the first attempt at a definitive answer was in 1842 in the celebrated case of Swift
v. Tyson." WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 369-70. The correct spelling of the defendant's name was
Tysen. Id. at 370 n.5.
34. Swift, 41 U.S. at 18.
35. Id. at 18-19.
36. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71 (1938). Eventually this led to a state of
affairs in which "federal courts assumed, in the broad field of 'general law,' the power to declare
rules of decision which Congress was confessedly without power to enact as statutes." Id. at 72.
In theory, state statutes were protected against this federal judicial imperialism by the prevailing
jurisprudential framework within which the Rules of Decision Act was interpreted. If general law
existed as a "brooding omnipresence of reason" and was discovered rather than made by both state
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"General jurisprudeace" (also described as "federal general com-
mon law" or "general law"), is a difficult-to-explain concept that was
controversial even in its own time.37 This jurisprudential theory was on
its way out even as it was used to decide cases like Black & White
Taxicab. In a few years Erie would drive another nail in its coffin and
relegate this so-called "brooding omnipresence of reason" view of law to
the category of jurisprudence past. 38 During its one-hundred year reign,
however, this theory authorized the federal courts to determine for them-
selves the content of most common law rules, without regard for what
the highest courts of the various states had to say. So elastic a concep-
tion of federal law virtually guaranteed interpretive conflicts between
state and federal courts over the extent of federal judicial power and the
relationship of that power to the reserved powers of the states. This
conflict is the animating force at the heart of the Erie/Hanna doctrine.
A. Erie
Swift was criticized from its inception, even by those resigned to
and federal judges, then federal judges could "discover" it directly for themselves. There was no
need to go through state judges. As the Court said:
It never has been supposed by us, that the [Decision Act] did apply, or was designed
to apply, to questions of a more general nature . . . where the state tribunals are
called upon to perform the like functions as ourselves, that is, to ascertain upon
general reasoning and legal analogies, ... what is the just rule furnished by the
principles of ... law to govern the case.
Id. at 71-72. A state could modify the received wisdom of the general law if it wanted to,
however, and it did this through its legislature, by enacting statutes. Federal courts were supposed
to respect these modifications by enforcing state statutes, but often this respect was shown more in
the breach than the observance. This resulted, the Court said:
from the broad province accorded to the so-called 'general law' . . . . '[Gleneral
law' was held to include the obligations under contracts entered into and to be
performed within the state, the extent to which a carrier operating within a state may
stipulate for exemption from liability for his own negligence or that of his
employee; the liability for torts committed within the state upon persons resident or
property located there, even where the question of liability depended upon the scope
of a property right conferred by the state; and the right to exemplary or punitive
damages. Furthermore, state decisions construing local deeds, mineral
conveyances, and even devises of real estate, were disregarded.
Id. at 75-76. To paraphrase Woody Allen, when general law and local law lay down together,
local law didn't get much sleep.
37. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., COLIN C. TArr & WIIAM A. FLETCHER, PLEADING AND
PROCEDURE, STATE AND FEDERAL: CASES AND MATERIALS 484-85 (8th ed. 1999) (describing
"general law").
38. See Erwin Chemeinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term: Foreward: The Vanishing
Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REv. 43, 65-67 (1989) (describing the Supreme Court's commitment
to a natural law jurisprudence that regarded law as a brooding omnipresence of reason); William
E. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement Upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in
Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REv. 513, 525-32 (1974) (arguing that opposition to
slavery in late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries intensified judicial belief in natural rights
doctrines).
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live with it but not inclined to extend it,3 9 but it was not overruled until
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.4" Erie, once described as "one of the
most important cases at law in American legal history,"'" is the first of
four Supreme Court decisions handed down over a period of almost
thirty years which collectively articulate the core of the Erie/Hanna doc-
trine. Factually, the Erie case involved a simple railroad tort. Harry
Tompkins was struck "by something which looked like a door projecting
from one of the moving cars" of the Erie Railroad Company while walk-
ing home late at night on a footpath running alongside the railroad's
tracks.42 Tompkins sued the Railroad for negligence in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Tompkins
claimed that he rightfully occupied the footpath as a licensee of the Rail-
road and was thus owed a duty of ordinary care under the general law
(i.e., federal common law). The Railroad denied liability and argued
that its duty to Tompkins should be determined in accordance with
Pennsylvania common law as declared by that state's highest court.
Under Pennsylvania law persons who used longitudinal pathways along-
side railroad rights of way were deemed to be trespassers to whom rail-
roads had a duty to avoid only wanton and willful negligence. Thus
defined, the same issue emerged in Erie as in the Swift and Black &
White Taxicab cases: must a federal court sitting in diversity under the
command of the Rules of Decision Act apply the common law as
39. See, e.g., Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer
Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532-36 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that he would not disturb the
doctrine of Swift v. Tyson but would not extend it into new fields); see also Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co.
v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 391-411 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting) (arguing that the doctrine of Swift v.
Tyson was unconstitutional, but acquiescing in the application of the doctrine thereafter).
40. Erie, 304 U.S. at 77-80.
41. See Hugo Black, Address, 13 Mo. B. J. 173, 174 (1942). The decision was not noticed
when it was first announced, but eight days later Justice Stone wrote to Arthur Krock of the New
York Times calling Krock's attention to "the most important opinion since I have been on the
court." See Irving Younger, Observation: What Happened in Erie, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1011, 1029
(1978) (citation omitted); see also Bob Rizzi, Erie Memoirs Reveal Drama, Tragedy, 63 HAev. L.
REc., Sept. 24, 1976, at 2. Krock subsequently wrote a column about the decision. Arthur Krock,
In the Nation: A Momentous Decision of the Supreme Court, State "General Law" Supreme, N.Y.
TIMES, May 3, 1938, at 22. Since then the case has been the subject of as much debate as perhaps
any case in the history of the Supreme Court. See, e.g., the Ely-Chayes-Mishkin exchange: Ely,
supra note 2; Chayes, supra note 5; Mishkin, supra note 5; John Hart Ely, The Necklace, 87
HARv. L. REV. 753 (1974); see also, e.g., the Redish & Phillips-Westen & Lehman exchange:
Martin H. Redish & Carter G. Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search of the
Appropriate Dilemma, 91 HARV. L. REV. 356 (1977); Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There
Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 311 (1980); Martin H. Redish,
Continuing the Erie Debate: A Response to Westen and Lehman, 78 MICH. L. REV. 959 (1980);
Peter Westen, After "Life for Erie" -A Reply, 78 MIcH. L. REV. 971 (1980).
42. Erie, 304 U.S. at 69. For a more complete story of the case, see Younger, supra note 41,
and Rizzi, supra note 41. This case serves as a classic example of how not to manage tort
litigation. For a daylight photograph of the scene where Tompkins was struck, see FIELD, KAPLAN
& CLERMONT, supra note 18, at 327.
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defined by the highest court of the state in which it sits (trespasser owed
a duty to avoid wanton and willful conduct), or is it free to decide what
the common law requires under its authority to interpret federal general
common law (licensee owed a duty of ordinary care)?43
"The trial judge refused to rule that the applicable law precluded
recovery," and the jury returned a verdict for Tompkins in the amount of
$30,000, which was affirmed by the Second Circuit.44 The court of
appeals based its decision on the "well settled" principle "that the ques-
tion of the responsibility of a railroad for injuries caused by its servants
is one of general law," and that "upon questions of general law the fed-
eral courts are free, in the absence of a local statute, to exercise their
independent judgment as to what the law is .... -4 According to the
court, the "general law" required that:
[w]here the public has made open and notorious use of a railroad
right of way for a long period of time and without objection, the
company owes to persons on such permissive pathway a duty of care
in the operation of its trains. It is likewise generally recognized law
that a jury may find that negligence exists toward a pedestrian using a
permissive path on the railroad right of way if he is hit by some
object projecting from the side of the train.4 6
The Supreme Court granted the Railroad's petition for certiorari and
reversed.47
The parties probably sensed something surprising was in the works
when the Supreme Court began its opinion: "The question for decision is
whether the oft-challenged doctrine of Swift v. Tyson shall now be disap-
proved." 48 Neither Tompkins nor the Railroad had briefed or argued the
validity of the Swift doctrine, and the issue had not been raised, at least
43. There were other issues in the case. For example, Tompkins denied that Pennsylvania
common law imposed a duty to avoid only wanton and willful conduct, Erie, 304 U.S. at 80, but
for present purposes those issues are beside the point.
44. Id. at 70.
45. Tompkins v. Erie R.R. Co., 90 F.2d 603, 604 (2d Cir. 1937).
46. Id. (citations omitted).
47. Erie, 304 U.S. at 80. During the pendency of the petition for certiorari to the Supreme
Court, Erie Railroad offered to settle the case for $7500, but Tompkins turned down the offer on
the advice of his lawyers, and ultimately took nothing. The actual sequence of events was a little
more bizarre. Not long after the Railroad's motion to set aside the verdict was denied, the owner
of the Hughestown gas station (Hughestown was the town in which Tompkins' accident took
place), reported to Tompkins that a friend of his who worked for the Railroad wanted Tompkins to
know that the Railroad was prepared to pay $7500 to settle the case. Tompkins' lawyer advised
him that the sum was too little for the loss of an arm and recommended that he not take it. The
lawyer worried that Tompkins might give in to the temptation of quick money, so he invited
Tompkins to visit him at his (the lawyer's) home and hid him out for two weeks until the appeal
was well under way. See Younger, supra note 41, at 1021-22.
48. Erie. 304 U.S. at 69.
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not directly, in the petition for certiorari.49 The opinion was structured
as a catalogue of the difficulties with Swift. As the Court explained,
"[e]xperience in applying the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, had revealed its
defects, political and social; and the benefits expected to flow from the
rule did not accrue."'50 The Court also noted the "doubt... repeatedly
expressed as to the correctness of [Swift's] construction [of] section
34,' 5" and the existence of "recent research of a competent scholar...
which established that the construction... was erroneous." 2 While this
characterization of Charles Warren's research, and its implications for
the Rules of Decision Act, was far from self-evident, as many commen-
tators have pointed out,5 3 the problems with the Swift doctrine were real
and substantial.
In addition to introducing "discrimination by non-citizens against
citizens" of the sort illustrated by the Black & White Taxicab case,54
Swift's general law-local law distinction did not result in the sought after
uniformity in the conduct of interstate business that it had been expected
to produce. State courts persisted in reaching their own (different) con-
clusions about the content of common law rules, and "the impossibility
49. See Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie - And of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U. L. REv. 383, 399 n.71 (1964). The Court had given signals that it was prepared to
overrule Swift but the Railroad chose to try to distinguish the case and leave the Swift doctrine
undisturbed. See Younger, supra note 41, at 1027-28. In its brief, for example, the Railroad
stated that it did "'not question the finality of the holding of this Court in Swift v. Tyson...[,]"'
see WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 375 (quoting Brief for the Erie Railroad Company at 27, Erie R.R.
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (No. 367)), and argued instead that Pennsylvania case law
defining the duty owed to a person in Tompkins' position was sufficiently "local" to be
controlling, even under Swift. Id.
50. Erie, 304 U.S. at 74.
51. Id. at 72. (citations omitted).
52. Id. (referring to Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act
of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 51-52, 81-88, 108 (1923)).
53. Many scholars think Warren's work supported a conclusion opposite from the one the
Court described. It may not matter since the Warren reference appeared to be more window
dressing than the actual basis for the Court's decision to overturn Swift. For discussions and
further references, see MARCUS, REDISH & SHERMAN, supra note 15, at 928-29; COUND,
FRIEDENTHAL, MILLER & SEXTON, supra note 24, at 381; HAZARD, TArr & FLETCHER, supra note
37, at 495.
54. In the Court's words, Swift:
made rights enjoyed under the unwritten 'general law' vary according to whether
enforcement was sought in the state or in the federal court; and the privilege of
selecting the court in which the right should be determined was conferred upon the
non-citizen. Thus, the doctrine rendered impossible equal protection of the law.
Erie, 304 U.S. at 74-75. It is not clear how literally the Court intended this equal protection
language. See discussion supra note 26. As Charles Alan Wright (and others) has pointed out,
"[ilt was not until many years [after Erie] . . . that it was first held that the notion of equal
protection binds the federal government as well as the states." See WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 382
n.6 (citations omitted); see also Westen, supra note 41, at 980 n.35 ("Needless to say, in speaking
of 'equal protection,' Justice Brandeis was not referring to the fourteenth amendment (which,
then, applied only to the states) or to any other constitutional limitation.").
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of discovering a satisfactory line of demarcation between the province of
general law and that of local law developed a new well of uncertain-
ties."55 General law also proved voraciously expansive, ultimately
including not only questions of purely interstate commercial law, but
also:
obligations under contracts entered into and to be performed within
the state, the extent to which a carrier operating within a state may
stipulate for exemption from liability for his own negligence or that
of his employee; the liability for torts committed within the state
upon persons resident or property located there, even where the ques-
tion of liability depended upon the scope of a property right conferred
by the state; and the right to exemplary or punitive damages. Fur-
thermore, state decisions construing local deeds, mineral convey-
ances, and even devises of real estate were disregarded.56
Soon, there was little left for state common law rules to regulate, and the
advantage to non-citizens bringing suits in federal courts based on diver-
sity jurisdiction where general law would be applied, became "far-
reaching.
57
Some thought it was possible to avoid these problems by interpret-
ing the "laws of the several states" language in the Rules of Decision
Act to include state decisional law as well as state statutes.58 That way,
federal courts under a federal statutory command would apply common
law rules as declared by the highest courts of the states in which they
sat. This hope proved illusory, however, as long as there remained a
separate category of federal general common law applicable to the same
areas of regulation. Under the rubric of interpreting federal common
law, federal judges would still be free to decide what the common law
required and, if the federal version of common law conflicted with the
state version, federal law would control under the Supremacy Clause of
the Constitution.59 To undo the harms produced by Swift, the Court in
Erie had to reconsider the legitimacy of the federal general common law
55. Erie, 304 U.S. at 74.
56. Id. at 75-76.
57. "The discrimination resulting became in practice far-reaching." Id. at 75.
58. Justice Reed concurred on the ground that Erie could have been decided on just a
statutory rationale, and that it was unnecessary to go into the constitutional problems created by
Swift. See id. at 92 (Reed, J., concurring).
59. For a description of the debate over the complicated constitutional relationship between
federal common law, the Rules of Decision Act, and state law, and a collection of relevant articles
and cases, see MARCUS, REDISH & SHERMAN, supra note 15, at 1005-08; WRIGHT, supra note 8, at
412 n.5. See also Sosa v. Alverez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2770 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(arguing that "[gleneral common law was not federal law under the Supremacy Clause, which
gave that effect only to the Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties," and citing
U.S. CoNsT., art. VI, cl. 2, and Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural
Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1245, 1279-85 (1996)).
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itself. In the most well-known and controversial part of its opinion, that
is precisely what it did.
"If only a question of statutory construction were involved," the
Court began, "we should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so
widely applied throughout nearly a century. But the unconstitutionality
of the course pursued has now been made clear, and compels us to do
so.''6° In ringing language known to almost every American law stu-
dent, the Court announced:
There is no federal general common law. Congress has no power to
declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State
whether they be local in their nature or 'general,' be they commercial
law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution
purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts.6"
It is a "fallacy,"62 the Court explained, to think there is a "transcen-
dental body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory within
it unless and until changed by statute,"63 which federal courts have the
power to interpret directly and independently. The view that common
law originates in a "brooding omnipresence of reason" to which federal
and state courts have equal access must give way to one which sees law
as originating in a "command" of the state. As the Court put it:
'[L]aw in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not exist
without some definite authority behind it. The common law so far as
it is enforced in a State whether called common law or not, is not the
common law generally but the law of that State existing by the
authority of that State without regard to what it may have been in
England or anywhere else .... The authority and only authority is
60. Erie, 304 U.S. at 77-78 (footnote omitted).
61. Id. at 78. The emphasis here should be on the adjective "general." It is clear that federal
courts continued to have common law rule-making power after Erie. As almost every casebook
points out, a federal statute regulating the duty of care owed trespassers on longitudinal pathways
next to interstate railroads (including Tompkins), could almost certainly have been justified by the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution (though the scope of Commerce Clause power is no longer
as extensive as it was once thought to be, see discussion infra note 152). Some books also point
out that on the same day Erie was decided, the Supreme Court held in another case that "whether
the water of an interstate stream must be apportioned between the two States is a question of
'federal common law' upon which neither the statutes nor the decisions of either State can be
conclusive." Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938).
See, e.g., FIELD, KAPLAN & CLERMONT, supra note 18, at 387. Hinderlider is the decision
reported immediately after Erie in volume 304 of the U.S. Reports. What federal courts do not
have, however, according to Erie, is a common law blank check to make rules regulating any and
every kind of subject, irrespective of whether legislative authority over such matters is given to
the federal government in the Constitution. Federal common law power extends to things
interstitial to, supplementary of, and inherent in the nature of federal constitutional power, but is
not a source of all encompassing law making authority.
62. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79.
63. Id. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab &
Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
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the State, and if that be so, the voice adopted by the State as its own
(whether it be of its Legislature or of its Supreme Court) should utter
the last word.'
64
The doctrine of Swift v. Tyson was thus "an unconstitutional
assumption of powers by the Courts of the United States" 65 not because
it "invaded rights . . . reserved by the Constitution to the several
"166 6states, as some argue, 7 but because it "assumed... the power to
declare rules of decision which Congress was confessedly without
power to enact as statutes."68 Nothing in the Constitution authorized the
creation of federal general common law. It was the absence of a consti-
tutional authorization, and not the invasion of an exclusive Tenth
Amendment right of the states to regulate commercial transactions,69
that made the "course pursued" in Swift unconstitutional. It was not
surprising, therefore, that in disavowing Swift, the Court did not hold
section 34 of the Rules of Decision Act unconstitutional. There was
nothing wrong with the statute itself, just the federal general common
law overlay under which it had been interpreted. Once federal general
64. Id. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 533-35 (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(alterations in original)). For an excellent discussion of Erie's attack on the legal philosophy
underlying Swift, see George Rutherglen, Reconstructing Erie: A Comment on the Perils of Legal
Positivism, 10 CoNsT. COMMENTARY 285 (1993).
65. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 533 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)).
66. Id. at 80.
67. See, e.g., WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 410.
Erie and its progeny recognize[d] that the choice of law to be applied in the federal
courts in diversity cases is an important question of federalism, and that the
constitutional power of the states to regulate the relations among their people does
overlap the constitutional power of the federal government to determine how its
courts are to be operated.
Id.
68. Erie, 304 U.S. at 72. That Congress could not enact general law as statutes is not as
simple an issue as the Court makes it seem. See, e.g., WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 384-85
(describing arguments for federal constitutional authority to make "general law"). The Court
could have made its reading of the Constitution clearer than it did. The Erie opinion does literally
say that the Swift doctrine invaded rights "reserved by the Constitution to the several States."
Erie, 304 U.S. at 80. It is this language that those who see the Tenth Amendment as protecting a
fixed enclave of state power pick up on and cite. But the Constitution does not protect a fixed
enclave of state power. See Ely, supra note 2, at 701-06 (describing the difference between an
"enclave" and "checklist" view of the relationship between federal and state power in the
Constitution). The Court does not refer to the Tenth Amendment in its opinion, nor in any other
way make it look as if it is adopting the enclave view of state power. It is quite the opposite.
Throughout the opinion it finds the unconstitutionality of the course pursued by Swift to be based
on the lack of an explicit constitutional authorization of federal power, rather than a violation of
an explicit grant of constitutional state power. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 77-78.
69. This makes the common casebook query, "Which provision of the Constitution did Swift
violate?" beside the point. See, e.g., YEAZELL (6th ed.), supra note 15, at 228; MARCUS, REDISH &
SHERMAN, supra note 15, at 928-30; STEPHEN N. SUBRIN, MARTHA L. MmNow, MARK S. BRODIN
& THOMAS 0. MAIN, CIVn. PROCEDURE: DOCTRINE, PRACTICE, AND CONTEXT 729 (2d ed. 2004).
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common law was eliminated and state decisional law was included
within the "laws of the several states" language of the Rules of Decision
Act,7 there was little left to do in Erie but apply the Pennsylvania "wan-
ton and willful conduct" rule to Tompkins's claim. There was no other
law which might govern. 1 Since the circuit court had not ruled on the
duty imposed by Pennsylvania common law, however, the Supreme
Court remanded the case for further proceedings.72
The Erie decision changed the understanding of the Rules of Deci-
sion Act in many notable ways including eliminating the local/general
and statutory/decisional law distinctions of Swift. However, Erie is most
well known for something it did not do as explicitly. The case came to
be regarded, even in subsequent opinions of the Supreme Court, 73 as
having announced a substance/procedure test for interpreting the Rules
of Decision Act and its well known phrase the "laws of the several
states." That is, Erie was understood to have held that the Rules of
Decision Act required federal courts sitting in diversity to apply state
substantive law and federal procedural law. 74 While the substance/pro-
cedure distinction is a famously difficult one to make operational, as any
first-year law student knows, in a situation like Erie it works perfectly
well. Once the possibility of federal general common law was elimi-
nated, there was only one substantive negligence standard available to
the district court with which to resolve the issue of the railroad's liabil-
ity. No difficult choice had to be made between competing state and
federal tort rules. Erie was a Rules of Decision Act case to be sure, but
it was not a hard one, in the sense that it did not present any of the
difficult substance/procedure choices lurking in the phrase "laws of the
several states," that were to become the Court's standard fare down the
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000).
71. Except, perhaps, New York tort law. But the case's only connection to New York was its
filing there. All of the events giving rise to Tompkins' claim took place in Pennsylvania.
Moreover, the conflicts of laws rules of both Pennsylvania and New York would have applied
Pennsylvania law.
72. Erie, 304 U.S. at 80.
73. See, e.g., Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1941); Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y.
v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105-112 (1945); Gasperini v. Ctr. for the Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415,
427 (1996).
74. This is not a wildly inaccurate way to summarize Erie as the decision does say something
of this sort, but it is not what it says literally. One can extract a substance/procedure test from
Erie by combining Justice Brandeis's statement for the majority, that Congress is powerless to
declare "substantive rules of common law applicable in a state," Erie, 304 U.S. at 78, with Justice
Reed's statement in his concurring opinion, that "no one doubts federal power over procedure,"
Id. at 92. Nonetheless, the opinion itself does not combine these statements, and it would be a
stretch to think of them as the explicit holding of the case. For example, the Rules of Decision
Act, on which Erie is based, makes no reference to procedural law of any kind. Commentators
quickly criticized this introduction of a substance/procedure distinction into the Decision Act.
See, e.g., WRIGrr, supra note 8, at 399 n.5 (listing of "scholarly criticism").
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road. That is why most of the opinion is concerned with explaining the
Court's repudiation of Swift. Erie was only a first draft of the Rules of
Decision Act's standard for determining when a federal court sitting in
diversity must apply state law, however, and like most first drafts it
would soon need to be refined. Difficult issues lay on the horizon, and
the first of them came to the Court a short seven years later in the case of
Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York.75
B. York
York was the first post-Erie case to consider the application of the
Rules of Decision Act to a state law that was both substantive and proce-
dural and thus, not readily classifiable under the Erie test.7 6 Guaranty
Trust Company was appointed trustee for the noteholders of the Van
Sweringen Corporation and charged with enforcing their rights and obli-
gations in the assets of the Corporation. Subsequent to its appointment
as trustee, Guaranty Trust made large cash advances to companies affili-
ated with the Corporation and wholly controlled by the Van Sweringen
brothers. When it became evident that the Corporation could not meet
its financial obligations, Guaranty Trust cooperated in a plan to purchase
the outstanding notes for fifty cents on the dollar and shares of Van
Sweringen Corporation stock. Noteholders who accepted this offer sub-
sequently sued Guaranty Trust for fraud and misrepresentation for fail-
ing to disclose its self-interest in proposing the offer (the Hackner
litigation). The trial court granted Guaranty Trust's motion for summary
judgment against the noteholders in Hackner, and this decision was
affirmed on appeal.77
York owned $6000 worth of notes in the Corporation, which were
given to her by someone who had not accepted the Guaranty Trust
purchase offer. After an unsuccessful attempt to intervene in the
Hackner litigation, she instituted an equity action in New York federal
district court against Guaranty Trust on behalf of the non-accepting
noteholders, for fraud, misrepresentation, and breach of trust. The trial
court granted Guaranty Trust's motion for summary judgment (this time
based on the preclusive effect of York's unsuccessful attempt to inter-
vene in Hackner), but the court of appeals reversed. On appeal, Guar-
anty Trust argued (for the first time) that York's claim was time barred
75. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
76. On its face, the case was complicated by claim preclusion and equity jurisprudence issues
that seemed to limit its value as a Decision Act precedent. For the most part the Court dismissed
or minimized these issues and considered the Decision Act question in its most straightforward
form.
77. Hackner v. Morgan, 130 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1942). The initial case filed in the Southern
District of New York was Eastman v. Morgan, 43 F. Supp. 637 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
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because it was filed after the relevant New York state statute of limita-
tions had run. The court of appeals rejected this argument, holding that
a federal court was not required to apply a statute of limitations that
would govern if the suit had been filed in state court. Because of "[t]he
importance of the question for the disposition of litigation in the federal
courts '78 the Supreme Court granted certiorari "to consider the extent to
which federal courts, in the exercise of the authority conferred upon
them by Congress to administer equitable remedies, are bound to follow
state statutes [of limitations] and decisions affecting those remedies."79
The Supreme Court used its opinion in York to do two things. First,
the Court explained the underlying rationale for the Erie decision in
greater detail, including its all-important shift in jurisprudential thinking
from a "brooding omnipresence of reason" to a command theory of law.
Second, York reformulated the substance/procedure test in more func-
tional terms, so as to counteract the over-inclusiveness problems present
when the test is read literally. The York opinion has a more self-con-
sciously jurisprudential tone than Erie, perhaps because Justice Frank-
furter wrote for the majority. He began by pointing out how the
"policy"8 of federal jurisdiction embodied in Erie:
did not merely overrule a venerable case. It overruled a particular
way of looking at law which dominated the judicial process long after
its inadequacies had been laid bare. Law was conceived as a 'brood-
ing omnipresence' of Reason, of which decisions were merely evi-
dence and not themselves the controlling formulations.81
"[T]he doctrine was congenial to the jurisprudential climate of the
time,"82 because it gave legitimacy to the "attractive vision of a uniform
body of federal law,"83 and allowed federal courts to "ascertain what
Reason, and therefore Law, required wholly independent of authorita-
tively declared State law . , The Court added:
78. York, 326 U.S. at 101.
79. Id. at 99.
80. It is not clear what the Court means by the term policy in this context. Erie was a judicial
interpretation of a statutory command. The source of law in Erie was an act of Congress, not a
judge made common law doctrine, policy, or judicial practice that had grown up over time.
Language of this sort, which is sprinkled throughout the Erie/Hanna decisions, contributes to the
wide variety of beliefs about the nature and origin of the Erie/Hanna rule.
81. York, 326 U.S. at 101-02. (citations omitted). "Brooding omnipresence" was Justice
Holmes' famous sarcasm. See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) ("The common
law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky, but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi
sovereign that can be identified ... .
82. York, 326 U.S. at 103.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 102. Because York was an equity action, the Court also explained that "such
sentiments for uniformity of decision and freedom from diversity in State law" were particularly
attractive "in cases where equitable remedies were sought, because equitable doctrines are so
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this impulse to freedom from the rules that controlled State courts
regarding State-created rights was so strongly rooted in the prevailing
views concerning the nature of law, that the federal courts almost
imperceptibly were led to mutilating construction even of the explicit
command given to them by Congress [in the Rules of Decision Act]
to apply State law in cases purporting to enforce the law of a State."
The difficulty with applying federal law in York, however, was that
"[i]n giving federal courts 'cognizance' of equity suits in cases of diver-
sity jurisdiction, Congress never gave [them] . . . the power to deny
substantive rights created by State law or to create substantive rights
denied by State law."86
Whatever contradiction or confusion may be produced by a medley
of judicial phrases severed from their environment, the body of adju-
dications concerning equitable relief in diversity cases leaves no
doubt that the federal courts enforced State-created substantive rights
if the mode of proceeding and remedy were consonant with the tradi-
tional body of equitable remedies, practice and procedure, and in so
doing they were enforcing rights created by the States and not arising
under any inherent or statutory federal law.8 7
The issue in York then, was whether "the outlawry, according to State
law, of a claim created by the States [is] a matter of 'substantive rights'
to be respected by a federal court of equity . ..or [whether] such [a]
statute [is] of 'a mere remedial character,' which a federal court may
disregard?"88
Problems arise, however, when one tries to answer the question of
whether a state statute of limitations is substantive or procedural, for in a
real sense it is both. Looked at one way, a limitations rule defines a
constituent element of a cause of action (the length of time the cause of
action exists) and thus, is substantive. From another perspective, how-
ever, it is simply a scheduling rule for administering the prosecution of a
claim and thus, is procedural. A state statute of limitations serves simul-
taneously as an element of the claim and a procedural restriction on the
claim's enforcement. It does no good to characterize it in the abstract,
for the characterization depends completely upon the purpose for which
often cast in terms of universal applicability when close analysis of the source of legal
enforceability is not demanded." Id. at 163. The longstanding nature of a separate system of
federal equity jurisdiction seemed to undercut the argument for applying state law in York, but the
Court disagreed. The Court concluded that the failure to apply the state limitations rule would
cause litigants to plead artfully in order to take advantage of federal equity power and in the
process undercut Erie and the Rules of Decision Act. Id. at 103-07.
85. Id. at 102 (citations omitted).
86. Id. at 105.
87. Id. at 106-07.
88. Id. at 107-08 (citation omitted).
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one asks. This problem did not arise in Erie, where everyone agreed
that the Pennsylvania duty of care standard was a substantive rule of law
and the only available substantive rule of law. In Erie the substance/
procedure dichotomy worked perfectly well, but in York it did not.
To apply the Decision Act standard to the York facts, the Supreme
Court had to reformulate the substance/procedure standard. In doing so,
the Court took a functional rather than formal approach,89 since sub-
stance and procedure imply "different variables depending upon the par-
ticular problem for which [they are] used."9 The Court did not reject
Erie or the substance/procedure test, but simply refined them. Its well-
known refinement, the so-called "outcome determination" test almost
got it perfect. The question of whether a statute of limitations "is a
matter of substance in the aspect that alone is relevant to our problem,"
the Court said, is whether it would "significantly affect the result of a
litigation for a federal court to disregard a law of a State that would be
controlling in an action upon the same claim by the same parties in a
State court[.]"'" Erie (and afortiori, the Rules of Decision Act),
was not an endeavor to formulate scientific legal terminology. It
expressed a policy that touches vitally the proper distribution of judi-
cial power between State and federal courts. In essence, the intent of
that decision was to insure that, in all cases where a federal court is
exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of citizenship
of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should
be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome
of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court.
92
The court concluded that when rights under state law are enforced
in federal court, that federal court is, in effect, "only another court of the
State,"'93 and, as such, "cannot afford recovery if the right to recover is
made unavailable by the State." 94 When Congress created diversity
jurisdiction it "afforded out-of-State litigants another tribunal, not
another body of law. The operation of a double system of conflicting
laws in the same State is plainly hostile to the reign of law." 95 When
applied to a state statute of limitations, the Court found the implications
89. In this sense, York, like Erie itself, is another offspring of legal realism and as such, part
of the general movement away from the formalism that represented American jurisprudence in the
first part of the twentieth century.
90. York, 326 U.S. at 108 (citations omitted).
91. Id. at 109.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 108; see also Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956)
("[T]he federal court enforcing a state-created right in a diversity case is... [citation omitted] in
substance 'only another court of the State."').
94. York, 326 U.S. at 108-09.
95. Id. at 112.
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of such a test clear. "[A] statute that would completely bar recovery in a
suit if brought in a State court bears on a State-created right vitally and
not merely formally or negligibly. As to consequences that so intimately
affect recovery or non-recovery a federal court in a diversity case should
follow State law."
96
While York's outcome determination test represented an advance in
the Court's effort to make the Rules of Decision Act operational, it did
not yet express a final understanding of the relationship between state
and federal judicial power contemplated by the Act. For example, the
statement that a federal court enforcing state created rights is "only
another court of the state," produced what came to be called the ventrilo-
quist's dummy objection. 97 As "only another court of the state," a fed-
eral court would have no independent identity or function, contrary to
the sovereign purposes underlying the establishment of the federal court
system. Asking federal courts to act as dummies for state court ventrilo-
quists did not permit the two judicial systems to co-exist as independent
entities. The "only another court of the state" view merely subordinated
one judicial system to the other by asking federal courts to imitate state
courts rather than emulate them.
The outcome determination test had other problems as well. As
many commentators and judges pointed out, an outcome determination
rule taken literally is over-inclusive. All legal rules, procedural as well
as substantive, can affect outcome, especially in the typical Erie situa-
tion. 98 Consider the well known paper size example. 99 A rule specify-
ing the size of paper on which pleadings must be filed is prototypically a
procedural rule. Paper size says nothing about what a party must prove
to succeed on the merits of its claim or which party should win. Further-
more, once complied with, such a rule drops out of a lawsuit as an influ-
ence on outcome altogether. Yet, suppose that in a given jurisdiction
federal courts require that pleadings be on fourteen-inch paper, while
state courts permit either fourteen or eleven-inch paper."° Assume fur-
96. Id. at 110 (citations omitted).
97. The characterization of a ventriloquist dummy was that of Judge Jerome Frank in
Richardson v. Comm'n Internal Revenue, 126 F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 1942). Charles E. Clark, the
principal drafter of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and Frank's colleague on the Second
Circuit also used it. See Daniel J. Meador, Transformation of the American Judiciary, 46 ALA. L.
REV. 763, 766 (1995).
98. See, e.g., WriGrr, supra note 8, at 379.
[If the York test was] applied literally, very little would remain of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure in diversity cases, for almost every procedural rule may have a
substantial effect on the outcome of a case. If the test was not to be carried to its
literal limits, however, there was confusion as to how far it was to go.
Id.
99. See discussion supra note 24.
100. So as to avoid complications involving the Rules Enabling Act and its different definition
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ther that one tries to file a federal action on eleven-inch paper two min-
utes before the clerk's office will close on the last day before the statute
of limitations will run. The clerk refuses to accept the filing because it
is not on fourteen-inch paper. After filing the same claim the next day
on fourteen-inch paper, and in response to the defendant's motion to
dismiss the claim as time barred, one argues that under the Rules of
Decision Act the federal court must apply the state paper size rule
because a failure to apply the rule will result in the claim being dis-
missed, and there is no greater effect on outcome than dismissal. A
version of this argument always will be available in an Erie situation.
The only time a party will argue for the application of a state rule will be
when he or she can no longer comply with the equivalent federal rule. If
the party could comply, he or she would just do that and avoid the extra
expense and delay entailed in defending against the inevitable motion to
dismiss. Yet, a paper size rule is purely procedural because it says noth-
ing, one way or the other, about legal liability. If a federal court must
apply it, the court truly will have become "only another court of the
state."
While easy to show that the outcome determination test, taken liter-
ally, is overinclusive, that does not mean that the test is not essentially
correct, for it is. It captures the core of the federalism concerns at the
heart of the different standards problem the Rules of Decision Act was
designed to resolve. Litigants should not be able to shop for different
justice for the same claims in a single jurisdiction just because they have
access to both state and federal courts. A focus on outcome embodies
that concern directly. Difficulties with the outcome determination test
arise only when the focus on outcome is left unqualified. Then, an out-
come determination test swallows up too much federal law (particularly
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) by requiring the application of
contrary state law in its place. The Court will solve this problem in the
Hanna decision a few years later by adding important refinements to the
idea of outcome determination but it will leave the key idea of effect on
outcome essentially intact. The problem with the York standard then
was not in its central insight, but in the way it translated that insight into
a doctrinal standard. York laid the foundation and provided the intellec-
tual core for a final Rules of Decision Act standard. Because of that,
apart from Hanna, York is the most important of the Erie/Hanna line of
cases.101
of the substance/procedure distinction, suppose also that this is a decisional rule, not part of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Court's local rules.
101. The York decision continues to be the principal authority for the requirement that federal
diversity courts apply state statutes of limitations to claims created by state law, even though the
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C. Byrd
The Supreme Court's next major discussion of the Erie doctrine
came in the confusing" °2 case of Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric
Cooperative, Inc.103 Blue Ridge sold electric power to subscribers in
rural South Carolina. Byrd worked as a lineman for R.H. Bouligny, Inc.,
a Blue Ridge sub-contractor responsible for building new power lines,
reconverting existing lines to higher capacities, and constructing new
substations. Byrd was injured while connecting power lines to one of
the new substations. Byrd sued Blue Ridge in South Carolina federal
district court, alleging that his injuries were caused by Blue Ridge's neg-
ligence. Blue Ridge defended on the ground, inter alia, that Byrd was a
statutory employee under the South Carolina Workmen's Compensation
Act because the work he did was the kind of work done by Blue Ridge's
own crews. As such, he was barred from suing Blue Ridge directly and
had "to accept statutory [workmen's] compensation benefits as the
exclusive remedy for his injuries."1 4 The district court struck Blue
Ridge's statutory immunity defense based on its reading of the Work-
men's Compensation Act and ruled that Byrd was not a statutory
employee under the Act. The case went to the jury on the merits. The
jury found for Byrd, and Blue Ridge appealed. The Fourth Circuit dis-
agreed with the district court's interpretation of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act and reversed. Rather than order a new trial to give Byrd a
chance to offer proof pertinent to its interpretation of the Act, however,
the Fourth Circuit made its own determination that Byrd was a statutory
employee and directed the entry of a judgment for Blue Ridge. 05 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine "whether the Court of
Appeals erred in directing judgment for [Blue Ridge] without a remand
to give [Byrd] an opportunity to introduce further evidence ... to meet
[Blue Ridge's] case under the correct interpretation" of the statute."0 6
Whether a person is a statutory employee under the South Carolina
Workmen's Compensation Act is a question of fact. In the words of the
South Carolina Supreme Court, "it is often a matter of extreme difficulty
to decide whether the work in a given case falls within the designation
of the [Workmen's Compensation] statute. It is in each case largely a
refinement of the outcome determination test developed in the Hanna decision calls this
conclusion into question.
102. Charles Alan Wright calls it "Delphic." See WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 403.
103. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
104. Id. at 527.
105. Id. at 529-31.
106. Id. at 528, 531.
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question of degree and of fact ....", In the case of Adams v. Davison-
Paxon Co., 8 decided several months after the Fourth Circuit's decision
in Byrd,'0 9 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that, contrary to fed-
eral practice, the factual issue of whether a person is a statutory
employee under the Workmen's Compensation Act was to be decided by
a judge and not a jury. The principal question for the Supreme Court to
answer in Byrd, therefore, was whether on remand the federal district
court, under the command of the Rules of Decision Act and Erie, had to
apply the South Carolina Adams rule. Either the Court could decide for
itself whether Byrd was a statutory employee, or it could follow federal
practice and send the question to the jury. Justice Brennan wrote the
opinion for the Court's majority.
Like other well known Brennan procedure opinions, Byrd had a
little something for everyone. 110 Its statement of the Rules of Decision
Act standard was a laundry list of the various ways the standard had
been expressed until then with no new suggestions for how all of these
not fully compatible versions of the standard were to be combined into a
single, coherent rule. The decision arguably was based on four or per-
haps five different, although not wholly discrete, grounds. The first was
the rule announced in Erie, that "federal courts in diversity cases must
respect the definition of state-created rights and obligations by the state
courts.""' This was the substance/procedure test in different language.
Applying this standard, the Court examined "the rule in Adams v.
Davison-Paxon Co., to determine whether it was bound up with these
rights and obligations in such a way that its application in the federal
court is required," and concluded that it was not.' 12 Instead, the Court
107. Marchbanks v. Duke Power Co., 2 S.E.2d 825, 831 (S.C. 1939) (quoting Fox v. Fafnir
Bearing Co., 139 A. 778, 779 (1928)).
108. Adams v. Davison-Paxon Co., 96 S.E.2d 566 (S.C. 1957).
109. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop. v. Byrd, 238 F.2d 346 (4th Cir. 1956).
110. For example, compare Byrd with the decision in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462 (1985), a well-known personal jurisdiction opinion also written by Justice Brennan. The
standard announced in each case takes the form of what might be best described as a sliding scale
relationship between the "real" test, that is, the one articulated in past cases, and a balancing of all
other relevant factors Justice Brennan thought important. (In Burger King the real test was the
"contacts/fairness factors" standard articulated in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286 (1980), and in Byrd the real test was the substance/procedure standard of Erie, as refined
by the outcome determination paraphrase of York).
111. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 535.
112. Id. (citation omitted). This part of the opinion also seems to say that if the Court had
come to the opposite conclusion and determined that the South Carolina rule was substantive, the
federal district court would have had to apply it, other considerations notwithstanding. But later
parts of the opinion seem to conflict with this reading and say that even substantive state law
would have to give way to countervailing federal interests. It is not necessary to resolve this
confusion, however, because of the Court's conclusion that the South Carolina rule was not
substantive.
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held that:
[T]he Adams holding is grounded in the practical consideration that
* . . South Carolina courts [in appeals] from the Industrial Commis-
sion . . . had become accustomed to deciding the factual issue of
immunity without the aid of juries.... Thus the requirement appears
to be merely a form and mode of enforcing the immunity, and not a
rule intended to be bound up with the definition of the rights and
obligations of the parties.113
Under Erie this should have been enough. A federal court need not
apply a state law which provides only a manner and mode of enforcing
substantive rights. Such rules are procedural. Since the Supreme Court
ultimately decided that the district court did not have to apply the South
Carolina rule, this would have been a good place for the opinion to stop,
but the Court (or Justice Brennan), was just getting started. Next, the
Court explained that:
[C]ases following Erie have evinced a broader policy to the effect
that the federal courts should conform as near as may be - in the
absence of other considerations - to state rules even of form and
mode where the state rules may bear substantially on the question
whether the litigation would come out one way in the federal court
and another way in the state court if the federal court failed to apply a
particular local rule. [citing York and Bernhardt v. Polygraphic
Co.]114
This seemed to say that a federal court, under the command of Erie (and
the Rules of Decision Act), must apply state procedural rules, rules even
of form and mode,'1 5 whenever they bear substantially on outcome.
1 16
This was a surprising. Erie made it clear that federal courts have control
over their own procedure and that without such control they could not
operate as a separate and distinct judicial system. After Erie, one would
have thought that a federal court would never have to apply a state pro-
cedural rule, but the discussion in Byrd seemed to say otherwise.
The Court's understandable mistake here was to see Erie and York
as separate and distinct Rules of Decision Act standards, rather than as
successive phrasings of the same standard. In what seemed to be an
113. Id. at 536 (citation omitted).
114. Id. at 536-37.
115. While the Court says that other considerations may override a state rule's effect on
outcome and thus outcome determinative state procedural rules might not have to be applied, the
very act of identifying this possibility implicitly acknowledges that the opposite may sometimes
be the case.
116. The Court's opinion also could be read as saying that a state law that does not bear
substantially on outcome does not have to be applied, even if it is "bound up [in the definition] of
rights and obligations" or substantive under Erie. This possibility is probably only hypothetical,
however, since it is difficult to imagine what such a law would look like.
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effort to give independent significance to everything that had been said
doctrinally up until then, the Byrd court tried to combine York and Erie
into a single, two-part test. 1 7 But in the process it provided for a kind
of York override of Erie instead, suggesting that federal courts must
enforce all state law, including procedural law, if it is outcome determi-
native. York did not intend to override Erie, however, it just intended to
paraphrase it. "Outcome determination" was intended only to restate the
substance/procedure test in a form that allowed it to be applied to state
rules that were both substantive and procedural in the ordinary sense of
those terms. In fairness, it is easy to see how the Byrd Court could have
misread York. York's statement of the outcome determination standard
did say that federal courts must apply state rules that have an effect on
outcome. To read York this literally, however, not only ignored the
Rules of Decision Act context of the case, but it also rendered Erie a
near nullity and undercut other parts of the Byrd opinion inconsistent
with this reading of York. For example, there was no reason for the
Court in Byrd to bother with a substance/procedure analysis of the
Adams rule, as it did in the first section of its opinion, if ultimately the
only important issue was the effect the rule had on outcome. Why not
simply start and finish with the outcome determination question? It
seemed as if the Byrd Court had not yet worked out its final understand-
ing of the relationship between Erie and York.
In deciding Byrd, the Court applied the outcome determination test
to the Adams rule, but in a curiously inconsistent manner. At one point,
the Court acknowledged that in a personal injury action "it may well be
that . . . the outcome would be substantially affected by whether the
issue of immunity is decided by a judge or a jury.""II 8 But later in the
opinion, the Court said that it did not think there was "the strong possi-
bility" that outcome would "be substantially affected by whether the
issue of immunity is decided by a judge or a jury."" 9 It did not say how
these statements were to be reconciled, but it probably did not have to
given its analysis in the next part of the opinion.
In the most difficult to interpret part of the opinion, the Court con-
cluded that the federal district court was not required to apply the South
117. For a similar criticism of lower federal court attempts to combine rather than synthesize
the Byrd and Hanna standards and a description of the confusion this created, see MARCUS,
REDISH & SHERMAN, supra note 15, at 961.
118. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537. This language seems to ignore the York point that it is the nature
of the legal rule, and not the nature of the tribunal, that must have the effect on outcome. York's
language reads, "the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially the same,
so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court."
York, 326 U.S. at 109 (emphasis added).
119. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 539-40 (citations omitted).
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Carolina rule because of "affirmative countervailing consideratioris." 120
The Court's argument was structured logically as follows. Federal
courts serve as an independent system for administering justice to parties
who properly invoke its jurisdiction. "An essential characteristic of that
system is the manner in which . . . under the influence - if not the
command - of the Seventh Amendment, [it] assigns the decisions of
disputed questions of fact to the jury.'"21 Thus, "there is a strong federal
policy against allowing state rules to disrupt the judge-jury relationship
in the federal courts,"' 22 because "state laws cannot alter the essential
character or function of a federal court." 123  The proper inquiry, there-
fore, "is whether the federal policy favoring jury decisions of disputed
fact questions should yield to the state rule in the interest of furthering
the objective that the litigation should not come out one way in the fed-
eral court and another way in the state court."'124  Not surprisingly, the
Court found that the federal policy should not yield.
1 5
While it did not use the term, this part of Byrd is generally regarded
as having "balanced" the federal interest in assigning fact questions to
juries against the interest in having the litigation come out the same way
in state and federal court.' 2 6 In fact, Byrd's claim to fame is for introduc-
ing a so-called balancing test into the Rules of Decision Act analysis.
127
This move, while understandable for reasons I will explain shortly, cre-
ated a number of new problems for the Erie doctrine. Balancing is a
notoriously open-ended and easy-to-abuse standard, a "last refuge of
120. Id. at 537.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 538.
123. Id. at 539 (quoting Herron v. S. Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91, 94 (1931)). This language
suggests that some features of the federal judicial system are so important that they could never be
outweighed or balanced away by a state law, no matter how strong the state interest involved. Yet
at other points in the opinion the Court suggests that the stronger of the state and federal interests
should always prevail. It is not always easy to reconcile various parts of the Byrd opinion.
124. Id. at 538.
125. Id.
126. While this interest is ostensibly that of the states, it also is a federal interest since it traces
its origins to the Rules of Decision Act, a federal statute. Those who believe that the Tenth
Amendment gives states a federal constitutional right to have their substantive law applied in
federal court might see it as a mixed state and federal interest, though for reasons I describe
elsewhere, see infra notes 148-52 and accompanying text, the belief is based on a mistaken
enclave view of the Tenth Amendment.
127. There are different ways of looking at how Byrd balancing is to be done. One could see
the decision as describing a kind of simple-balancing in which state and federal interests of any
kind are considered and weighed, or a kind of two-stage balancing in which only state interests
that are outcome determinative are weighed against federal interests. There is language in the
opinion to support both views. Byrd has one other, lesser claim to fame. It is the only Supreme
Court case, so far as I have been able to determine, in which the names of counsel arguing the case
are doubly alliterative: Henry Hammer for Byrd and Wesley Walker for Blue Ridge. Byrd, 356
U.S. at 526.
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scoundrels" to borrow Samuel Johnson's famous phrase.'28 And it is a
particularly difficult test to apply in a Rules of Decision Act context. As
Charles Alan Wright explains:
[T]here is no scale in which the balancing process called for [by
Byrd] can take place. There is no way to say with assurance in a
particular case that the federal interest asserted is more or less impor-
tant than the interest in preserving uniformity of result with the state
court. Even if there were such a scale, the weights to be put in it
must be whatever the judges say they are.12 9
In addition, neither the Rules of Decision Act nor the Constitution
authorizes balancing explicitly. It is hard to imagine why either would.
If federal courts have constitutional and statutory authority to create
their own procedures, what countervailing state interest could be so
strong as to balance this authority away? If they do not have such
authority, what federal interest could be so strong as to outweigh the
state interest, protected by the Rules of Decision Act, in having state law
apply? No matter how one thinks an Erie/Hanna analysis is grounded,
balancing is difficult to justify.
On the other hand, it is not hard to understand the Byrd Court's turn
to balancing. Balancing can be an undemanding standard. It allows for
a consideration of all factors a court thinks are relevant, yet leaves the
court free to decide how to combine and weigh those factors in reaching
particular results. And it does this without requiring a precise doctrinal
explanation of how the decision is justified. Balancing permits a court
to do the right thing, in other words, while effectively insulating itself
from knock-down criticisms by others who disagree. As a result, bal-
ancing is a hard test to fail, and such tests are attractive by definition.
But in Byrd there may have been something else going on as well.
Recall that the central problem with the outcome determination test was
its over-inclusiveness. All state law is outcome determinative when a
party can no longer comply with federal law, and the Erie issue arises in
only that context. If state law is always outcome determinative in an
Erie context, however, federal law, particularly federal procedure and
the right of federal courts to control their own essential character and
function, is lost. For the Court in Byrd, balancing was simply a way to
reign in the scope of an unqualified outcome determination test. If the
application of state law cut too deeply into things federal, a court could
prevent this by having recourse to "affirmative countervailing federal
128. JAMES BOSWELL, LIFE OF JOHNSON 615 (R.W. Chapman ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1980)
(1775). Johnson was referring to the dishonest expression of nationalistic sentiments to establish
one's patriotism, but using a balancing test to establish the legitimacy of a gut reaction is equally
dishonest.
129. See WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 404.
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considerations." These considerations could provide a counterweight to
the "effect on outcome," and make that concern only one of several fac-
tors to be taken into account in determining whether a state law was a
"rule of decision."'130
While the introduction of balancing to Erie analysis was under-
standable and well intended then, it also was doomed to fail. Balancing
is too crude an analytical instrument to provide any clear and consistent
check on outcome determination analysis and too difficult a concept to
ground in the text of the Rules of Decision Act. The Court would have
been better off trying to combine Erie and York into a single, integrated
test, capable of distinguishing between outcome determinative rules that
are substantive on the one hand, and rules that are procedural on the
other, and to require the application of only the former. This will be
Hanna's contribution to the Decision Act standard, but Hanna was still
a few years away. It is a mistake to criticize Byrd for not being Hanna,
however. Byrd was the Court's first attempt to solve the over-inclusive-
ness problem in the outcome determination standard. It was an interim
draft, and like most interim drafts, it needed more work.
There are those who read Byrd as a constitutional case, grounded in
a Seventh Amendment division of labor between courts and juries.131
The Court itself intimated something to this effect when it described the
federal practice of assigning "under the influence - if not the command
- of the Seventh Amendment .... decisions of disputed questions of fact
to the jury."'32 This language is curiously equivocal, 133 however, and
130. This may be what Subrin, Minow, Brodin & Main have in mind when they refer to Byrd
as rescuing federal practice and procedure from the overly broad sweep of the unqualified
outcome determination test. See SUBRIN, MINOW, BRODIN & MAIN, supra note 69, at 740. These
authors also describe Hanna and Byrd as joined in the task of reigning in York. See id. at 754
(referring to the "ByrdlHanna rescue operation"). Rather than see Hanna as finishing what Byrd
started, they seem to believe that the two cases regulate different domains and articulate
complementary standards; Hanna for cases in which a Federal Rule conflicts with state law, and
Byrd for a case in which a federal practice conflicts with state law. Cf. id. at 736 ("It was left to
the ingenuity of two great Supreme Court Justices to reassert [after York] the independence of the
federal courts in the Byrd and Hanna cases ....").
131. See, e.g., Westen & Lehman, supra note 41, at 346-51 (suggesting that the determination
of whether Byrd was a statutory employee within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation
Act was not a function that the Seventh Amendment allocates to the jury, thus distinguishing
between jury as detective (e.g., what did Byrd do?), and jury as policymaker (e.g., what is
contemplated by the term "employee"?)).
132. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537.
133. Accord MARcus, REDISH & SmRMAN, supra note 15, at 950.
The Court apparently believed that it need not resolve the constitutional question,
because even if the Seventh Amendment did not "command" the result, its
"influence" was sufficiently great to weigh heavily on the federal side of the
balance. [But] [h]ow can a constitutional provision that does not dictate a particular
result nevertheless "influence" the outcome?
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does not help in determining the extent to which the Court relied con-
sciously on the Constitution in reaching its decision. Given the fdct that
the decision was based on other, independent grounds, the Court did not
need to develop its Seventh Amendment analysis to any greater extent,
and it explicitly did not.' 34 This has left generations of commentators
free to disagree about whether Byrd is really a Seventh Amendment case
or not, that is, whether the Seventh Amendment provides a better
grounding for the decision than the one(s) the Court adopted more
explicitly. Without more guidance from the Court however, there is no
way to argue dispositively for this interpretation based on what the
Court said.
Byrd is an important part of the Erie/Hanna line of cases, but not
because it is controlling law as some argue.' 35 Indeed, Hanna effectively
repudiated it as a doctrinal statement.1 36 Nor is Byrd the best way to
formulate the Rules of Decision Act standard as others contend. 137 The
decision is either incoherent or an obfuscation much of the time. How-
ever, Byrd is important because it identified the need for and began the
process of refining the outcome determination test of York. It under-
stood the purpose of the Decision Act correctly to require the same sub-
stantive justice in state and federal courts in the same jurisdiction and
tried to effectuate that policy by combining the idea of effect on out-
come with the idea of substance/procedure to create a doctrinal standard
which protected state and federal judicial interests equally. Yet, because
its solution (balancing) created new difficulties of its own, Byrd's contri-
134. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537 n.10.
Our conclusion makes unnecessary the consideration of - and we intimate no view
upon - the constitutional question whether the right of jury trial protected in federal
courts by the Seventh Amendment embraces the factual issue of statutory immunity
when asserted, as here, as an affirmative defense in a common-law negligence
action.
Id.
135. See, e.g., Richard D. Freer, Erie's, Mid-Life Crisis, 63 TuL. L. REv. 1087, 1107 (1989)
[hereinafter Mid-Life Crisis] ("Most lower courts seem to ignore the Supreme Court's explication
of the twin aims of Erie and continue to apply Byrd."); Richard D. Freer, Some Thoughts on the
State of Erie After Gasperini, 76 TEx. L. REv. 1637, 1647, 1647-51 (1998) [hereinafter Some
Thoughts] ("Byrd set out what is still the Court's fullest explication of a global RDA analysis
.... "); King, Note, supra note 18, at 173-74 ("Gasperini affirmed Byrd's place in the analysis and
clarified how federal courts should perform the balancing test."); MARY KAY KANE, CIVIL
PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL 280-81 (4th ed. 1996) (describing how a federal court should proceed
by means of a four-fold balancing analysis in cases not involving a Federal Rule).
136. See infra notes 166-72 and accompanying text; see also Rowe, supra note 22, at 986-90
and authorities cited therein (discussing the extent to which Byrd survived Hanna).
137. See Some Thoughts, supra note 135, at 1651 ("Byrd gives a sophisticated model" for
determining the applicability of state law in federal court); MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 211-46 (2d ed. 1990) (arguing
for the virtues of Byrd balancing).
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bution is now largely historical. Byrd asked the right questions about
the Act, however, and the next time the Court took up these questions it
was ready to answer them. This was in the case of Hanna v. Plumer.138
D. Hanna
Hanna is the most important of the Erie/Hanna line of cases for a
number of reasons. It comes last among the core cases defining the
doctrine, for one thing, and presumably represents the Court's best
thinking about how the Decision Act should be interpreted.1 39 In addi-
tion, it reconciles the contradictions of the earlier cases, synthesizing
their different formulations of the Act's standard into a new, single, and
coherent statement which has the added benefit of being faithful to the
Act's text because it does not rely on balancing. Hanna's new formula-
tion of the Decision Act standard makes sense as a matter of policy and
provides a workable, clear, and almost algorithmic statement of how to
determine the applicability of state law in federal courts. The Court's
multiple drafts of the Decision Act standard finally produced a winner: a
version of the standard with a legitimate claim to reflective equilibrium.
The only surprising thing about Hanna, given its straightforwardness
and eminent good sense, is that some commentators and judges have
trouble understanding or accepting it.
Like its predecessors, Hanna was a factually unremarkable case.
Hanna, a citizen of Ohio, sued Osgood and Plumer, citizens of Massa-
chusetts, in Massachusetts federal district court for injuries resulting
from an automobile accident in South Carolina, allegedly caused by the
negligence of Osgood. Osgood was deceased at the time of the filing,
and Plumer was the executor of her estate. The controversy in the case
arose over the adequacy of service. Hanna served Plumer in his own
right and as executor for Osgood's estate, by leaving copies of the sum-
mons and complaint with Plumer's wife at the family residence in com-
pliance with then Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(1) (hereinafter
Rule 4). 140 In his answer, Plumer alleged that service was inadequate
138. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
139. There are Erie/Hanna cases decided subsequent to Hanna of course, but none, with the
possible exception of Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996), that makes
any fundamental change in Hanna's interpretation of the Decision Act or Enabling Act, For a
discussion of Gasperini, see infra notes 203-31 and accompanying text.
140. At the time, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 provided:
Service shall be made as follows: (1) Upon an individual other than an infant or an
incompetent person, by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to
him personally or by leaving copies thereof at his dwelling house or usual place of
abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein ....
See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 461. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 has been since amended
substantially.
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because it did not comply with a Massachusetts state rule requiring in-
hand service on executors and administrators of estates. 14' The district
court granted Plumer's motion for summary judgment, concluding that
the adequacy of service had to be measured by Massachusetts law (cit-
ing York). 142 The First Circuit affirmed on the ground that the conflict
between the state and federal rules turned on "a substantive rather than a
procedural matter." '43 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
the question of "whether, in a civil action ... based upon diversity...
service of process shall be made in the manner prescribed by state law or





Structurally, the Hanna opinion breaks down into three separate
sections. The first section articulates an Enabling Act (or Hanna) basis
for the decision and by itself justifies the Court's conclusion. The sec-
ond section responds to Plumer's argument, accepted by the courts
below, that the Decision Act and the Erie doctrine 145 controlled the deci-
sion in the case by showing how this argument was wrong. The third
section returns to and elaborates on the Enabling Act rationale of section
one. While the three sections sometimes bleed into one another and
sometimes loop back on themselves, for the most part the decision is
fairly straightforward and clear. This is no small feat in what by then had
become a very messy area of doctrine. I will take up the sections in
order.
In the first section, the Court explained how the presence of a Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure146 changed the ground rules for determining
the applicable law in a diversity action. Simply stated, the Court held
that when a Federal Rule, validly promulgated pursuant to an act of
Congress that is itself constitutional, is pertinent to the issue before the
federal court, no Erie problem arises. The court must apply the Federal
141. See MAss. GEN. LAWS. ch. 197, § 9 (1958) (current version at MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 197,
§ 9 (2004)). At the time, the law provided, in relevant part, that:
[A]n executor or administrator shall not be held to answer to an action by a creditor
of the deceased which is not commenced within one year from the time of his giving
bond for the performance of his trust .... unless before the expiration thereof the
writ in such action has been served by delivery in hand upon such executor or
administrator ....
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 462.
142. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 462.
143. Hanna v. Plumer, 331 F.2d 157, 159 (1st Cir. 1964).
144. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 460.
145. These are different if one sees the rule in Erie as constitutionally grounded. See infra
notes 65-70, 148-52 and accompanying text.
146. I will use upper case to refer to a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (Federal Rule), and
lower case to refer to a federal common law rule (federal rule), and act of Congress, law of the
United States, federal statute, or some other such term, to refer to federal statutory law.
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Rule. It could not be otherwise under the Supremacy Clause of the Con-
stitution or ironically, under the Decision Act as well.' 4 7 In the face of a
Federal Rule, therefore, a federal diversity court's duty to apply state
law gives way as long as the Hanna requirements of pertinence, validity,
and constitutionality are met. In Hanna they were. As the Court said,
Rule 4 "neither exceeded the congressional mandate embodied in the
Rules Enabling Act nor transgressed constitutional bounds, and that the
Rule is therefore the standard against which the District Court should
have measured the adequacy of the service."
1 48
Those who think of Erie as a constitutional doctrine, grounded in
the Tenth Amendment's grant of reserved powers to the states have
trouble with this reasoning. If the Erie doctrine is constitutional, they
argue, it trumps the Federal Rules, whose force is only statutory. If it
requires the application of all outcome determinative state law, as a lit-
eral reading of York and Byrd suggest, that means that the district court
in Hanna should have applied the Massachusetts service rule, Rule 4
notwithstanding. Both the Massachusetts district court and the First Cir-
cuit relied on a version of this argument to justify their decisions, 4 9 and
Justice Harlan made the argument famous in his concurring opinion in
the Supreme Court. ° But as Ely pointed out, to see Erie as a constitu-
tional doctrine is to misread the Constitution. There is no constitution-
ally fixed area of state regulatory power forever inviolate against federal
intrusion. The Tenth Amendment reserves to the states just those "pow-
147. The Decision Act makes an exception for situations in which the issue before the court is
controlled by another act of Congress. See 28 U.S.C § 1652 (2000) ("The laws of the several
states, except where... Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules
of decision .... ). Rule 4 was promulgated pursuant to the authority of the Rules Enabling Act,
an act of Congress, and thus comes within this exception.
148. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464.
149. The Supreme Court summarized the syllogism at the heart of the argument made by
Plumer, and accepted by the lower courts, in the following fashion:
(1) Erie, as refined in York, demands that federal courts apply state law whenever
application of federal law in its stead will alter the outcome of the case. (2) In this
case, a determination that the Massachusetts service requirements obtain will result
in immediate victory for respondent [i.e., Plumer]. If, on the other hand, it should
be held that Rule 4 (d)(1) is applicable, the litigation will continue, with possible
victory for petitioner [i.e., Hanna]. (3) Therefore, Erie demands application of the
Massachusetts rule. The syllogism possesses an appealing simplicity, but is for
several reasons invalid.
Id. at 466.
150. Id. at 474-78. The fact that Justice Harlan was among those defending the "fixed enclave
of states' rights" view no doubt has contributed to its popularity. See Ely, supra note 2, at 699. In
fairness to Justice Harlan, the Supreme Court had applied Erie outside of the Decision Act
context, see, e.g., Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); Woods v.
Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541
(1949), and he might reasonably have concluded from these cases that the decision was grounded
in the Constitution.
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ers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States . . ,"" This is a grant of residuary power left over
after one determines the scope of federal power. Residuary power is by
definition an amorphous and shifting realm, the content of which
changes as the Court broadens or narrows its interpretation of federal
enumerated power over the years. 152  Ely described the difference
151. U.S. CONST. amend. X. For a discussion of earlier Tenth Amendment jurisprudence
defining the relationship between state and federal power on the basis of principles of state
sovereignty implicit in the constitutional enterprise as originally understood, rather than the
specific language of the Constitution, see Gordon G. Young, Enforcement of Federal Private
Rights Against States After Alden v. Maine: The Importance of Hutto v. Finney and
Compensation via Civil Contempt Proceedings, 59 MD. L. REv. 440, 446-49 (2000); see also New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156-57 (1992).
[T]he Tenth Amendment confirms that the power of the Federal Government is
subject to limits that may, in a given instance, reserve power to the States. The
Tenth Amendment thus directs us to determine . . . whether an incident of state
sovereignty is protected by a limitation on an Article I power.
Id. at 157; see also Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975) ("Congress may not
exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function effectively
in a federal system.").
152. The latest evidence of this broadening and narrowing process is to be found in the
Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence of the last few years. Acknowledging that its
"interpretation of the Commerce Clause has changed as our Nation has developed," United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000), the Court has recently cut back in a decisive and clear
fashion on the scope of federal Commerce Clause authority. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down the 1990 Federal Gun-Free School Zones Act as not supported by
Commerce Clause power); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598 (striking down the 1994 Federal Violence
Against Women Act as not supported by Commerce Clause power). But see Reno v. Condon, 528
U.S. 141, 148 (2000) (finding that vehicle license information is an "article in commerce" and "its
sale or release into the interstate stream of business is sufficient to support congressional
regulation"); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding an Endangered Species Act
regulation that limits taking of red wolves on private land substantially affects interstate
commerce and is thus a valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause authority). In Morrison,
in language eerily reminiscent of Swift v. Tyson, the Court rejected the argument that "Congress
[may] regulate any crime as long as the nationwide, aggregated impact of that crime has
substantial effects on [interstate] employment, production, transit, or consumption." Morrison,
529 U.S. at 615. Such a view, the Court concluded, "[would] completely obliterate the
Constitution's distinction between national and local authority," id., and in effect, give the
Commerce Clause a force analogous to that of federal general common law at the time of Swift.
Since state residuary power exists in a sliding scale relationship with federal enumerated power
under the Constitution, a decision that Congress may not regulate "intrastate violence that is not
directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce," id. at 618,
also is a decision that states may regulate such violence. This is not because such regulation "has
always been the province of the States," id, but because in a sliding scale relationship, when the
authority on one side of the scale shrinks, the authority on the other side expands.
The revival of a states rights perspective on the Constitution also is evident in the Supreme
Court's recent expansion of state immunity from suits in federal and state court. See Seminole
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress has no power under Article I
alone to circumvent Eleventh Amendment restrictions of Article III federal jurisdictional power
and create rights enforceable in federal court against unconsenting states); Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that states are free to refuse to open their own courts to a wide variety of
suits brought against them by persons possessing rights under federal law); Fla. Prepaid
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between a "federal checklist" and "state enclave" view of the Tenth
Amendment in considerable detail, making it clear that no matter how
sincerely and deeply held the belief in a fixed enclave of state power, the
plain language of the Tenth Amendment does not support it.153 For all
of its simplicity, this has been one of the most difficult of Ely's points to
have register.
Determining the pertinence, constitutionality, and validity of a Fed-
eral Rule can be complicated and difficult tasks, though not in Hanna.
Rule 4 was pertinent to the issue before the Court because the issue was
the adequacy of Hanna' s service of process, and Rule 4 is a service rule.
The Enabling Act had already passed constitutional muster in Sibbach v.
Wilson;15 4 and Rule 4 had been held to be "in harmony with the Ena-
bling Act . . ." in Mississippi Publishing Corporation v. Murphree.155
These conclusions are not difficult to understand. The Enabling Act
grants "the Supreme Court ... power to prescribe general rules of prac-
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (holding that Congress
has no power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to expose states to patent
infringement suits in the absence of evidence that the violation of federally created patent rights is
systematic and intentional, and that state law remedies are inadequate); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (holding that Congress has no
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to expose states to unfair competition suits
because unfair competition does not involve a deprivation of property that may be regulated by
Congress under the Fourteenth Amendment); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000)
(holding that provisions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 purporting to
abrogate state immunity are beyond Congress's power of remediation under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding
that states are shielded from suit by disabled workers under the Americans with Disabilities Act
because Congress had not identified a history and pattern of unconstitutional employment
discrimination by the states against the disabled); Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541
U.S. 440 (2004) (holding that a bankruptcy court discharge of a student loan debt does not
implicate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity); Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004)
(upholding a federal bribery law that makes it a crime to give anything of $5000 or more in value
to influence a state or local official). This states' rights perspective has also expanded into the
development of an anti-commandeering principle precluding Congress from compelling states to
enforce federal law. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (invalidating the "take
title" provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985); Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (invalidating provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act). For a self-described "enduring and constructive" manifesto of this new states'
rights jurisprudence, see Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst., 169 F.3d 820, 893 (4th Cir. 1999)
(Wilkinson, C.J., concurring), affd, Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598. For good discussions of this, in
effect, continuation of the National League of CitieslGarcia debate, see Peter M. Shane,
Federalism's "Old Deal": What's Right and Wrong with Conservative Judicial Activism, 45
VILL. L. REv. 201 (2000), and Young, supra note 151, at 446-55. There are other signs, however,
that the federalism revolution of the Rhenquist Court has limits. See Nev. Dep't of Human Res.
v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (permitting employees to sue states under the Family Medical
Leave Act); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (upholding Congress's power to enforce
anti-discrimination laws against the states when fundamental rights are involved).
153. See Ely, supra note 2, at 701-06.
154. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
155. Miss. Publ'g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445 (1946).
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tice and procedure ... for cases in the United States district courts ......
as long as "such rules [do] not abridge, enlarge or modify any substan-
tive right .... 156 Service of process is part of the "practice or proce-
dure of the district courts" since, for the most part, service simply starts
the court's procedural apparatus in motion. It also is not difficult to
understand how the authority to regulate practice and procedure is nec-
essary for Congress to ordain and establish a system of federal courts.
Without control over their own procedure, federal courts cannot be said
to exist in any meaningful sense. As for the question of Rule 4's valid-
ity, a Federal Rule is valid under the Enabling Act, as the Hanna court
famously put it, whenever it regulates "matters which, though falling
within the uncertain area between substance and procedure, are ration-
ally capable of classification as either." '157 A service rule has many pur-
poses such as giving notice to the defendant, limiting the lifetime of a
claim, discouraging certain types of lawsuits, and providing a starting
point for scheduling timetables, some of which are substantive and
others procedural. Since any significant procedural purpose is enough to
satisfy the Enabling Act, Rule 4 qualifies easily as a rule of practice and
procedure. 58
While Hanna is an Enabling (and not Decision) Act case, therefore,
concerned principally with the questions of whether Rule 4 was perti-
nent, constitutional, and valid, in what is regarded as dicta, the Supreme
Court reconsidered and refined the outcome determination test of York.
Ironically, Hanna has perhaps become better known for this refinement
of York (and a fortiorari Erie), than its decision on the merits. The
156. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000).
157. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965). Sibbach offers the not very helpful re-
formulation of the Enabling Act's "practice and procedure" requirement as "whether a rule really
regulates procedure." Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14. Ely's paraphrase of the same requirement is
whether a rule is "designed to make the process of litigation a fair and efficient mechanism for the
resolution of disputes." See Ely, supra note 2, at 724. Justice Harlan inadvertently articulated
perhaps the most well known paraphrase, when he criticized the Court for adopting an "arguably
procedural, ergo constitutional" standard for evaluating Federal Rules. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 476
(Harlan, J., concurring). Stripped of its constitutional underpinnings, this arguably procedural
standard would hold that a rule is one of practice and procedure when it has any significant
procedural purpose or effect.
158. See Ely, supra note 2, at 718-26. The Court famously did not consider the second half of
the Enabling Act test or discuss whether Rule 4 abridged the plaintiffs substantive rights. Id. at
719-20. But if it had, arguments were available to suggest that the Rule did not do either of these.
Id. at 733-37. The point is not without controversy however. See Chayes, supra note 5, at 751-
52. Professor Burbank, in his extensive and highly regarded history of the Enabling Act, argues
that the substantive rights part of the Act's standard was intended as surplusage, that it "served
only to emphasize a restriction inherent in the use of the word 'procedure' in the first sentence" of
the Act. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015,
1108 (1982).
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Court explained, quoting a well known Fifth Circuit case, 159 that "[t]he
purpose of the Erie doctrine ... was never to bottle up federal courts
with 'outcome-determinative' and 'integral-relations' stoppers - when
there are 'affirmative countervailing [federal] considerations' and when
there is a Congressional mandate (the Rules) [i.e., the Rules Enabling
Act] supported by constitutional authority."16 Seeing Erie as a reaction
to the practice of forum-shopping which had developed in response to
Swift, the Court concluded that the outcome determination test had to be
read with reference to "the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of
forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the
laws." '161 As a consequence, Erie required federal courts to apply state
law when "it would be unfair for the character or result of a litigation
materially to differ because the suit has been brought in a federal
court." '162 This twin aims re-formulation of the outcome determination
test, Hanna's most well known contribution to the Erie doctrine, has
proven difficult to interpret. Both commentators and judges give it dif-
ferent readings.163 Reduced to its essentials, it consists of four distinct
ideas, each independently important and all necessary.
The first important feature of what I, following Ely, will refer to as
Hanna's refined outcome determination test, is the requirement that the
outcome determination question be asked about state law, not federal
law or the relationship between the two. A federal court must ask
whether the failure to apply state law will result in the kind of forum
shopping that the Rules of Decision Act is designed to prevent. The
court should not ask whether the application of federal law will
encourage such forum shopping, nor how a federal court should choose
between state and federal law. Hanna did not change the test in this
regard, but over the years courts had slipped into the habit of describing
the Erie issue as a choice between state and federal law, and requiring a
direct collision between the two as a precondition of an Erie problem.
164
159. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d 759, 764 (5th Cir. 1963). It is
interesting that the Court quoted the Lumbermen's case for this proposition rather than Byrd,
which included an almost identical statement. Not using Byrd makes sense, however, if the Court
was trying to repudiate Byrd, not only by expressly disavowing it, but also by refusing to use it as
precedent even for a point still accepted as valid. See infra notes 168-75 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the Court's decision to repudiate Byrd.
160. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 473 (alteration in original).
161. Id. at 468.
162. Id. at 467.
163. See Rowe, supra note 22, at 984-90 (discussing various meanings given to the "twin
aims" formulation).
164. See, e.g., Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1987). It was not until
Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988), that the Court finally acknowledged that a
"'direct collision' between state and federal law" was not a necessary precondition to an Erie
problem. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 26 n.4. The Erie question, pure and simple, is whether a state law
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Hanna itself, in fact, used the language of "direct collision."' 6 5 The
Rules of Decision Act is not a standard for applying federal law, how-
ever, or for choosing between federal and state law. It is a standard for
determining when a "law of the several states" shall be regarded as a
"rule of decision" in courts of the United States. If federal law applies
to an issue before the court, it is because the law is pertinent and consti-
tutional. The Rules of Decision Act adds no force to a pertinent and
constitutional federal law. Such a law governs because its own terms
require it and because there can be no superior law. Most of the time
asking whether state or federal law applies will involve substantially the
same inquiry as asking whether state law applies, but occasionally it will
not as, for example, when there is no qualifying federal or state law on
point and a court has to make a common law rule to dispose of the issue
or simply deny relief to the party relying on the rule. It is important
then, to ask the Erie question in the form the Rules of Decision Act
frames it.
The second feature of Hanna's refined version of the outcome
determination test, and probably its most important contribution since it
solved the problem of overinclusiveness that had plagued the Erie stan-
dard since York, is what might be thought of as an ex ante requirement.
Roughly stated, the ex ante requirement asks a federal court to consider
whether the application of state law will encourage forum shopping for
character or result as of the beginning of the lawsuit, when all options
are open and it is still possible for a litigant to comply with both state
and federal law. 166 The ex ante requirement is designed to narrow th6
sweep of the outcome determination test, and to prevent circularity. If
one waits to ask whether state law is outcome determinative when it is
no longer possible to comply with federal law and only the state rule
will preserve the litigant's right to proceed, the state rule will be out-
come determinative by definition. Since an Erie problem arises in only
these circumstances, a test which asks the outcome determination ques-
tion from the perspective of a litigant's present situation rather than from
the perspective of the beginning of the lawsuit, always will find a state
should be considered a "rule of decision" for a federal court sitting in diversity. What other law
might apply in the event state law does not apply is no doubt an important question, but it is not
part of the Decision Act inquiry. The Decision Act speaks only about state law.
165. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472 ("Although this Court has never before been confronted with a
case where the applicable Federal Rule is in direct collision with the law of the relevant State,
courts of appeals faced with such clashes have rightly discerned the implications of our
decisions.").
166. See id. at 469 ( "Though choice of the federal or state rule will at this point have a marked
effect upon the outcome of the litigation, the difference between the two rules would be of scant,
if any, relevance to the choice of a forum.").
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law to be outcome determinative.
67
Closely related to the ex ante requirement is Hanna's third refine-
ment of the outcome determination test. The question of whether the
failure to apply state law will encourage a litigant to choose or avoid the
federal forum must be seen as a question about a hypothetical, reasona-
ble litigant, and not one about an actual party (usually the plaintiff) to
the lawsuit. The subjective preferences of the particular litigants before
the court cannot control the decision of whether a federal court must
apply state law. The parties will give self-serving answers to this ques-
tion, and understandably so. The forum shopping question is a question
about the nature of state law and not one about the parties' personal
preferences for a forum. It is expressed in the latter terms so as to iden-
tify the features of the state law which help determine whether it should
be regarded as a rule of decision, but this framing of the question should
not be misinterpreted; the outcome determination is a question about
state law, and not one about the actual litigants' forum preferences.
Finally, to be outcome determinative under Hanna's refined ver-
sion of the test, a state law must have an effect on either the character or
result of a lawsuit. A rule, or even more so, a practice, which makes
litigation faster, cheaper, easier to understand, or more enjoyable to
undergo, does not qualify.' 68 State and federal judicial systems can and
will differ in many respects, and often these differences can have a sig-
nificant influence on the decision to litigate in one forum or the other,
but the Rules of Decision Act has nothing to say about most of these
differences. To qualify as a rule of decision, a state law must say some-
thing directly about whether a party will win or lose on the merits of the
dispute. A rule which drops out as an influence on outcome once com-
plied with, such as a paper-size rule, does not affect character or result,
even though, under the right circumstances, such a rule might have a
bigger influence on outcome than a rule of substantive liability. Only a
rule which has a continuing influence on the question of winning and
losing, such as a burden of proof rule, or a liability rule like the negli-
gence standard in Erie, is a rule that affects character or result.
When the foregoing features of Hanna's refined outcome determi-
nation test are combined and expressed in question format, they provide
a near algorithm for doing a Rules of Decision Act analysis. After
167. Id. at 468-69 (finding that if a court waits until only one rule will allow a party's lawsuit
to proceed, "every procedural variation is 'outcome determinative' "). For an excellent critique of
the use of the ex ante concept to identify the difference between substantive and procedural rules,
see Solum, supra note 21, at 16-19.
168. Id. at 467 ("The Erie rule is rooted in part in a realization that it would be unfair for the
character or result of a litigation materially to differ because the suit had been brought in a federal
court.").
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Hanna, a federal court sitting in diversity and presented with an argu-
ment for the application of state law must ask: "Is the state law the type
of law that would cause a reasonable litigant to choose (or avoid) the
state forum at the beginning of the lawsuit when both state and federal
law can be complied with, because of the law's effect on the character or
result of the litigation?" If the answer is yes, then the federal court must
apply the state law. If the answer is no, it need not. This refined out-
come determination test accomplishes what Byrd tried to do with balanc-
ing, that is, reign in the overly broad sweep of an unqualified outcome
determination standard so that it does not swallow up large parts of the
Federal Rules and make federal courts just "other courts of the state."
And it achieves this end without resorting to a hopelessly indeterminate
and subjective standard such as balancing. Thus seen, Erie, York, Byrd,
and Hanna are four variations on a common theme. They consider the
same doctrinal problem and resolve it with increasing degrees of suc-
cess: first, with a general sentiment about the division of labor between
state and federal court (substance/procedure); then with an overly broad
operationalization of that sentiment (outcome determination); next, with
an inadequately qualified version of the operational standard (balanc-
ing); and finally, with a workable test (refined outcome determination).
The only loose end in all of this analysis is the Byrd balancing rule.
Many commentators and judges still question whether Hanna rejected
balancing, and the Supreme Court itself is less than clear about the
answer to that question. Hanna did not overrule Byrd explicitly, but it
also did not have to. Even under a refined outcome determination test,
the South Carolina rule requiring that a judge rather than a jury decide
the issue of statutory immunity did not qualify as a rule of decision. It
was not a liability rule like the negligence standard in Erie, a rule articu-
lating a constituent element of the cause of action like the limitations
rule in York, or a rule changing the type or amount of evidence needed
to prove a prima facie case like the burden of proof rule in Palmer v.
Hoffman 6 9 or the weight of the evidence rule in Gasperini.170 It was, as
the Byrd Court said, a rule providing "merely a form and mode of
enforcing the immunity." 171
That it agreed with the Byrd outcome, however, does not mean that
Hanna agreed with the Byrd rationale. In every way imaginable short of
overruling the decision, the Court in Hanna made it clear that it did not
approve of balancing. The clearest repudiation appears in Hanna's dis-
cussion of the First Circuit's rationale for applying the Massachusetts
169. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
170. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
171. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 536 (1958) (citation omitted).
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service rule. In an unmistakable use of balancing, the First Circuit asked
how important the interests protected by the Massachusetts rule were to
the state.' 72 This confused the Supreme Court; it could not understand
"what sort of question the Court of Appeals was addressing .... "173 As
the Supreme Court saw it, the importance of state interests in the
abstract was neither here nor there in a Decision Act analysis. The
Court explained:
Erie and its progeny make clear that ... the importance of the state
rule is indeed relevant, but only in the context of asking whether
application of the rule would make so important a difference to the
character or result of the litigation that failure to enforce it would...
be likely to cause a plaintiff to choose the federal court.14
In this language, the Court recast balancing in terms of refined outcome
determination to make "effect on character or result" the important con-
sideration and "generalized importance of the state interests" irrelevant.
If a state law does not affect the character or result of the litigation, the
importance of that law to the state is immaterial. Since an inquiry into
generalized importance is relevant only to balancing, by rejecting such
an inquiry the court also rejected balancing.
175
In articulating its new standard for the Rules of Decision Act, it is
significant to note that the Court chose to refine the outcome determina-
tion test of York rather than the balancing test of Byrd. Because there
was no Rules of Decision Act issue before the Court in Hanna, it did
not have to announce a refinement of the Erie test, yet it chose to do so
anyway. It is always hard to be certain about the motives behind gratui-
tous, but considered, dicta. Here the Court simply might have been try-
ing to clear up the considerable confusion the Erie standard had
generated in lower federal court decisions. 176 It no doubt also was
important that the Court now had a formulation of the Decision Act test
that looked as if it would work. The Court had figured out how to
restrict the reach of unqualified outcome determination without resorting
to an open-ended balancing standard. If this is why the Hanna Court
172. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 n.9 (1956).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See MARCUS, REDISH & SHERMAN, supra note 15, at 961 ("What, if anything, is left of
Byrd after Hanna? ... specifically [after] footnote 9 in the Court's opinion."); Arthur R. Miller,
Federal Rule 44.1 and the "Fact" Approach to Determining Foreign Law: Death Knell for a Die-
Hard Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REV. 613, 714-15 (1967) ("Apparently abandoned [in Hanna] ... is
the notion derived from Byrd by several courts and commentators that competing state and federal
practices must be balanced ....").
176. Perhaps the best evidence of this confusion is the fact that two highly respected federal
courts, the two lower courts in Hanna, could not distinguish between a Decision Act problem and
an Enabling Act problem.
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addressed the Erie/Decision Act standard when it was under no obliga-
tion to do so, the only difficult question is why it did not repudiate bal-
ancing explicitly. The answer to this question is not clear. The Court
may have been worried about Gasperini177-type cases down the road,
and wanted to leave itself a doctrinal alternative if it turned out that
refined outcome determination itself needed to be refined. Preserving
doctrinal options is instinctive to the Court and it would not be surpris-
ing if was doing just that in Hanna. In addition, the Court did not know
for certain that it had produced a stable version of the outcome determi-
nation test - that fact became clear only in retrospect as the test held up
under scrutiny. Accordingly, the Court in Hanna may have equivocated
on balancing simply to hedge its bets. Whatever its motives, there can
be little doubt that Hanna repudiated balancing in everything but name.
Since it is now clear that there is no reason to preserve it in any form,
the Court should repudiate Byrd balancing in name also.
E. Garnishes, Flourishes, and Digressions
A number of other Supreme Court decisions expand or contract the
Erie/Hanna doctrine in large and small ways. While none of these deci-
sions works any major change to its central tenets, occasionally they
illustrate what seem to be different levels of enthusiasm on the part of
the Court for using the doctrine. In this section, I describe a few of these
outlier cases and show how they fit within the framework just outlined.
1. RAGAN AND WALKER
First, are two pseudo Erie/Hanna cases, that is, cases which ini-
tially look as if they belong in the Erie/Hanna category but which, on
second glance, do not. These two cases represent a small but important
set of decisions in which the central question seemed to be 78 whether
federal courts should read the Federal Rules narrowly in order to avoid
conflicts with state law. In Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse
Co.,
1 79 and Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.,8 ° the Supreme Court had to
decide whether a federal court sitting in diversity should apply state law
or Rule Three of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter Rule
3) to determine when an action was commenced for purposes of comply-
ing with the state statute of limitations. In each case, state law provided
that the action was commenced upon service,"' and Rule 3 provided
177. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
178. See, e.g., id. at 428 n.7 (citing to Walker and Ragan).
179. Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
180. Walker v. Armco Steel Co., 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
181. Under each state statute, if a defendant was served within sixty days of filing, the action
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that it was commenced upon filing. Each petitioner had filed an action,
but had not served the defendant, within the applicable limitations
period.
Ordinarily, one would not expect identical cases 1 2 out of the
Supreme Court within a thirty year period, but many thought Hanna
overruled Ragan in holding that the Rules Enabling Act, and not the
Rules of Decision Act, was the proper standard for judging the applica-
bility of a Federal Rule. The petitioners in Walker argued this to the
Supreme Court. ' 8 3 The Court rejected the argument, however, and held,
as it did in Ragan, that "the scope of the Federal Rule [is] not as broad
as the losing party [urges], and therefore, there being no Federal Rule
which [covers] the point in dispute, Erie [commands] the enforcement of
state law."' 184 In effect, the Court held that Ragan and Walker were not
Enabling Act cases after all, even though each involved a question of the
applicability of a Federal Rule.' 85 Recall that for a federal court to apply
a Federal Rule in the face of a contrary state law, the Federal Rule must
be pertinent, valid, and constitutional. In Ragan and Walker, Rule 3 did
not pass the pertinence test. As the Walker Court explained, Rule 3 did
not cover the statute of limitations point in dispute.' 86 In the Court's
view, the Rule was not intended "to toll a state statute of limitations,
much less ... to displace state tolling rules .... [It simply] governs the
date from which various timing requirements of the Federal Rules begin
to run ... ,,.8 It was unnecessary, therefore, to ask whether the Rule
was valid or constitutional, for even if it was, on its own terms it did not
apply to the limitations issue before the court. Ragan and Walker are
pertinence cases then, similar to but not the same as Erie/Hanna cases.
Thus they contribute nothing to the Erie/Hanna doctrine as such, save
for a partial glimpse of its outer boundary.
Some commentators question the Court's good faith in grounding
Ragan and Walker on a pertinence rationale. They use the plain lan-
guage of the title to Rule 3, "Commencement of Action," to argue that
was deemed to have commenced at filing even if service occurred outside the applicable
limitations period. See Ragan, 337 U.S. at 531 n.4; Walker, 446 U.S. at 743.
182. The Court called the cases "indistinguishable," in part, because the "predecessor to the
Oklahoma statute [in Walker] was derived from the predecessor to the Kansas statute in Ragan."
Walker, 446 U.S. at 748.
183. Id. at 749 ("Petitioner argues that the analysis and holding of Ragan did not survive our
decision in Hanna."). Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion in Hanna, also concluded that
Ragan was no longer good law. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 476-77 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
184. Walker, 446 U.S. at 750 (alteration in original) (quoting Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470).
185. Or, as the Court put it: "Since there is no direct conflict between the Federal Rule and the
state law, the Hanna analysis does not apply." Id. at 752.
186. Id. at 750.
187. Id. at 750-51.
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the Court willfully blinded its eye to the only reasonable interpretation
to be given to the Rule. But this objection is weak. The Court gives
reasons for its conclusion that Rule 3 is not a limitations rule, and while
one could question the persuasiveness of these reasons, they are sup-
ported by detailed and well worked out arguments. 188 Moreover, there
188. Arguing that "[tihere is no indication that the Rule was intended to toll a state statute of
limitations, much less that it purported to displace state tolling rules," id. at 750-51, the Court
concluded that Rule 3 "governs the date from which various timing requirements of the Federal
Rules begin to run .... Id. at 751. The Advisory Committee Notes' discussion of the Rule was
the only evidence of such intent mentioned by the Court. While that discussion acknowledged
that the question of whether Rule 3 tolled a state statute of limitations could come up, it concluded
only that the answer would "depend on whether it is competent for the Supreme Court, exercising
the power to make rules of procedure without affecting substantive rights, to vary the operation of
statutes of limitations." Id. at 750-51 n. 10. The Notes and the Court in Walker expressed no view
on this question. Commentators question the Court's good faith mostly because they believe this
reading of Rule 3 in Walker cannot be reconciled with the equivalent reading of Rule 4 in Hanna,
asking, for example, "[w]hy is Rule 4 read broadly, making a clash with state law 'unavoidable,'
while Rule 3 is read to incorporate an implied exception for state statutes?" See COUND,
FRIEDENTHAL, MILLER & SEXTON, supra note 24, at 406-07 n.2. One answer is that the two Rules
are not comparable. For example, reading Rule 4 to avoid a clash with the Massachusetts service
rule in Hanna would read Rule 4 out of existence. In Hanna, Rule 4 is a service rule pure and
simple. The issue before the Court in Hanna was the adequacy of service. If Rule 4 did not apply
there, it did not apply anywhere. But the same was not true with respect to Rule 3 in Walker.
Rule 3 had a life of its own as a timing rule, both for other provisions of the Federal Rules and
perhaps federal statutes of limitations (the Court withheld judgment on this issue, see Walker, 446
U.S. at 752 n.14), independently of whether it defined the point at which an action was
commenced for purposes of a state statute of limitations. This, coupled with the Court's
legitimate concern about modifying state substantive law (statutes of limitations were substantive
after York) through a Federal Rule, which would have been contrary to the command of the
Enabling Act, is more than enough to establish the reasonableness of the Court's reading of Rule
3.
Walker also is significant because it is one of the few decisions in the Erie/Hanna line of
cases grounded explicitly in the second half of Erie's twin aims rationale of "inequitable
administration of the laws." See Walker, 446 U.S. at 753 ("[A]lthough in this case failure to apply
the state service law might not create any problem of forum shopping, the result would be an
'inequitable administration' of the law.") (citing Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468). York is another.
Having determined that Rule 3 did not apply, the Court in Walker had to decide whether the Rules
of Decision Act and Erie required the application of the state commencement of the action rule. A
commencement of the action rule is not likely to encourage ex ante forum shopping for character
or result. The rule drops out as a factor in a lawsuit once the suit is filed. Acknowledging this,
see Walker, 446 U.S. at 753, the Court went on to point out that the failure to apply the state rule
would result in "an inequitable administration of the law" because it would keep alive a lawsuit
that would have been barred in state court. Id. There was "simply no reason" for this, the Court
said, "solely because of the fortuity that there is diversity of citizenship between the litigants." Id.
The Court has yet to confront squarely the principal issue raised by the second half of the
Enabling Act standard, namely how to determine when a right is "substantive" and thus not able to
be abridged by a Federal Rule. The issue was raised in Sibbach and Hanna, and the Court ducked
it each time by focusing instead on the question of abridgement (whether the differences between
the state and federal rules were insubstantial or trivial), rather than on the question of whether the
right being abridged was substantive. Ely discusses this point best. See Ely, supra note 2, at 718-
26. Gasperini may begin to deal with the issue, though it is difficult to be certain about anything
in Gasperini. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996); see also Allan
Ides, The Supreme Court and the Law To Be Applied in Diversity Cases: A Critical Guide to the
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is no separate repository of evidence on the Court's motives which one
could consult to test the objection that the Court acted in bad faith. Any
discussion of that issue inevitably must devolve into a "yes, it did - no, it
did not" impasse. Even if the Court used a pertinence rationale in Ragan
and Walker to avoid making a hard Erie/Hanna decision, exercising one
of its so-called passive virtues, it seems best simply to accept this and
move on, and in the process to remove Ragan and Walker from the Erie!
Hanna category of cases. The Court does not duck hard Erie/Hanna
questions often, and no important issue is taken off the table or made
more difficult to resolve with Ragan and Walker out of the picture.
There is simply no reason to fight the Court on this point. Ragan and
Walker are interesting examples of statutory interpretation, not federal-
ism, problems.
2. STEWART
Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.,189 is another pseudo
Erie/Hanna case representative of a small but important group of cases
in which a federal court must determine whether to apply a federal stat-
ute. Stewart, an Alabama corporation, entered into a dealership agree-
ment with Ricoh, a New Jersey corporation, to market the latter's copier
products. "The agreement contained a forum selection clause providing
that any dispute arising out of the contract could be brought only in a
court located in Manhattan."19 After business relations between the
parties soured Stewart brought an action for breach of the dealership
agreement, among other claims, against Ricoh in federal district court in
Alabama. Ricoh moved to transfer the case to the Southern District of
New York under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), or to dismiss for improper venue
under 28 U.S.C. § 1406. The district court denied the motion to transfer
and held that transfer was controlled by Alabama law, which did not
enforce forum-selection clauses. A divided panel of the Eleventh Cir-
cuit, holding that venue was governed by federal law and that forum-
selection clauses were enforceable under federal law,19 1 reversed and
remanded with instructions to transfer the case to the Manhattan
Development and Application of the Erie Doctrine and Related Problems, 163 F.R.D. 19, 82
(1995) ("Substantive law refers to that body of principles designed to regulate primary human
activity; procedural law refers to that body of principles designed to provide a means for
adjudicating controversies over rights derived from the substantive law.").
189. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
190. Id. at 24.
191. The court cited The Bremen for this proposition. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore
Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) (enforcing an explicitly bargained-for forum selection clause in a
commercial contract between two sophisticated companies dealing in international commerce).
For an example of the Court's approach to a more representative form of a forum selection clause,
see Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
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court.' 92 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed on grounds
not relied on by either of the courts below.
The Court's reasoning was straightforward and simple, and it did
not involve an application of either the Rules of Decision Act or the
Rules Enabling Act:
A district court's decision whether to apply a federal statute such as
§ 1404(a) in a diversity action, however, involves a considerably less
intricate analysis than that which governs the "relatively unguided
Erie choice. . . ." Our cases indicate that when the federal law sought
to be applied is a congressional statute, the first and chief question for
the district court's determination is whether the statute is "sufficiently
broad to control the issue before the Court." This question involves a
straightforward exercise in statutory interpretation to determine if the
statute covers the point in dispute.
If the district court determines that a federal statute covers the point
in dispute, it proceeds to inquire whether the statute represents a valid
exercise of Congress' authority under the Constitution .... If Con-
gress intended to reach the issue before the district court, and if it
enacted its intention into law in a manner that abides with the Consti-
",193tution, that is the end of the matter ....
This was familiar reasoning. It tracked quite closely the reasoning used
in Hanna to explain when a federal court must apply a Federal Rule.
The "sufficiently broad" issue identified by Stewart, sometimes called
the scope issue, was a statutory version of the pertinence issue raised
about Rule 4 in Hanna and Rule 3 in Ragan and Walker. The questions
of validity and constitutionality are separate for a Federal Rule, but they
merge into one when asked about a statute, since an act of Congress,
unlike a Federal Rule, is tested directly against the Constitution. Just as
with a Federal Rule, if a federal statue is pertinent, valid, and constitu-
tional, that is "the end of the matter."' 94 There is no higher authority.
The first question in Stewart then, was whether the federal transfer
statute covered the issue before the court. This was an easy question.
"The issue is whether to transfer the case to a court in Manhattan in
accordance with the forum-selection clause."' 95 The Alabama court's
only authority to transfer the case came from the federal transfer statute.
Thus, the statute covered the issue before the court. Since the statute
192. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 779 F.2d 643 (11 th Cir. 1986). The full Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the result and much of the reasoning of the panel opinion. See
Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066 (11 th Cir. 1987).
193. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 26-27 (citations omitted).
194. Id. at 27.
195. Id. at 29.
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also was constitutional, 96 the only remaining question was whether it
authorized the transfer. The text of the statute authorized transfer "[fior
the convenience of parties and witnesses, [and] in the interest of jus-
tice." '19 7 This meant that the statute placed "discretion in the district
court to adjudicate motions for transfer according to an 'individualized,
case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness'" and "to weigh
in the balance a number of case-specific factors" such as "the parties
private expression of their venue preferences."'' 98 At first, the Court
concluded that the transfer statute and the Alabama law were in direct
conflict, and that the Alabama law had to give way,'9 9 seemingly as a
simple matter of Supremacy Clause pre-emption. But then the Court
reversed itself, acknowledging that the two rules "are not perfectly coex-
tensive," and held that "the forum-selection clause . . . should receive
neither dispositive consideration ... nor no consideration ... but rather
the consideration for which Congress provided in § 1404(a)."2 0 As a
"private expression of [the parties'] venue preferences," the Court said,
the clause was one of the many factors which "figures centrally in the
district court's calculus."20 '
This seeming compromise resolution not only failed to solve the
Stewart problem, it made it worse. If the forum-selection clause was
mere evidence of the parties' views on the convenience of the New York
forum, the court would have needed to know what the parties had in
mind in agreeing to the clause before knowing how much weight to give
the clause as evidence of the parties' disposition towards New York. If
Stewart, for example, thought that the clause would never be enforced
196. Id. at 31-32.
The constitutional authority of Congress to enact § 1404(a) is not subject to serious
question. As the Court made plain in Hanna, 'the constitutional provision for a
federal court system... carries with it congressional power to make rules governing
the practice and pleading in those courts, which in turn includes a power to regulate
matters which, though falling within the uncertain area between substance and
procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either. [citation omitted].
[S]ection 1404(a) is doubtless capable of classification as a procedural rule, and
indeed, we have so classified it in holding that a transfer pursuant to § 1404(a) does
not carry with it a change in the applicable law. [citation omitted]. It therefore falls
comfortably within Congress' powers under Article III as augmented by the
Necessary and Proper Clause. [citation omitted].
Id. at 32.
197. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2000).
198. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 29-30 (citations omitted). A court also is supposed to consider "the
convenience of the witnesses and those public-interest factors of systemic integrity and fairness
that, in addition to private concerns, come under the heading of the 'interest of justice."' Id. at 30.
199. Id. ("Our cases make clear that, as between these two choices in a single 'field of
operation,' [citation omitted] the instructions of Congress are supreme.").
200. Id. at 30, 31.
201. Id. at 29, 30.
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by an Alabama court (state or federal) and that agreeing to it was a
meaningless act, he was not necessarily expressing any opinion about
the convenience of the New York forum in signing the agreement. Par-
ties often say things they do not mean when they think they will not be
bound by them, particularly in bargaining situations when they have no
leverage to change the terms of the agreement but still want to make the
deal. If Stewart was wrong about the legal significance of the clause, on
the other hand, and the clause was enforceable, he could have been held
to have expressed the view that New York was a convenient forum, his
mistaken understanding notwithstanding; ignorance of the law is no
excuse. But to know whether this was the case, and thus to know how
much evidentiary weight to accord Stewart's ostensible agreement to the
New York forum, the Court would have had to perform a Rules of Deci-
sion Act analysis of the Alabama law, in order to determine whether a
federal court sitting in diversity had to enforce it. The Court would have
had to resolve an Erie issue, in other words, before it could resolve the
statutory issue incorporating it. Only Justice Scalia raised a version of
these concerns,202 and even he did not play out the analysis to its logical
conclusion. The Stewart case has an embedded Erie issue, therefore, but
the Court's failure to identify and resolve it means that the case has no
value as an Erie precedent. As a consequence, Stewart is a case about
the application of an act of Congress in federal court and comes within
one of the exceptions to the Decision Act command to apply state law.
It is an exception to the Erie doctrine, not an application of it.
3. GASPERINI
Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.20 3 is a complicated and
strange case.2 "4 It is presumptively authoritative since it is the most
202. Id. at 38-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
203. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
204. One of the best indications of Gasperini's difficulty is the way in which the opinion is
edited (or not edited) for inclusion in the casebooks. Almost all of the books reprint the case
nearly in its entirety, unusual for casebooks where space is always at a premium, making
Gasperini the longest case in the Erie/Hanna section of most books. It is as if the casebook
authors are not sure about what parts of the case, if any, will turn out to be important and what
parts are safe to leave out, so they reproduce almost everything. Some of the newer editions have
begun to change this pattern. See, e.g., YEAZELL (6th ed.), supra note 15, at 245 (reducing the
case to one paragraph). Babcock & Massaro reversed this pattern by including Gasperini as a
short blurb in its first edition and a long case excerpt in its second. Compare BARBARA ALLEN
BABCOCK & TONI M. MASSARO, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND PROBLEMS 216-17 (1997)
(hereinafter BABCOCK & MASSARO (1st ed.)), with BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK & TONI M.
MASSARO, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND PROBLEMS 840 (2d ed. 2001) (hereinafter BABCOCK &
MASSARO (2d ed.)). For commentary on Gasperini, see C. Douglas Floyd, Erie Awry: A Comment
on Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 1997 BYU L. REV. 267; Some Thoughts, supra note
135; Wendy Collins Perdue, The Sources and Scope of Federal Procedural Common Law: Some
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recent Supreme Court Erie/Hanna decision and it discusses all (i.e.,
Decision Act, Enabling Act, and Constitutional) of the dimensions of the
doctrine. As a consequence, one might reasonably expect it to articulate
and be based on a mature, complete, and settled statement of the law.
Unfortunately, the Court's analysis is often confusing and strangely
organized, and its description of the relevant legal standards is fre-
quently mixed up. Justice Ginsburg, a new player in the Erie/Hanna
field, wrote the opinion of the Court and gave it many of the idiosyn-
cratic linguistic twists and turns one associates with a new author going
over familiar ground. In the process, she produced the type of precedent
that, in retrospect, often turns out to be either the harbinger of a new
doctrinal order, or an analytical wild card never heard from again; which
one is impossible to say. One can only wait to see what the Court does
with the decision down the road, therefore, to know whether Gasperini
becomes an integral part of a new Erie/Hanna overview, or is forgotten
as a doctrinal frolic and detour.205
Like Erie/Hanna cases generally, Gasperini arose out of a rather
ordinary legal dispute. William Gasperini, a television and newspaper
reporter, sued the Center for Humanities, Inc. (The Center) for losing
three hundred slide transparencies which he had loaned to The Center to
make an educational videotape. He filed his action in the federal district
court for the Southern District of New York, invoked the Court's diver-
sity jurisdiction,206 and based his claim on several state law theories,
including breach of contract, conversion, and negligence. The Center
conceded liability for the lost transparencies and contested only the issue
of damages. The damages issue was tried to a jury, and it awarded Gas-
perini $450,000 by assigning a value of $1500 to each of his slides, the
same amount Gasperini's expert testified was the industry standard for a
lost transparency. The Center moved for a new trial under Federal Rule
59 arguing among other things that the verdict was excessive. The Dis-
Reflections on Erie and Gasperini, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 751 (1998); Rowe, supra note 22; King,
Note, supra note 18.
205. Professor Rowe, for one, thinks that Gasperini "does not appear to mark a major shift in
the Supreme Court's Erie jurisprudence." See Rowe, supra note 22, at 966. Gasperini may also
be evidence that the Erie/Hanna telephone game has come full circle and begun a second round.
The Court's original articulation of the doctrine in the ErielYork/Byrd/Hanna sequence of cases,
as reproduced (and modified) by casebook authors and then repeated (and modified once again)
by lower federal court judges and clerks in new case opinions, may now have been ratified by the
Supreme Court in Gasperini and sent back out for a second turn around the same cycle. It will be
interesting to see what casebook authors and lower federal court judges do with Gasperini this
time around. The decision in Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001),
may provide a clue in this regard, though many of the casebooks do not yet discuss it, and those
that do often say very little about it. See, e.g., YEAZELL (6th ed.), supra note 15, at 250-51.
206. Gasperini was a citizen of California and the Center was incorporated and had its
principal place of business in New York. See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 419 n.l.
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trict Court denied the motion without comment, but the Second Circuit
vacated the judgment and ordered a new trial unless Gasperini agreed to
a remitted award of $100,000.27
The principal question on appeal in the Supreme Court was what
standard the New York federal courts, both trial and appellate, should
use to determine whether the jury award was excessive. A New York
statute authorized state courts to find a jury award excessive only if the
award "deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensa-
tion. '2 8 Adopted in 1986 as part of a series of tort reform measures,
this statute replaced the common law "shocks the conscience" standard
previously in effect in both state and federal court in New York.
According to the Supreme Court, the New York legislature adopted the
"deviates materially" standard to ratchet up excessiveness review and, in
the words of Governor Mario Cuomo, to "assure greater scrutiny of the
amount of verdicts and promote greater stability in the tort system and
greater fairness for similarly situated defendants throughout the
State." 2°9 To decide whether an award "deviates materially" from "rea-
sonable compensation," New York state courts were instructed to com-
pare the award with awards in other, similar cases. Under the "shocks
the conscience" standard, state courts also looked to analogous cases,
but the "deviates materially standard "tighten[ed] the range of tolerable
awards" considerably.21° Whether federal courts in New York should
apply the state statutory standard was unclear however, since the Sev-
enth Amendment to the Constitution, applicable in federal but not state
court, provides that "no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-
examined in any Court of the United States, [other] than according to the
rules of the common law."'21' Because a determination of whether a jury
award is reasonable in comparison with awards found by other juries
arguably involves a re-examination of facts,212 the "deviates materially"
standard presumptively conflicted with the Seventh Amendment, or at
least whether it did was a question the Supreme Court had to resolve.
207. Id. at 420-21.
208. N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW § 5501(c) (McKinney 1995).
209. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 424.
210. Id. at 425.
211. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
212. Justice Stevens disputed this point. While acknowledging that excessiveness review
presents a mixed question of fact and law, he argued that it should be treated as a question of law
since, in making such a decision, a court is required "to construe all record inferences in favor of
the factfinder's decision and then to determine whether, on the facts as found below, the legal
standard has been met." Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 443 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This does not
involve a re-examination of any facts found by a jury, he argued, and thus does not trigger the re-
examination clause prohibition. Id. at 439-48. The majority gave an oblique signal that it might
agree with the general conceptual point, but dealt with the re-examination clause prohibition in
other ways. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 433.
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The Court vacated the judgment of the Second Circuit, holding that
the Erie doctrine required the application of the state standard in federal
court, and instructed the Court of Appeals to remand the case to the
District Court for an application of that standard. 213 But then, in what
can only be seen as an appellate version of a compromise verdict, the
Court also held that in reviewing the District Court's application of the
state standard on appeal, the Second Circuit was bound to follow federal
and not state law. Thus, the Second Circuit could reverse the District
Court's decision only if the latter's application of the deviates materially
standard amounted to an abuse of discretion. 214 As the Supreme Court
explained, "New York's law controlling compensation awards for exces-
siveness . . .can be given effect, without detriment to the Seventh
Amendment, if the [state] review standard ... is applied by the federal
trial court judge, with appellate control of the trial court's ruling [gov-
erned by federal law]. ' ' 1 5 Justices Stevens and Scalia dissented sepa-
rately, and Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined in the
Scalia dissent.
Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion is the most confusing of the
three and also, as the opinion of the Court, the most important. Structur-
ally, the opinion begins in an unusual manner. Ordinarily in an Erie!
Hanna opinion a court takes up the legal questions in a preferred
sequence. First is the question of whether the case can be resolved by
the application of a constitutional rule. If the federal Constitution con-
trols the issue before the court, it does not matter what other federal or
state law may say to the contrary. If no constitutional provision applies,
a court must determine whether a federal statute governs the issue for
decision, as in Stewart. If it does, and the statute is constitutional, the
only remaining question is what the statute requires. No other law can
govern. If neither a federal constitutional provision nor a statutory rule
applies, a court must ask whether a Federal Rule of Civil (or Appellate)
Procedure is pertinent to the issue before it. If yes, the Court then asks
whether that Rule is a valid exercise of Enabling Act authority. As with
a federal statute, if a valid Federal Rule is pertinent to the issue for
decision that is the end of the story. State law cannot apply.21 6 Only
when no valid federal constitutional provision, statute, or Rule governs
213. Id. at 439.
214. Id. at 438-39.
215. Id. at 419. Ironically, Justice Ginsburg fashioned this standard while at the same time
criticizing Justice Scalia's alternative for being "sphinx-like," with a "state forepart [and] a federal
hindquarter." Id. at 439 n.23. This trial/appellate contraption is an indication that Justice Ginsberg
is not averse to constructing a legal satyr of her own.
216. This is true for the simple reason that a Federal Rule is not valid under the Enabling Act if
it abridges substantive rights, including those created by state law.
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does a federal court have to determine whether to apply state law under
the command of the Rules of Decision Act. This is the preferred
sequence of questions in a constitutional system in which federal power
is enumerated and state power is reserved, but unfortunately, the major-
ity opinion in Gasperini has the sequence reversed.
Following the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court characterized the
issue for decision as whether the New York "deviates materially" stan-
dard was substantive or procedural for Erie purposes and concluded that
it was both.2" 7 This being so, "the dispositive question," the Court said,
was "whether federal courts can give effect to the substantive thrust of
[the New York law] without untoward alteration of the federal scheme
for the trial and decision of civil cases." '218 This way of framing the
question is reminiscent of Byrd, in which the interests underlying con-
flicting state and federal rules, each arguably applicable to the case,
were balanced against one another to determine which rule applied.
21 9
Byrd's balancing formulation was abandoned in Hanna, however, so it is
not clear whether the Gasperini Court was reviving Byrd, or whether it
just failed to understand it. In addition, in concluding that the New York
rule was in part substantive, the Court gave the rule a kind of presump-
tive applicability, subject to being overridden only by affirmative, coun-
tervailing federal interests. This manner of framing the issue makes the
regulation of judicial review of jury verdicts a quasi enclave power of
the states. Even if outweighed by federal power, the state rule still must
be taken into account in identifying which excessiveness standard to
apply. But there is no fixed enclave of state power protected by the
federal Constitution; that was one of the lessons of Hanna. States pos-
sess only residuary power not granted to the federal government in the
enumerated powers provisions of the Constitution. Thus, the question of
whether the "deviates materially" standard was substantive should not
have arisen until the Court first determined that no federal rule of any
kind applied.
The Court should have begun its analysis by asking whether the
Re-examination Clause of the Seventh Amendment defines the standard
for federal court review of jury decisions as an essential characteristic of
217. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 426.
218. Id.
219. Several commentators see Gasperini as reviving Byrd balancing. See, e.g., COUND,
FRIEDENTHAL, MILLER & SEXTON, supra note 24, at 422 n.1. But see Rowe, supra note 22, at
1000 ("the Court... in Gasperini has continued to send... the message.., that the place to start
. .is with the Hanna 'twin aims' formulation, and not with Byrd's balancing approach."). The
COUND book also has Gasperini reviving York's outcome determination test, see CouNo,
FRIEDENTHAL, MILLER & SEXTON, supra note 24, at 422 n. 1, but Hanna had already done that.
See discussion infra notes 159-67 and accompanying text.
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the federal court system.22° If yes, as the Court seemed to say, at least
for federal appeals courts,221 then it was beside the point that the New
York excessiveness standard was substantive. If no, as the Court also in
effect seemed to say in regard to federal trial courts, 222 then the Court
needed to ask whether Rule Fifty-Nine of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (hereinafter Rule 59) provided a standard for trial court
review of jury verdicts as excessive, and if so, whether that rule was a
valid exercise of Enabling Act authority.223 Justice Scalia recognized
the importance of Rule 59 and argued at length for its applicability, but
the majority ignored his argument, responding only perfunctorily in a
footnote. 2 4 The majority seemed to believe that it had a duty to accom-
modate both state and federal interests whenever state and federal rules
were arguably on point and the state rule was substantive. The Court did
not indicate from where this duty came, and there is nothing in the Erie!
Hanna doctrine which imposes it.
It would be surprising if the Court intended to ground its decision
on the premise that the Tenth Amendment creates a fixed enclave of
state power to regulate judicial review of jury action. The enclave view
of the Tenth Amendment was Justice Harlan's well known but mistaken
contribution to the Erie/Hanna debate. Justice Ginsburg's respect for
Justice Harlan notwithstanding, the view simply has too much contrary
220. Gasperini discusses this issue but not at the point in the opinion one would have expected.
See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 431 (citing Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525
(1958)); Rowe, supra note 22, at 1002-13 (criticizing Gasperini's "essential characteristic"
discussion as "cryptic or unclear").
221. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 434-35.
222. Id. at 431-33 (concluding that the Seventh Amendment applied to trial courts, but that it
also incorporated state common law standards for court review of jury action).
223. The Court recognized that a pertinent and valid Federal Rule would apply, even in the
face of a contrary state law, but believed that Federal Rules had been interpreted "with sensitivity
to important state interests and regulatory policies." Id. at 428 n.7 (citing Walker v. Armco Steel
Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750-52 (1980)). This seems to be another way of saying that Federal Rules
must be read narrowly in order to avoid conflicts with state law. This view, ironically, is the
opposite of what the Court said in Walker:
This is not to suggest that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to be narrowly
construed in order to avoid a 'direct collision' with state law. The Federal Rules
should be given their plain meaning. If a direct collision with state law arises from
that plain meaning, then the analysis developed in Hanna v. Plumer applies.
Walker, 446 U.S. at 750 n.9.
224. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 437 n.22. Even Justice Scalia cut his Enabling Act analysis short,
arguing only for the pertinence and not the validity of Rule 59, perhaps in response to the
majority's similarly limited argument. The majority argued, in effect, that while Rule 59 permits
a trial judge to set aside a jury verdict for excessiveness, it does not include a separate standard for
determining when a verdict is excessive. Thus, there is nothing in Rule 59 that is pertinent to the
issue of whether the Gasperini jury verdict should be set aside. Justice Scalia may have assumed
that the majority did not contest the validity of Rule 59, but only its pertinence and therefore,
responded in kind.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:475
constitutional text to overcome to be persuasive. Perhaps the majority
opinion was drafted by a law clerk who learned about the Erie/Hanna
doctrine from one of the casebooks discussed in the next section and
never quite understood the lessons of Ely's analysis. 2 5 Or, since the
opinion has the appearance of having been assembled quickly, with a
minimum of research, perhaps the Court was too pressed for time to iron
out what it knew were substantial doctrinal wrinkles.2 2 6 Absent a clearer
statement of its reasoning, however, and a convincing argument for how
its view is compatible with the Constitution, the opinion should not be
interpreted as having resurrected the enclave view of the Tenth
Amendment.227
Gasperini's mixed-up rationale notwithstanding, the decision's out-
come is not necessarily wrong. One could justify the decision on Sev-
enth Amendment grounds, as a case in which the Court, in effect,
concluded that a federal trial court is permitted to re-examine jury ver-
dicts for excessiveness because federal trial courts were permitted to do
so at common law. The Seventh Amendment prohibition on fact re-
examination makes an exception for common law practice. 8 Moreo-
225. Only Justice Stevens cites to Ely, and then only for a scrivener's point. Id. at 440 n.l
(Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority opinion is remarkably thin on citations generally, which is
remarkable only because that is not typical for Erie/Hanna opinions.
226. Evidence of this less than diligent research is apparent in the text of the decision. For
example, the Court quoted the "original" Rules of Decision Act as applying to "civil actions,"
instead of "trials at common law." Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 427 n.6. The civil action terminology
was not added until the 1948 revision of the Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 note (2000) (Revision Notes
and Legislative Reports).
227. For the same reasons, Gasperini also should not be seen as resurrecting Byrd balancing,
though some commentators think it does. See, e.g., King, Note, supra note 18, at 183-84. The
Gasperini majority uses Byrd only to establish the uncontroversial point that the Seventh
Amendment regulates the distribution of functions between judge and jury as an essential
characteristic of the federal judicial system. See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 431-33. Since the Erie
and Hanna decisions are grounded in statutory rules, each is unquestionably subordinate to a
federal constitutional command. Gasperini's use of Byrd therefore, does not modify the Erie!
Hanna doctrine in any way. To conclude otherwise is to make the familiar mistake of seeing the
doctrine as a single, undifferentiated, constitutional rule. See also id. at 427-28 (where the
Gasperini majority leaves Byrd out of its rendition of the history of the Erie/Hanna doctrine and
thereby indicates that it did not view balancing as an integral part of that history).
228. For Justice Stevens, one need not get to the exception clause of the Seventh Amendment
to conclude that the Amendment does not apply. He saw excessiveness review as raising a
question of law rather than a re-examination of fact, and thus as outside the scope of the
Amendment's basic prohibition altogether. See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 441-44 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). While not agreeing with this particular point, the majority agreed that trial court fact
determinations can be so unreasonable as to be wrong as a matter of law. See id. at 435.
Gasperini does make one new constitutional point. The Court holds for the first time that federal
appellate review of trial judge decisions to set aside verdicts as excessive is "reconcilable with the
Seventh Amendment as a control necessary and proper to the fair administration of justice." See
id. Until Gasperini, the Court had not formally approved this widespread lower federal court
view.
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ver, Rule 59, the Federal Rule authorizing re-examination of jury ver-
dicts, does not contain an excessiveness standard itself, making Rule 59
not pertinent to the issue of whether the award is excessive, and a state
excessiveness standard would seem to be outcome determinative in the
refined Hanna sense. If all of this is true, it follows that the federal trial
court must apply the state excessiveness standard. However, federal
appeals courts cannot take advantage of the same Seventh Amendment
exception for common law practice because at common law appeals
courts were not permitted to re-examine jury verdicts.229 Unfortunately,
the Court equivocated in describing the role of the Seventh Amendment
in justifying its decision. 23' Thus, while Gasperini may be best
explained as a Seventh Amendment case, there is not much basis in the
Court's opinion to read it this way.
If Gasperini is not a Seventh Amendment case, it must be either an
Enabling Act case or a Decision Act case, but again the Court did not
say which. On the one hand, if Rule 59 articulates a substantive stan-
dard for re-examining jury verdicts in addition to a procedural standard
permitting such re-examination, Gasperini is an Enabling Act case and
the Court needed to determine whether Rule 59 was a valid exercise of
Enabling Act power. This issue was a principal point of contention
229. See id. at 450-55 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia viewed Gasperini as primarily a
constitutional case. Oversimplifying just a little, his argument went like this: the Seventh
Amendment prohibits federal court re-examination of facts found by juries except as permitted at
common law. A determination that a jury verdict is excessive involves a re-examination of facts.
Federal appeals courts were not permitted to re-examine facts at common law. Thus, the Second
Circuit's decision to set aside Gasperini's verdict as excessive was unconstitutional. One need not
reach any Erie/Hanna issues to resolve the case. For federal trial courts the argument was a little
different. Federal trial courts were permitted to re-examine verdicts at common law so they come
within the exception to the Seventh Amendment prohibition. This review is regulated by federal
law, and the relevant federal standard is that set out in Rule 59. Distinguishing between an
"excessiveness" standard per se, and a "setting aside for excessiveness" standard (a distinction
without a difference the majority might argue), Justice Scalia concluded that while "[sitate
substantive law controls what injuries are compensable and in what amount . . . [Rule 59]
determine[s] whether the award exceeds what is lawful to such a degree that it may be set aside by
order for new trial or remittitur." See id. at 464 (Scalia, J., dissenting). At the trial court level, in
Justice Scalia's view, Gasperini was a Hanna/Enabling Act case involving the applicability and
validity of Rule 59; it did not involve any Erie/Decision Act issue. Although Justice Scalia
discussed the question of whether an excessiveness standard is outcome determinative in the
refined sense, that discussion was not necessary to his analysis. Unfortunately, while he discusses
the pertinence of Rule 59, he did not consider whether the Rule was a valid exercise of Enabling
Act authority (i.e., was it a rule of practice and procedure, and did it abridge substantive rights),
but that may be because the majority did not press this point.
230. Gasperini's reference to "the federal system's division of trial and appellate court
functions [as] an allocation weighted by the Seventh Amendment ... sounds rather like Byrd's
reference to the Amendment's 'influence' along with its dodge of deciding whether the
Amendment in the circumstance before the Court issued a 'command."' Rowe, supra note 22, at
1006 n. 175 (quoting Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958)) (alterations
in original).
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between the majority and Justice Scalia but it was not resolved conclu-
sively. On the other hand, if Rule 59 does not contain a substantive
excessiveness standard, Gasperini is a Decision Act case and the Court
needed to discuss whether an excessiveness standard is outcome deter-
minative in the refined sense described by Hanna. The majority made a
feint at such an argument by analogizing the standard to a damage cap
rule, which everyone agreed was substantive,2 3 1 but Justice Scalia dis-
puted this point.
In the final analysis, Gasperini is a seriously confused decision,
particularly in its description of the relationships among the constitu-
tional, statutory, and rule dimensions of the Erie/Hanna doctrine. It
intertwines Seventh Amendment, Enabling Act and Decision Act issues
in a manner reminiscent of Byrd and repudiated in Hanna and raises
more questions than it resolves. Such an opinion cannot be said, at least
without further development, to represent a change in the doctrinal uni-
verse, especially so longstanding and well-developed a doctrinal uni-
verse as Erie/Hanna. The principal difficulty with Gasperini, therefore,
is in figuring out what it means, not in determining whether it makes a
justifiable change in direction. The decision does not so much develop
and explain the Erie/Hanna doctrine as reflect the confusing state into
which the doctrine has sunk. Lower federal courts have been confused
about Erie/Hanna case law for a long time, but now even the Supreme
Court seems to be in on the confusion. Gasperini is an example of the
excessiveness that has crept into Erie/Hanna opinions over the years, a
kind of overdoing and making a mess out of what, at the core, is really a
rather simple and straightforward set of statutory interpretation ques-
tions. This is ironic, since excessiveness was the legal issue raised by
the plaintiff in Gasperini.
What then can be said about the Erie/Hanna doctrine in general?
First of all, it is more a line of cases than a doctrine, at least if one thinks
of a doctrine as a concept-based, self-contained, court-created rule or set
of rules applicable to a discrete area of legal regulation. If a federal
court sitting in diversity must apply state substantive law and federal
procedural law, the best candidate for a statement of the Erie doctrine,
the source of this obligation is statutory rather than doctrinal. The obli-
231. Id. at 429. ("We think it a fair conclusion that CPLR § 5501 (c) differs from a statutory
cap principally 'in that the maximum amount recoverable is not set by statute, but rather is
determined by case law.' In sum, § 5501(c) contains a procedural instruction but the State's
objective is manifestly substantive.") (quoting Brief for Amicus Curiae The City of New York at
11, Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996) (No. 95-719)).
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gation is located partly in the Rules of Decision Act, not the Erie deci-
sion, because Erie is a gloss on the Decision Act, and partly in the Rules
Enabling Act, not the Hanna decision, because Hanna is an interpreta-
tion of the Enabling Act. There is a constitutional backdrop to the obli-
gation, of course, since all statutes, federal and state, have force only
when they are constitutional. However, the Constitution only permits
the substance/procedure obligation to be imposed; it does not require it.
The obligation itself comes from federal statutes. At a high enough
level of abstraction the Decision Act and Enabling Act converge in a
common purpose: that of prescribing a substance/procedure formula for
federal and state judicial system coexistence within a single geographi-
cal jurisdiction. A common policy concern does not make for a legal
rule, however, and at the foregoing level of abstraction the Erie doctrine
is more a policy than a rule.
The fact that there is no Erie doctrine does not mean that the Erie/
Hanna cases are unrelated or all separate tubs on their own bottoms.
Erie, York, Byrd and Hanna are successive stages in a single, longstand-
ing, interpretive project of the Supreme Court. Collectively, they articu-
late an increasingly sophisticated and ultimately stable interpretation of
the different substance/procedure standards at the core of the Rules of
Decision and Rules Enabling Acts. Throughout this interpretive project,
the Court works with the same legal rules, pursues the same underlying
policy interests, and is constrained by the same background constitu-
tional limitations. The Court attempts to protect the rights of state and
federal courts to create their own distinctive organizational forms, while
at the same time preserve the right of individual litigants using these
courts to be judged by a single, uniform system of justice, one in which
the nature and extent of legal rights and obligations do not depend upon
the fortuity of being in federal or state court. And it does all of this
within a modern legal realist jurisprudential framework, one which sees
law as originating from the command of a sovereign rather than a brood-
ing omnipresence of reason in the sky.
Conflicts between the system-integrity and litigant-fairness inter-
ests protected by the doctrine have arisen over the years. The Court has
resolved each of these conflicts by interpreting the Decision and Ena-
bling Acts in progressively more complicated ways. When an interpre-
tation developed in one context did not work well in another context, the
Court adapted its reading of the statutes to the new situation. For exam-
ple, when Erie's substance/procedure standard did not help categorize
the statute of limitations rule in York, the Court reformulated substance/
procedure in functionalist outcome-determination terms. When an
unqualified outcome-determination test threatened to sweep too broadly
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into the federal domain, as in Byrd and Hanna, the Court reined it in,
first with an overly elastic balancing standard, and then with a refined
outcome determination test. Until Hanna, this interpretive project was
principally a work in progress, with each new decision building cumula-
tively upon those that had come before, preserving what had worked and
modifying what had not. Once the Court happened upon the refined
outcome determination test in Hanna, however, its analysis reached a
stable state. 32 Refined outcome determination deals clearly and fairly
with all types of Erie problems, imagined and real, and needs only to be
understood accurately, not replaced. Conceiving of the Erie/Hanna
cases in this way, as multiple and increasingly sophisticated drafts of the
same interpretive project, each of which tweaks rather than replaces the
legal standard of the previous case, gives the cases an order and coher-
ence they do not have when seen as different and competing formula-
tions of a freestanding Erie rule. For this reason, if for no other, this is
how the cases should be interpreted, studied, and presented in law
school casebooks. But as we shall see in the next section, this is any-
thing but the case.
III. THE CASEBOOKS
There are more than a dozen civil procedure casebooks available
for use in American law schools, 233 each with a section on the Erie!
Hanna doctrine, although the length and sophistication of these sections
varies considerably from book to book. It would be unwieldy to
describe each book's treatment of the doctrine in detail - such a discus-
sion would loop back on itself many times over, and seem interminable
in the process - but fortunately, it is not necessary to do this. With only
a little distortion, the books can be sorted by their emphases into three
232. This is true only with respect to the Erie, or Decision Act, part of the Erie/Hanna
standard. The Court still has quite a bit of work to do explaining the second half of the Enabling
Act standard. See supra note 157.
233. See, e.g., BABCOCK & MASSARO (2d ed.), supra note 204; ROBERT C. CASAD, HOWARD
P. FINK & PETER N. SIMON, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1989); COUND,
FRIEDENTHAL, MILLER & SEXTON, supra note 24; DAVID CRUMP, WILLIAM V. DORSANEO, III &
REX R. PERSCHBACHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE (4th ed. 2001); FIELD,
KAPLAN & CLERMONT, supra note 18; RICHARD D. FREER & WENDY COLLINS PERDUE, CIVIL
PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, AND QUESTIONS (3d ed. 2001); HAZARD, TArT & FLETCHER,
supra note 37; A. LEO LEVIN, PHILIP SHUCHMAN & CHARLES M. YABLON, CIVIL PROCEDURE:
CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 2000); JOEL WM. FRIEDMAN, JONATHAN M. LANDERS & MICHAEL
G. COLLINS, THE LAW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS (2002); MARCUS, REDISH &
SHERMAN, supra note 15; MAURICE ROSENBERG, HANS SMIT & ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS,
ELEMENTS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS (1990); THOMAS D. ROWE, JR.,
SUZANNA SHERRY & JAY TIDMARSH, CIVIL PROCEDURE (2004); SUBRIN, MtNow, BRODIN &
MAIN, supra note 69; LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPH U. WHITrEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE (3d ed. 2004);
YEAZELL (6th ed.), supra note 15. My apologizes to anyone omitted.
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general categories: "old-fashioned" or "traditional," "advocacy," and
"practitioner" formats. A description of a representative book from each
category will give a reader a relatively complete picture of the books as
a whole.
Traditional books present the Erie/Hanna opinions in nearly com-
plete form, as pure data, and with little selective editing or argumenta-
tive notes to suggest correct interpretations. Framed in general terms,
the "Notes and Questions" sections of these books usually ask the reader
to explain or discuss the cases, so that analysis takes its shape almost
completely from the ideas of those carrying on the discussion rather than
the authors of the books.2 34 Advocacy books argue quite straightfor-
wardly for single, correct, but not always identical, interpretations of the
Erie/Hanna line of cases. Perhaps for marketing purposes, to differenti-
ate themselves from competitors, or perhaps for pedagogical reasons, on
the belief that argument is more instructionally engaging than data,
advocacy books leave little doubt about how to interpret the Erie/Hanna
cases. These books give the reader only one option: agreeing or dis-
agreeing. Practitioner books present the Erie/Hanna cases as infinitely
manipulable, capable of multiple and equally convincing, if not always
consistent, interpretations. In a sense, these books combine the qualities
of the first two types by arguing for particular meanings of cases, but in
so numerous and varied a fashion as to cancel out one another and thus
leave readers with the responsibility of determining for themselves what
the cases mean.
Rarely, if ever, does a book fit into just one category. In all of the
books, for example, a note arguing that a case stands for such-and-such a
proposition often is followed by a more open-ended invitation to discuss
or explain the case.235 But any single book is likely to have an overall
emphasis or general spirit, and in that sense, the books break down into
the above categories. I will describe the Erie/Hanna section of a book
from each of these categories and use that book's presentation of the
doctrine to represent the other books of the same type. The three books
I have chosen to represent these categories are widely adopted and thus
234. Traditional books also typically provide more extensive substantive commentary on the
principal cases taken from treatises, law review articles, and other case decisions, than do either
advocacy or practitioner books. For the best example, see HAZARD, TArt & FLETCHER, supra note
37.
235. It is easy to see how multiple-author books could adopt more than one approach to the
presentation of material. If each co-author worked on the entire book rather than on individual
sections, editing and adding to the work of each other co-author from a different theoretical,
pedagogical, or marketing perspective, and if these contributions were not then put into a
proverbial single voice, the effect easily could be a book with a hybrid traditional/advocacy/
practitioner perspective. This format is a little more surprising when it appears in a single author
book.
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presumably of great influence on American procedure instruction. They
also are exceptionally skillful at carrying out their particular
approaches.2 36 Others could and probably would make different, and as
effective, choices.
A. Cound, Friedenthal, Miller & Sexton
Cound, Friedenthal, Miller, and Sexton's Civil Procedure: Cases
and Materials (hereinafter Cound),2 37 now in its eighth edition, is one of
the oldest of the procedure books in continuous existence, perhaps the
most old-fashioned, 239 and one of the most complete,2 40 which is to say
one of the longest. 24' These qualities make it an excellent baseline from
which to compare all casebook treatments of the Erie/Hanna doctrine.
Cound 242 is one of the limited number of books which provides
236. Necessarily, this must mean as I see it. Views about which books are the most skillful
will be almost as numerous as there are procedure teachers in American law schools. Inevitably,
some readers will argue that books I have left out do a better job of presenting the Erie/Hanna
doctrine than do the books I have included. I agree that each book has its strengths and
weaknesses. Some present Erie accurately but not York, while others overemphasize Byrd's
importance but get Hanna's Decision Act/Enabling Act distinction right. Still others understand
the lasting importance of the outcome determination test, but do not recognize Hanna's
refinement of it, and so on and so forth. My judgment about whether to discuss a book at length is
based on my view of the book as a whole, and not on its presentation of any particular part of the
doctrine.
237. See COUND, FRIEDENTHAL, MILLER & SEXTON, supra note 24. A ninth edition of the
book, authored by Professors Friedenthal, Miller, Sexton, and Hershkoff, was published in August
2005, too late for discussion in this article.
238. Authorship of casebooks changes considerably over the years, so that the older the book
the less likely it is to have any connection with its original authors. The oldest book, for example,
is FIELD & KAPLAN, but Professor Field is now deceased and Professor (now Judge) Kaplan is
retired. The COUND casebook, on the other hand, is still written in part by its original authors.
The order of the age of the books is as follows: FIELD, KAPLAN & CLERMONT (formerly FIELD &
KAPLAN) (1952), HAZARD, TAIT & FLETCHER (formerly HAZARD & LouISELL) (1962),
ROSENBERG, SMrr & DREYFUS (formerly ROSENBERG & SMrr) (1962), and COUND, FRILDENTHAL,
MILLER & SEXTON (formerly CouND, FRIEDENTHAL & MILLER) (1968).
239. I do not mean this in any pejorative sense, and it does not seem to have affected sales, as
the COUND book is the second most widely adopted casebook, behind Yeazell, discussed infra Part
II.B.
240. The book devotes fifty pages to the topic of "Statc Law in the Federal Courts," and
another forty pages to the related topics of "Ascertaining State Law," "Federal Common Law,"
and "Federal Law in the State Courts." Only the MARCUS, REDISH & SHERMan book at ninety-
seven pages, supra note 15, HAZARD, TAIT & FLETCHER at ninety-six pages, supra note 37, and
FIELD, KAPLAN & CLERMONT at sixty-two pages, supra note 18, treat the subject in greater or
comparable detail. The Yeazell book, by contrast, devotes only thirty-two pages to the subject
(down from forty-three in the fifth edition). There is no necessary correlation between the age of
a book and length of its Erie/Hanna section. MARCUS, REDISH & SHERMAN, supra note 15, has
the longest Erie/Hanna section but is one of the newest books.
241. HAZARD, TAIT & FLETCHER, supra note 37, is the longest book at 1443 pages, FIELD,
KAPLAN & CLERMONT, supra note 18, has 1486 pages, and COUND, supra note 24, has 1376
pages.
242. I will refer to this and other multi-authored casebooks by the name of the lead author
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sufficient historical context to give the reader a sense of just how radical
a break Erie made with the nearly one hundred year old regime of Swift
v. Tyson.243 Unusual among procedure casebooks, the book quotes the
Swift opinion at length, including its well known jurisprudential premise
that the Rules of Decision Act,
never has been supposed ... to apply, to questions of a more general
nature ... especially to questions of general commercial law where
the state tribunals are called upon to perform the like functions as
ourselves, that is, to ascertain upon general reasoning and legal analo-
gies what is the.., just rule furnished by the principles of commer-
cial law to govern the case. 2"
It also describes the economic, social, and intellectual conditions in
place at the end of the nineteenth century, which had an identifiable
influence on the Court's thinking. These conditions included a rapid
increase in interstate commerce, a corollary demand for a uniform and
stable national law of negotiable instruments, and a prevailing natural
law jurisprudential world view that made the idea of a general law
coherent.24 5 Most procedure books make some reference to these fac-
tors, but Cound describes them in greater detail than most.
The book's nearly verbatim reproduction of the Erie decision is one
of the most complete presentations found in any of the casebooks. In
fact, except for York, the Cound authors omit very little of the Erie/
Hanna decisions. In Erie, for example, each of the key sections of the
opinion - the Court's description of the numerous failings of the Swift
doctrine, the unconstitutionality of the "course pursued" in Swift, and
even the Butler dissent and Reed concurrence, 246 - are reproduced
almost in their entirety. This complete presentation ensures that no
important discussion about the case is foreclosed because the informa-
tion needed to carry it on is kept from the reader.247 The "Notes and
alone. No disrespect of the other authors is intended in the use of this shorthand. It is just that
multi-author references can become cumbersome.
243. HAZARD, TArr & FLETCHER, supra note 37, has the most detailed and informative note on
Swift at six pages, while SuBRIN, MiNow, BRODIN & MAIN is at the other end of the spectrum with
no introductory textual discussion of the Swift decision or the legal era in which it held sway. See
SUBRtN, MINow, BRODIN & MAIN, supra note 69, at 723. The SUBRIN book relies on the Erie
decision's discussion of Swift to inform the reader about the Swift rule. This is ironic, given that
the subtitle to the SUBRiN book is "Doctrine, Practice, and Context." See SuBRIN, MINow, BRODIN
& MAIN, supra note 69. In the Erie/Hanna section of the book at least, there is very little context.
244. COUND, FRIEDENTHAL, MILLER & SEXTON, supra note 24, at 373.
245. Id. at 374.
246. This is important because without Justice Reed's concurrence it is not possible to find a
substance/procedure standard anywhere in the text of the Erie opinion. See Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 92 (1938) (Reed, J., concurring) ("[N]o one doubts federal power over
procedure.").
247. Reproducing the Erie opinion in its entirety is not difficult to justify. The opinion is not
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Questions" following the case are equally comprehensive. Framed gen-
erally, the questions rarely argue explicitly for a particular interpretation
of the case or push particular substantive criticisms of the Court. There
is a tacit, substantive agenda implicit in the decision to ask some ques-
tions and not others, but that agenda is comprehensive enough to raise
all relevant concerns. For example, the first set of questions asks about
Erie's constitutional status, the enclave/checklist debate about how to
interpret the Tenth Amendment, 248 the relationship between the constitu-
tional and statutory justifications for the decision, and the nature of the
constitutional violation in Swift. 2 49 The second set asks about the unfair-
ness problem illustrated by the Taxicab case and whether a better solu-
tion might use the collusive joinder provisions of the United States
Code. 250 The third question set asks about the Charles Warren research
relied on by the Court to support its modified construction of the Rules
of Decision Act and whether that research supports the Court's conclu-
sion.2 1' This combination of constitutional, statutory, and fairness per-
lengthy as modern opinions go, and just about all of it is needed to understand the full import of
the Court's change in course.
248. For a discussion of the enclave/checklist debate see supra notes 148-52 and
accompanying text.
249. COUND, FRIEDENTHAL, MILLER & SEXTON, supra note 24, at 380. Not only do these
questions not suggest their own answers, they may even teach students not to look for clues to the
answers in the structure of the questions themselves as many students have learned to do from
courses preparing them to take standardized tests. For example, the first question after the case,
"Is Erie a constitutional decision or does it rest on other grounds?" is framed as an either-or
choice, but it does not take much thought to realize that it must be answered "yes" and "yes." Id.
If the Swift doctrine is not found unconstitutional the problem will recur as a Supremacy Clause
problem, and if the Rules of Decision Act is not held to include state decisional law, there will be
no authorization to apply the Pennsylvania negligence standard. See discussion supra notes 58-59
and accompanying text. The Erie decision needs both its statutory and constitutional bases to be
fully coherent.
250. See COUND, FRIEDENTHAL, MILLER & SEXTON, supra note 24, at 380-81; see also 28
U.S.C. § 1359 (2000). It is not clear that the actions of the cab company were collusive. The
Black & White Taxicab Company simply re-incorporated in another state, as it had a right to do,
and it did not work in tandem or secretly with any other party to pull this off. If the company
continued to operate from its Kentucky headquarters and existed as a Tennessee corporation in
name only, its actions might be considered collusive, but the court's opinion in the case does not
indicate, one way or another, whether this happened. For a fuller discussion, defending the
actions of the cab company, see John B. Corr, Thoughts on the Vitality of Erie, 41 AM. U. L. REV.
1087, 1106-10 (1992).
251. See COUND, FRIEDENTHAL, MILLER & SEXTON, supra note 24, at 381. Warren's research
purported to shed new light on the question of whether the "laws of the several states" language in
the Decision Act was intended to include state decisional law as well as state statutes. Warren
found a previously unknown draft of the Act which explicitly included "common law now in use"
in the text of the Act. What is not clear, and Warren's research does not help us here, is whether
the more explicit language of the earlier draft was deleted from the Act because Congress thought
the remaining language included state decisional law clearly enough or because Congress meant to
exclude such decisional law from the idea of the "laws of the several states." For discussions of
the Warren research, see supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
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spectives reflects a comprehensive approach to examining Erie and
helps one understand the case in most of its complexity. The section
concludes with a selective list of articles discussing Erie and its
progeny.Z25
The book's questions are queries only in the most general sense.
They identify topics for discussion more than ask specific questions and
are open-ended so as to serve a wide variety of interpretive objectives.
Professors with radically different beliefs about how Erie should be
understood would feel equally unconstrained by the questions' content;
they are elastic enough to pursue any, and every, agenda.253 The only
omission, if it is one, is the book's lack of any substantial inquiry into
the case's jurisprudential dimension. The book largely ignores the
Court's discussion of the shift from a brooding omnipresence to a com-
mand theory of law. This is ironic given the fact that the Cound
casebook provides better background detail for discussing this shift than
most books, but a focus on doctrinal rather than jurisprudential issues is
characteristic of Cound's treatment of the Erie/Hanna subject as a
whole. Jurisprudential issues are not ignored altogether, as this would
be impossible given the content of the cases. But these issues are not
given equal emphasis, and readers are not asked specifically to identify
and evaluate the Court's assumptions about the nature and origins of the
252. This mini-bibliography is sometimes more interesting for what it omits than for what it
includes. While it includes a reference to the Redish/Phillips-Westen/Lehman debate, see supra
note 41, it does not mention Ely's Irrepressible Myth article or the discussion it provoked in the
Harvard Law Review between Professors Ely, Chayes, and Mishkin. See supra notes 2, 5. In one
sense this is understandable. Professor Ely's article is about Hanna as much as Erie and fits as
logically in the notes and questions following the Hanna decision as well as it does here. The
COUND book does quote from it at that point. See COUND, FRIEDENTHAL, MILLER & SEXTON,
supra note 24, at 401. On the other hand, the Redish/Phillips-Westen/Lehman debate is
indistinguishable from that between Professors Ely, Chayes, and Mishkin, so it is not clear why
the book refers to one debate about the meaning of Erie and not the other. Even when the Ely
article is finally mentioned, the responses of Professors Chayes and Mishkin are not.
253. For the best example of a nearly "pure questions" approach to the cases, and one with
almost no commentary to supplement the Erie/Hanna decisions themselves, see SUBRIN, MINOW,
BRODIN & MALN, supra note 69. Compare this approach with other traditional books, such as
HAZARD, TAIT & FLETCHER, supra note 37; FIELD, KAPLAN & CLERMONT, supra note 18; and
MARCUS, REDISH & SHERMAN, supra note 15, where case law excerpts, law review discussion,
and original descriptive and analytical commentary, are used to varying degrees to supplement
questions about the cases. The "Notes and Questions" section of each of these books along with
that of COUND, FRIEDENTHAL, MILLER & SEXTON is filled with interesting and uncommon insights
into the Erie/Hanna cases, as well as a compendium of critical scholarly commentary pointing out
gaps, inconsistencies, and omissions in the Court's reasoning. While sometimes a bit didactic,
and every now and then a little rhetorical, for the most part these "Notes and Questions" operate to
provide rich background detail about what was going on at the time the Erie/Hanna cases were
decided, both inside and outside of the Court, as well as a summary of the best commentary on the
development of the doctrine over the years. The overall effect is to encourage reasoned
examination of the cases rather than simple assent or disagreement with a proffered interpretation.
These books use erudition to its best end.
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Erie rule. This omission after the Erie decision could be explained by
the fact that York discusses the abandonment of the brooding omnipres-
ence view in detail and questions about that topic appear in the section
of the book after York. At other times, however, the authors' reasons are
not so evident.
For York, the Cound book summarizes the facts of the case rather
than quote verbatim from the Court's opinion. Almost every procedure
book provides its own summary of York, if not in the first edition, then
from its second edition onward. Long and complicated, the York litiga-
tion involved numerous parties, extended through several stages, was
carried on in multiple courts, and continued for many years, and these
qualities contributed in major part to the statute of limitations problem at
the heart of the case. One does not need to know most of this procedural
history, however, in order to understand the case's contributions to the
Erie/Hanna doctrine. Cound's summary of the York facts is as accurate
as any and clearer than most. The book errs on the side of being overin-
clusive in deciding how much of York's doctrinal and jurisprudential
discussion to include. The full York opinion has three distinct sections:
an explanation of the shift in jurisprudential philosophy underlying the
move from Swift to Erie, an analysis of the special problems created
under the Rules of Decision Act by an equity action,2 54 and an articula-
tion of the outcome determination re-formulation of the Erie substance/
procedure standard. No book includes all of these sections in their
entirety, and some include only the last. Cound includes a single para-
graph from the opinion on the first of these topics, three paragraphs on
the second, and seven paragraphs on the third, so that, as with its presen-
tation of Erie, the emphasis is placed on York's doctrinal rather than
jurisprudential contributions to the Erie/Hanna standard.
The notes and questions following York address probably the two
most important doctrinal issues in the case: the difficulty of applying a
substance/procedure standard in an equity action where right and rem-
edy interrelate and the problem of limiting the scope of the outcome
determination rule so that it does not require the application of all state
rules, including procedural rules, in federal court. Thought of in another
way, the book's questions ask why York needed to reformulate the Erie
standard and whether its reformulation is the final word. Doctrinally, it
254. At the time of the York decision, the Decision Act command to apply the laws of the
several states was explicitly limited to "trials at common law." See Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99, 103-04 (1945). This seemed to make the statute inapplicable to an equity
action such as York, but the Court ultimately concluded that the statute was not so limited, in part,
because interpreting it in such a fashion would encourage artful pleading and undercut the federal
judicial system's longstanding and independent grant of equity jurisdiction. See id. at 104-07.
Most of the Court's discussion of this point is omitted from the Cound version of York.
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is hard to find two more pressing concerns. The difficulty of applying
the substance/procedure standard also is illustrated by the use of blurbs
from the Ragan, Cohen, and Woods cases 255 - a frequently quoted trio
of post Erie and pre-Hanna decisions in which the Court was still work-
ing out its understanding of the Decision Act and that Act's relationship
to the Enabling Act.256 The risk that an unqualified outcome determina-
tion test would swallow up the Federal Rules is addressed in a quotation
from a 1950 article in which the author unpresciently concluded that
"York ... spelled death to the hope for a completely uniform federal
procedure. '25 7 Each of these excerpts could be discussed in different
ways but again, as throughout this section, Cound merely reproduces the
excerpts and asks "What do you think?" or "Evaluate the following pas-
sage," rather than suggests how the analysis ought to come out.
Byrd is the first real test of a procedure book, not so much for
requiring authors to abridge the case for inclusion in a book, but for
forcing them to take a position on the case's place in the Erie/Hanna
doctrine. By making the Erie/Hanna line of cases more confusing and
the contours of the doctrine more difficult to sort out, Byrd serves as a
litmus test for determining what one understands Erie/Hanna to be
about. It is the decision in which casebook views about the content of
the doctrine begin to diverge. It is also the case where the Cound book
begins, ever so slightly, to abandon its agnosticism about the meaning of
the Erie/Hanna doctrine. Cound includes almost all of the Byrd opinion,
omitting only the Court's description of the lower courts' handling of
the case and its discussion of the history of the South Carolina Adams
rule.25 8 The four or five possible bases for the decision... are described
fully, allowing one to discuss the coherence problems involved in recon-
ciling these sometimes confusing and not always consistent rationales.
255. Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); Cohen v. Beneficial
Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
256. The three cases are all more complicated than this, of course. For example, the excerpt
from Ragan raises the pertinence and validity problems involved when a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure conflicts with a state law. See supra notes 145-47, 152-57 and accompanying text.
Since the three opinions pre-date Hanna, where many of the problems are finally resolved, it is
not clear how much meaning the cases could or should have for the typical law student reader.
The book uses them to illustrate the difficulties of distinguishing between substantive and
procedural rules, but the Court's views on this subject changed substantially in Hanna, which
makes the cases of limited usefulness for this purpose as well.
257. COUND, FRIEDENTHAL, MILLER & SEXTON, supra note 24, at 386 (quoting Edward
Lawrence Merrigan, Erie to York to Ragan - A Triple Play on the Federal Rules, 3 VAND. L. REV.
711, 717 (1950)).
258. Cound also omits the long concurring opinions by Justices Frankfurter and Whitaker that
were procedurally specific to the Byrd case and had only limited implications for the general
doctrine.
259. For a discussion of the possible Byrd rationales, see supra notes 110-134 and
accompanying text.
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The "Notes and Questions" section starts with a constitutional
question, a familiar pattern in Cound. This time the question asks about
the role of the Seventh Amendment in justifying the Court's decision to
require the application of federal law. 260 The question seems somewhat
rhetorical, perhaps suggesting that Byrd is best seen as a Seventh
Amendment case - a position with which many commentators would
agree.26' The second question, a little more argumentative than
expected from Cound, asks whether the South Carolina rule is substan-
tive or procedural,262 while simultaneously suggesting that worker com-
pensation schemes in many states were adopted after "carefully
balancing the equities involved in the typical workplace accident. 263
The third question set asks about balancing, its relationship to the out-
come determination and substance/procedure tests, and how the process
of balancing is carried out. These questions revert to the book's more
familiar, open-ended format. Even though somewhat cryptic, these
questions are rich enough to allow a skilled questioner to open up every-
260. The question asks about Byrd's famous "influence if not the command" phrase and points
out that if the Seventh Amendment commands the application of federal law then there is no need
for its influence. However, if the Seventh Amendment does not command the application of
federal law, then it is not clear why it should influence it. See COUND, FRIEDENTHAL, MILLER &
SEXTON, supra note 24, at 390 n. 1. This phrase has puzzled many commentators, most of whom
seem to think that Byrd would have been better off grounded on the Seventh Amendment. See,
e.g., Ely, supra note 2, at 709 ("[I]n Byrd .... [t]he question presented ...could have been
decided ... on seventh amendment grounds pure and simple .... [but] [t]he court shunned this
straightforward course ...."); MARCUS, REDISH & SHERMAN, supra note 15, at 948-49 n.4 ("How
can a constitutional provision that does not dictate a particular result nevertheless 'influence' the
outcome?").
The book also revisits another constitutional question allegedly raised in Erie, by asking "If
Erie is constitutionally based, does Congress or do the federal courts have the power to establish
jurisdictional standards for diversity actions?" Put another way, this asks "are jurisdictional rules
substantive or procedural within the meaning of Erie and York ... ?" COUND, FRIEDENTHAL,
MILLER, & SEXTON, supra note 24, at 392. A number of judicial and academic commentators
were pre-occupied with this question in the early 1960s, before the constitutional status of Erie
was clarified, and while it seemed an important and difficult question at the time, it turns out not
to be an Erie question. Whether Congress and the courts have power to establish jurisdiction
conferring rules for diversity actions depends upon whether any provision of the Constitution
conveys such power, but Erie is not about constitutional power.
261. See id; see also Ely, supra note 2, at 709; Westen & Lehman, supra note 41, at 344-52.
262. The question reads: "Is Justice Brennan correct in asserting that the South Carolina rule
.is 'merely a form and mode of enforcing the immunity * * * and not a rule intended to be
bound up with the definition of the rights and obligations of the parties'?" COUND, FRIEDENTHAL,
MILLER & SEXTON, supra note 24, at 390 n.2.
263. Id. The book says: "Does it seem likely, then, that South Carolina randomly would have
appropriated to the judge the function of defining a statutory employee?" Id. This is a hard
question to answer without more background on the South Carolina rule, and the book does not
provide any. The book's purpose here may be to encourage an examination of the substance/
procedure distinction in general, and not the South Carolina law in particular. It may simply be
trying to show that the substance/procedure distinction remains an important part of a Decision
Act analysis, Byrd's balancing language notwithstanding.
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thing doctrinally distinctive and difficult about Byrd's balancing test.26 '
All that is missing, if the focus is purely doctrinal, is an inquiry into the
relationship among the not-always-consistent Byrd reasons. This omis-
sion is important, since Byrd is difficult not in figuring out what it says
line to line, but in figuring out what it stands for overall. As a whole,
Cound's questions about Byrd are perhaps more didactic and argumenta-
tive than its questions about Erie and York. Both in tone and in lan-
guage, its treatment of the case spots issues a little less and suggest
answers a little more, not just asking a reader to "discuss and evaluate,"
but also hinting at how that evaluation ought to come out.
Cound treats Hanna more quizzically than didactically or argumen-
tatively. Its abridged version of the case is nearly complete and leaves
out only Hanna's extended quotations from other cases and its citations
to other authorities. It includes verbatim the Court's discussion of the
differences between a Decision Act problem and an Enabling Act prob-
lem, its refinement of the outcome determination standard, its elabora-
tion on Sibbach's 65 interpretation of the Enabling Act's two part test for
the validity of a Federal Rule,26 6 and Justice Harlan's famous "arguably
procedural, ergo constitutional" concurrence. This provides a full view
of the case. The early questions after the case are also straightforward
and unremarkable. The first asks about the relationship between the
Decision Act and the Enabling Act and whether the two statutes impose
contradictory obligations.267 The petitioners' argument in Hanna was
premised, at least tacitly, on the belief that they did. This is a good place
to start an analysis of Hanna because it allows a reader to distinguish
between the opinion's Erie and Hanna parts, specifically between its
contributions to Decision Act analysis on the one hand, and Enabling
Act analysis on the other. The two statutes cannot impose contradictory
264. The book also illustrates the difficulties of balancing with an interesting Seventh Circuit
case raising the question of whether declaratory relief of non-liability was available to an
insurance company in federal court when the same relief was not available in state court because
of a state policy prohibiting direct actions against insurance companies. The Cound book uses the
case to illustrate the difficulties of identifying and comparing state and federal interests, but the
note also might be read as tacitly approving of the Byrd balancing standard. The note may breathe
life into balancing in other words, by taking the test seriously and trying to make it work. As in
many of the Cound book's notes and questions, the point of the example will depend almost
completely on the understanding of the one using it.
265. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1941).
266. The Enabling Act requires that a Federal Rule be a rule of "practice and procedure," and
that it not "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right." 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (a), (b) (2000).
The Cound book's discussion of the Enabling Act in this section is only as complete as the Hanna
Court's, which famously did not address the question of how to define substantive in section (b) of
the Act, except to say that it should not be defined the same way as in the Rules of Decision Act.
See Ely, supra note 2, at 719-26 (discussing failure of the Court in Hanna to define the meaning
of substantive rights and describing possible definitions).
267. COUND, FRIEDENTHAL, MILLER & SEXTON, supra note 24, at 399.
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obligations since each makes an exception for the other,268 but students
often fail to see this. The Cound questions allow one to make this point
clear right from the outset.
The second set of questions asks about the substance/procedure dis-
tinction and whether the terms have the same meaning in an Enabling
Act context as they have in a Decision Act context.269 The Court in
Hanna says that they do not.27° This point is crucial to understanding
the difference between Erie and Hanna analysis. It also is often a diffi-
cult point to explain, and asking about it explicitly makes sense.
Throughout this section, the book's questions are non-suggestive and
non-argumentative. They simply raise issues and leave it to the reader
to determine what to say about them.271 But the next set of questions,
dealing with Hanna's effect on York and Byrd, is a little more confusing.
The question about York is straightforward and manageable. It asks
what Hanna does to the outcome determination test. However, the book
then describes Byrd as articulating a "bound up with the rights and obli-
gations," or substance/procedure, test and asks what consideration
should be given to this test after Hanna. This is a partly understandable
268. The Decision Act's command to apply the "laws of the several states" does not apply
when the issue before the court is regulated by "Acts of Congress." 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000).
The Enabling Act is an act of Congress. Similarly, a Federal Rule is not valid under the Enabling
Act if it "abridge[s], enlarge s] or modifie[s] any substantive right," and state laws which qualify
under the Decision Act create substantive rights. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2000).
269. Only the Enabling Act uses the express terms "substantive" and "procedure," but the Erie
decision has been interpreted as articulating a substance/procedure standard from the beginning.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a), (b) (2000); see, e.g., Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 10-11; Guaranty Trust Co. of
N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105-12 (1945); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).
270. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471.
The line between "substance" and "procedure" shifts as the legal context changes.
"Each implies different variables depending upon the particular problem for which
it is used." It is true that both the Enabling Act and the Erie rule say, roughly, that
federal courts are to apply state "substantive" law and federal "procedural" law, but
from that it need not follow that the tests are idencical. For they were designed to
control very different sorts of decisions.
Id. (quoting York, 326 U.S. at 108).
271. Take, for example, the book's questions "How does Chief Justice Warren treat the
distinction between substance and procedure in Hanna? How does he define that distinction for
purposes of the Rules Enabling Act? For purposes of the Rules of Decision Act? Are the
definitions the same?" COUND, FRIEDENTHAL, MILLER & SEXTON, supra note 24, at 399. The
open-endedness of the questions permits a professor to raise the issue of what meaning should be
given to the Enabling Act's prohibition on abridging substantive rights without suggesting how
the issue should be resolved. With the exception of a few comments about non-substantial or
incidental effects on substantive rights, see Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 11; Miss. Publ'g Corp. v.
Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445-46 (1946), the Supreme Court has ducked this question over the
years, and many now act as if section (b) of the Enabling Act has expired for lack of use. Cound,
to its credit, takes all of the language of the Act seriously, and even points out how the issue was
left hanging in Sibbach by quoting the relevant language from the Sibbach opinion. See CoUNo,
FRIEDENTHAL, MILLER & SEXTON, supra note 24, at 399-400 n.2. Ely has the best discussion of
the possible meanings for section (b) of the Enabling Act. See Ely, supra note 2, at 725-27.
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way to put the point. Byrd did use a "bound up with rights and obliga-
tions" standard, but only as a first step in a four or five step analysis, in
which balancing was the most important and overriding part. Ironically,
the Court in Byrd did not definitively answer the question of whether the
South Carolina rule was "bound up with rights and obligations." Or
more accurately, it answered it both ways. But it also concluded that the
answer was not necessary to the disposition of the case. It would not
have been surprising, therefore, if Cound had asked what effect, if any,
Hanna's refinement of the outcome determination test had on Byrd bal-
ancing. This was the precise question that pre-occupied commentators
after Hanna but the book does not ask that question, and by failing to do
so it may encourage readers to assume that balancing is still good law.272
Cound asks next whether Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion,
succeeds in finding a middle ground between the outcome determination
test of York and the refined outcome determination test of Hanna.2 7 3 To
describe a view as middle-ground suggests moderation, even-handed-
ness, and tolerance, and can predispose a reader to approve of the view.
But if the polar positions defining the spectrum on which the middle
ground is located are themselves imbalanced, the expression is more of a
rhetorical strategy than a description of fact, and that seems to be the
case here. Outcome determination and refined outcome determination
do not define opposite ends of a spectrum as much as represent margin-
ally different articulations of the same idea. Each attempts to give
meaning to the substance/procedure dichotomy at the heart of the Deci-
sion Act but with increasing degrees of precision and sophistication. As
such, there is not much middle ground to find between them.
For Cound to see Harlan's view as half way between the two ideas
is difficult to comprehend. Harlan's proposed rule would require the
application of all state laws "substantially affect[ing] those primary deci-
sions respecting human conduct which our constitutional system leaves
to state regulation." '274 Recall however, that the Tenth Amendment does
not "leave to state regulation" any particular area of human conduct, it
simply reserves to the states all powers not delegated to the federal gov-
272. Cound may assume that Byrd balancing has continuing validity, and even suggest that
Hanna ratifies the balancing standard. See COUND, FRIEDENTHAL, MILLER & SEXTON, supra note
24, at 422 n. 1. It also gives Gasperini credit for reviving York's outcome determination standard,
but Hanna did that when it repudiated balancing. Id.
273. Id. at 400 n.4.
274. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 475 (Harlan, J., concurring). This so-called primary conduct standard,
if viable, would be a difficult one to define. For example, how does one say, in non-circular
terms, what makes conduct "primary" (e.g., to say primary conduct is all conduct which is not
secondary simply restates the problem). Since attempts to define primary conduct usually lead
back to some form of a substance/procedure dichotomy, it would seem to be better to work with
those terms in the first instance.
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ernment, and this is a shifting enclave of regulatory power.27 5 Because a
primary conduct rule assumes the existence of a fixed enclave of state
power, contrary to what the Constitution says, it is not a middle ground
but instead off the spectrum defined by these two versions of an out-
come determination rule. Perhaps Cound designed the questions to elicit
this response, rather than favorable reaction to Harlan's "primary con-
duct" rule, though that does not seem to be the overall tone of the para-
graph in which the question is asked. Instead, the book seems to support
Harlan's idea that Erie announces a constitutional rule based on the
Tenth Amendment, rather than a statutory rule based on an interpretation
of the Decision Act. If so, it contributes to the misunderstanding sur-
rounding the constitutional significance of Erie.
The last major2 76 item in the notes and questions following Hanna
is Cound's first reference to the Ely article. Cound quotes a little over a
page from the introduction to the Irrepressible Myth of Erie, describing
the "three distinct and rather ordinary problems of statutory and consti-
tutional interpretation" which make up the Erie/Hanna doctrine: the
Enabling Act problem, present when "the matter in issue is covered by a
Federal Rule;" the Decision Act problem, present when the federal law
in issue is "wholly judge-made;" and the constitutional problem, present
when "Congress has passed a statute creating law for diversity
actions." '277 Cound does not comment on the Ely excerpt, except to ask
the reader to "[c]ompare [Ely's] .. .analysis with" an excerpt from a
Westen and Lehman article describing the differences between the perti-
nence and validity issues in an Enabling Act analysis.278 It is not clear
how one would go about making this comparison, however, since there
is no incompatibility between the two excerpts. They are about different
subjects altogether, and complement rather than contradict one
275. For a discussion of the difference between the "enclave" and "checklist" views of the
Tenth Amendment, see supra notes 101-54 and accompanying text. On the issue of how the
scope of state and federal regulatory power shifts over time, see supra note 151.
276. The book also asks a somewhat obscure, but interesting question about whether the Erie
doctrine was intended to protect institutional or party interests, that is, whether Hanna's grounding
in a concern for treating litigants fairly is compatible with Erie's desire to protect the sovereign
interests of the federal and state judicial systems to regulate their own manners of operating.
COUND, FRIEDENTHAL, MILLER & SEXTON, supra note 24, at 400 n.5. This is a difficult question
to answer without a great deal more background information about the two cases than the book
provides. There is also a short blurb on Marshall v. Mulrenin, 508 F.2d 39 (1st Cir. 1974), an
Enabling Act case involving the application of FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c) to an attempt to amend a
federal complaint to change parties. The 1991 amendments to Rule 15(c), and the case of
Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21 (1986), make this discussion largely academic.
277. COUND, FRIEDENTHAL, MILLER & SEXTON, supra note 24, at 401 (quoting Ely, supra note
2, at 697-98). Putting an excerpt from Ely's article, which is careful to differentiate between
Erie's constitutional and statutory dimensions, next to a question which runs Erie's constitutional
and statutory dimensions together is a particularly strange move.
278. See Westen & Lehman, supra note 41.
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another. 279 Asking a reader to compare incommensurables and expres-
sing approval of both Ely's and Harlan's (incompatible) views raise
questions about the extent to which Cound understands Ely's analysis
accurately.
At the outset, I described Cound's presentation of the Erie/Hanna
doctrine as traditional (or old-fashioned) and perhaps now it is easier to
understand why. Cound's treatment of the Erie/Hanna cases reminds
one of the Langdellian vision, popular in the 1950s, of law study as
science. As the raw data of the common law universe, court decisions28°
are presented in a minimally pre-digested form and examined through a
series of conjectures and refutations to test tentative hypotheses about
what the data (i.e., the cases) could mean. Cound reproduces this case
data almost in its entirety and edits it minimally so as not to present a
distorted picture of the Erie/Hanna universe. The book asks minimally
suggestive or confining questions so as not to pre-determine reader
inquiries or foreclose resolutions readers might find convincing. The
authors spot issues, in the parlance of another era, and leave it to the
reader to decide what to do with them. This is a familiar approach to
constructing a casebook, but it is not as popular as it once was.28' Mod-
279. There is perhaps one issue on which the two excerpts disagree. Ely argues that the
Decision Act governs the issue of whether a federal court sitting in diversity must apply a federal
common law rule in the face of a contrary state rule. Federal common law would have to give
way, in Ely's view, to a contrary state rule that qualified as substantive under the Decision Act.
Westen and Lehman, on the other hand, argue that "if a valid federal rule exists - whether
constitutional, statutory, or judge-made - the federal rule shall govern," because of the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution. COUND, FRIEDENTHAL, MILLER & SEXTON, supra note 24, at 401
(quoting Westen & Lehman, supra note 41). While Westen and Lehman may be correct in the
abstract, that a valid federal common law rule is superior to a contrary state law under the
Supremacy Clause every thing else being equal, but see Sosa v. Alverez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739,
2770 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("General common law was not federal law under the
Supremacy Clause, which gave that effect only to the Constitution, the laws of the United States,
and treaties."), Congress's passage of the Decision Act arguably reversed that state of affairs by
making state substantive law the rule of decision except in the face of an Act of Congress, treaty,
or Constitutional provision. If so, Ely's position would be correct. Stewart seems to support Ely's
view. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
If no federal statute or Rule covers the point in dispute, the district court then
proceeds to evaluate whether application of federal judge-made law would disserve
the so-called "twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and
avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws." If application of federal
judge-made law would disserve these two policies, the district court should apply
state law.
Id. at 27 n.6 (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965)). For additional discussion and
references, see WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 411-21.
280. Not everyone views appellate court opinions as raw data of the legal universe. In fact, the
selective and strategically manipulated information such opinions contain may make them one of
the least representative sources of data about the day-to-day operation of the courts and lawyers.
281. The Field, Kaplan and Clermont book is perhaps the purest example of the law-as-science
approach. It reprints more Erie/Hanna cases and in greater detail than any other book, asks
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em casebooks often have a message to get across - this is how they
seem to separate themselves from one another - by offering explana-
tions rather than descriptions of the legal universe. Books like Cound
have their risks. They teach unevenly, for example, because they
depend almost completely on the understanding readers bring to the
analysis.282 Experienced teachers get more out of a book like Cound
than do novices. While Cound is not a book for everyone, therefore, of
all the modem casebooks it is one which contributes the least to the
popular misconceptions about the Erie/Hanna doctrine, if only because
it takes fewer stands than most casebooks on what that doctrine requires.
B. Yeazell
Stephen Yeazell's Civil Procedure (hereinafter Yeazell),283 pro-
vides an interesting contrast to Cound. Half as old and about five hun-
dred pages shorter, Yeazell, unlike Cound, has undergone substantial
transformations in its presentation of the Erie/Hanna doctrine as its
authorship has changed during the first twenty years of its existence.284
Its most recent edition devotes thirty-one pages to the doctrine, half as
many as Cound,z85 and accords principal case treatment only to Erie,
York, Byrd, and Hanna, although other major cases are reproduced in
blurb form or summarized in notes following the principal cases. It cites
to, or quotes from, scholarly discussions of the cases less than Cound
and, as a consequence, is sometimes described as less erudite, or more
accessible, 286 depending on one's preferences in euphemisms, or as
questions about the cases almost to the exclusion of commenting on their analytical soundness,
and almost never argues for specific interpretations of the cases. Like Cound, its questions are
open-ended and non-argumentative and probe the courts' reasoning for analytical errors, debatable
factual assumptions, and hidden policy preferences. If there is such a thing as Socratic
questioning in a casebook, Field, Kaplan and Clermont is an exemplar of it. The book does this
less and less, however, as it gets further into the Erie/Hanna cases, so that by the end of its section
on the doctrine it does little more than provide synopses of cases.
282. The most difficult book to teach from may be HAZARD, TAIT & FLETCHER, supra note 37.
The book provides very few questions and leaves it to the professor to decide what to inquire
about and how. This task is complicated by the fact that the book resolves most of the analytical
difficulties in the cases in extensive textual notes. It is hard to think of a question that the book
has not already resolved.
283. YEAZELL (6th ed.), supra note 15.
284. The book started as Landers and Martin in 1982 and became Landers, Martin, and Yeazell
in 1988. After Professor Martin's untimely death the book turned into Yeazell, Landers and
Martin in 1992, and then into Yeazell in 1996. As I understand it, Professors Martin and Yeazell
were responsible for the successive versions of the book's chapter on the Erie/Hanna doctrine. As
will become apparent in this section, their views on the doctrine seem to have differed
considerably.
285. In fact, the book has devoted about ten fewer pages to the doctrine in each successive
edition, so that what started as about an eighty page chapter is now down to about a thirty-two
page chapter.
286. A book described as accessible often means that it is easy to understand, principally
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more of a teaching than reference book. Yeazell is the most widely
adopted procedure book in American law schools, however, and that fact
alone means that it must be taken seriously as a major influence on the
legal profession's understanding of the Erie/Hanna doctrine. If Cound
is old fashioned, then Yeazell is au courant.
Yeazell's introductory section to the chapter on Erie/Hanna is a
little more detailed than Cound's. It describes not only the way in which
the late nineteenth century increase in interstate commerce and the cor-
responding pressure for a national law of negotiable instruments helped
create the Swift doctrine, but also how federal courts used the doctrine to
run roughshod over state law in favor of national business interests.
This, in turn, produced the furor that resulted in Erie.287 Federal courts,
Yeazell explains, saw "Swift [as] a charter of judicial independence, a
declaration that they could ignore state law even when sitting in cases
that were not explicitly governed by federal law." '288 They used this
independence to protect "mercantile and corporate interests [which were
more likely to be national] against agrarian and workingmen's interests
[which were more likely to be local] . -2"9 The book quotes exten-
sively from the Swift opinion, although from a different part of the opin-
ion than Cound does, to give the reader a sense of the jurisprudential
climate that made a regime of a federal general law coherent. It repro-
because it does not overwhelm one with references to supplementary material or critical
commentary. This characterization is not always a compliment, but since the Yeazell book also is
described as intelligent being accessible in its case is probably a plus. Traditional books tend to
provide more extensive supplementary case law and secondary research material than advocacy
and practitioner books. The latter seem less intrigued by the analytical intricacies of doctrine
itself, almost as a matter of style or taste, and more concerned with transforming doctrine into a
set of workable black-letter propositions that will be useful in argument. There is not always a
correlation between style and age. The fourth edition of MARCUS, REDISH & SHERMAN, supra
note 15, for example, published in 2005, has the longest Erie/Hanna section of any of the books
and is filled with erudite references and critical commentary. Yet, the first edition of the book was
published in 1989, making it a relative newcomer among procedure books.
287. YEAZELL (6th ed.), supra note 15, at 222-23. It is now commonplace for procedure
scholars to provide detail about famous cases by describing the personal, social, political, and
strategic background features of the cases not reported in the official opinions. There is even a
new instructional text based on that format. See CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES (Kevin M. Clermont,
ed. 2004). For Erie, these articles appear in Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Story of Erie: How
Litigants, Lawyers, Judges, Politics, and Social Change Reshape the Law, in CIVIL PROCEDURE
STORIES 21 (Kevin M. Clermont, ed. 2004); Younger, supra note 41; Rizzi, supra note 41. The
articles report some of the more tragic aspects of the Erie case, including the fact that Tompkins
eventually took nothing for his injuries, lost a $30,000 verdict, and rejected a $7500 (in 1937
dollars) settlement offer on the advice of his attorneys. See supra note 47. The Erie decision may
have reached a correct outcome in some larger sense, but one would have had a hard time
convincing Harry Tompkins that justice was served in his particular case.
288. YEAZELL (6th ed.), supra note 15, at 223.
289. Id. (quoting HOWARD FINK & MARK V. TUSHNET, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: POLICY AND
PRACTICE 179 (2d ed. 1987)).
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duces the Erie decision almost in its entirety, including parts not
included in Cound.2 9° But it also omits significant parts of the opinion,
and the decision of what to omit and what to include, along with the
book's persistent characterization of Erie as a "constitutional deci-
sion," '291 are early indications of how Yeazell will differ from Cound.
Unlike Cound, Yeazell argues for a particular view of Erie and the line
of cases following in its wake. Rather than present the cases and ask
readers to analyze them for themselves, Yeazell tells readers what the
Erie/Hanna cases mean.
The book's most prominent argument, that Erie is a "constitutional
decision," is made explicitly in section-headings, notes, and questions,
and implicitly in the way the Erie decision is abridged for inclusion in
the book. This view of Erie is controversial, as Yeazell acknowl-
edges,292 but the problem with the book's presentation of this view is not
so much its controversy as its ambiguity. A decision can be constitu-
tional in at least two senses of the term, one of which is coherent and
unremarkable when applied to Erie, and the other of which is coherent
but wrong. Unfortunately, Yeazell may have the second sense in mind.
A decision is constitutional in a positive sense when it holds that a par-
ticular provision of the Constitution requires or prohibits a certain course
of action. A holding that the Tenth Amendment requires the application
of state negligence law in diversity actions, for example, would be such
a decision. Erie is not a constitutional decision in this sense, since its
command to apply Pennsylvania law was based on the Decision Act and
not the Tenth Amendment.293 A decision also can be constitutional in a
negative sense as, for example, when it holds that the Constitution does
not authorize a particular course of action, without commenting one way
or another on whether any other particular course of action is constitu-
tionally required or prohibited. This is Erie. Erie held only that the
Constitution does not authorize the creation of federal general common
law, and thus that the "course pursued" in Swift based on such law was
290. It is more accurate to say that the book used to do this, in its fifth edition, see STEPHEN C.
YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 265-70 (5th ed. 2000) [hereinafter YEAZELL (5th ed.)], but its
treatment of Erie was cut nearly in half in the sixth edition. See YEAZELL (6th ed.), supra note 15,
at 224-227.
291. YEAZELL (6th ed.), supra note 15, at 228-29.
292. Yeazell's acknowledgment that "lawyers and political scientists have argued about
whether [Erie is] a constitutional decision," id. at 228, is evidence of some open-mindedness on
the issue. However, the book also describes the Erie Court as "handing down a constitutional
decision," id., and the decision as "Constitutionalizing the Issue." Id. at 223. Yeazell describes
opinions subsequent to Erie as changing the focus from the constitution to federal statutes. Id. at
237. It is hard to avoid the impression that Yeazell thinks of Erie as a constitutional decision.
293. The Decision Act has force because it is a valid exercise of constitutional power. In this
attenuated sense Erie announces a constitutional rule. But under that conception of a
constitutional decision, there would be no such thing as a statutory decision.
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unconstitutional. To say this, however, is not to say anything about what
law a federal court sitting in diversity should apply. Erie articulated no
positive constitutional rule for making that decision. It did not have to,
since Congress had acted with respect to that question in enacting the
Rules of Decision Act.
Yeazell seems to see Erie as announcing a positive constitutional
rule grounded in the Tenth Amendment. The book communicates this
view in several different ways.2 94 For example, it describes the Swift
and Erie decisions in mutually exclusive terms, depicting Swift as a
decision based on a statute (the Decision Act), and Erie as a decision
based on the Constitution.295 It characterizes Erie as "[c]onstitu-
tionalizing the [i]ssue" 29 6 considered in Swift and asks why the Decision
Act "won't work" as authority for Erie's holding that the Pennsylvania
federal court had to apply Pennsylvania negligence law.29 7 The book
seems to base this reading of Erie on the Court's response to Justice
Reed's argument in his concurring opinion in Erie, that it was not neces-
sary to "disapprove of Swift" in order to dispose of the case and that all
that was needed was a re-interpretation of the Decision Act.2 98 In
response to Reed, Justice Brandeis, writing for the majority, stated: "If
only a question of statutory construction were involved, we should not
be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied throughout nearly a
century. But the unconstitutionality of the course pursued has now been
made clear, and compels us to do so."299 Justice Brandies explained the
majority's position in this way:
we do not hold unconstitutional section 34 of the Federal Judiciary
Act of 1789 [the Rules of Decision Act] or any other act of Congress.
We merely declare that in applying the [Swift] doctrine this Court and
the lower courts have invaded rights which in our opinion are
reserved by the Constitution to the several states. 3°
This last sentence, particularly the phrase "rights ...reserved by the
Constitution to the several states," could be read as a tacit adoption of
294. For example, the book's transition note from Erie to York, which states: "Erie holds only
that 'general' federal common law may not displace that of the states in areas in which the
Constitution grants lawmaking power to the states." YEAZELL (6th ed.), supra note 15, at 230.
The statement that the Constitution reserves an "area of lawmaking power to the states" is the
classic expression of the enclave view of the Tenth Amendment
295. The transition sentence from the book's Swift to it's Erie section states: "Swift reached its
conclusion as an interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act, which Congress could have amended
during. [sic] Congress did not amend the Act. The next step in the story [Erie] took matters out of
Congress's hands." Id. at 223.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 227 n.2(b).
298. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 90-92 (1938) (Reed, J., concurring).
299. Id. at 77-78 (footnote omitted).
300. Id. at 79-80.
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the enclave view of the Tenth Amendment, but this almost certainly was
not the meaning the Court intended. Nothing else in the opinion
expresses or relies on the enclave view, and the phrase "reserved to the
states" could just as easily mean left over for the states after federal
power is determined not to include it. Justice Brandeis does not other-
wise shed light on the question of whether the reserved powers of the
states is a fixed or shifting category of power, but this is not surprising
given that Erie was not a constitutional case.
The Court was correct when it said that a re-interpretation of the
Decision Act, by itself, would not dispose of Erie. Even if the Decision
Act was construed to include Pennsylvania state decisional law, as Reed
suggested it should be, so that it commanded the application of the
Pennsylvania common law negligence standard, a federal court con-
fronted with a conflict between a pertinent and valid federal common
law rule on the one hand, and a qualifying (under the Decision Act)
Pennsylvania law, statutory or decisional, on the other, would have to
resolve the difficult Supremacy Clause question of which law con-
trolled.3"' Only when federal general common law was eliminated as a
possible source of authority in Erie was a re-interpretation of the Deci-
sion Act, by itself, enough to dispose of the case. To create this condi-
tion, however, the Court had to take up the constitutional question of
whether federal courts had the power to make general common law.
This constitutional issue was unavoidable in Erie. Once the Court
decided that the Constitution did not grant federal courts the power to
create federal general common law, the only remaining issue, whether
the Pennsylvania negligence standard was a "rule of decision," was a
statutory one. While it is true that Erie is a constitutional decision of
sorts, it is neither primarily a constitutional decision nor the kind of con-
stitutional decision Yeazell seems to think it is.3" 2
301. For different views on how such a question should be answered see, for example, Ely,
supra note 2, at 697-98 (state law governs); Westen & Lehman, supra note 41, at 314-15 (federal
law governs). The court would have to reconcile not just conflicting state and federal law, but
conflicting federal laws as well, since the obligation to apply state law comes from a federal
statute. The resolution of the Supremacy Clause question would depend upon the extent to which
the statutory language "rule of decision" expressed the same idea as the constitutional language
"law of the land." See also supra note 282.
302. The book's remaining notes and questions after Erie have to do with the constitutional
limitations on the common law making power of the federal courts, the question of whether state
conflict of laws rules are an exception to the Erie rule (resolved by Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec.
Mfg. Co., Inc., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) as the book indicates), and the extent to which Erie's concern
about forum-shopping is justified. YEAZELL (6th ed.), supra note 15, at 227-30. The questions
about constitutional limitations on common law making power are complicated, difficult, and well
beyond the capacity and background of first-year law students to discuss. Justice Reed's
concurring opinion in Erie contains a good discussion, see Erie, 304 U.S. at 91-92 (Reed, J.,
concurring), but that part of Reed's opinion is not reproduced in the book. The Klaxon note
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Yeazell's transition from Erie to York illustrates once again the
book's mixing and matching of Erie's constitutional and statutory
dimensions. In quick succession, the book describes the Erie doctrine as
"having struggled with .. .constitutional ambiguities," characterizes
York, Byrd, and Hanna as "decisions in which the issue is whether and
how to apply the Erie doctrine," which in turn determines the circum-
stances under which federal courts sitting in diversity are "bound to rep-
licate state practice," and points out that in making that determination
"Erie's ... setting suggest[s] that ... federal courts ... should observe
state substantive law."3 °3 Paraphrased, this sequence of propositions
argues that the Erie doctrine begins as a constitutional rule and at some
point transmogrifies into a substance/procedure standard emanating
from the setting of the Erie case. How and when this happens is not
clear. It is clear that it must occur, however, if Yeazell is to reconcile its
view of Erie with York, Byrd, and Hanna. The latter three decisions are
not constitutional cases in any Erie sense of the term,3°4 yet, according
to Yeazell, they are applications of the Erie doctrine, which is constitu-
tional. There is no easy way for this to happen without, at some point,
having the Erie doctrine shift its shape.
Yeazell does not seem to see York as an important case in the Erie!
Hanna sequence. The book's excerpted version of the decision is
among the shortest in all of the casebooks. It includes a paragraph from
the Court's opinion on the repudiation of the brooding omnipresence
view, two paragraphs announcing the outcome determination standard,
and nothing on the equity/law issue raised by the "trials at common law"
language then part of the Decision Act.30 ' The notes and questions fol-
lowing the case are also brief. Among other things, they characterize
provides useful information about the reach of the Erie doctrine, though why it, among all of the
possible esoteric Erie extensions, is selected for presentation is not clear. See YEAZELL (6th ed.),
supra note 15, at 229 n.4(b). The questions about forum shopping suffer from some of the same
difficulties as the book's discussion of Erie's constitutional dimension. They overstate the
Court's view on forum-shopping, by describing it as an objection to all forum shopping for
whatever reason, not just forum shopping for substantive legal rules affecting character or result.
Yeazell then knocks down that straw man by pointing out that forum shopping is not always bad,
and in fact to some extent, inevitable.
303. YEAZELL (6th ed.), supra note 15, at 231.
304. The Seventh Amendment played some, not fully defined role in Byrd, and Article III,
Section 2 was the standard against which the Enabling Act was judged in Hanna. However
neither of these constitutional issues involved an Erie question about the extent of a diversity
court's duty under the Tenth Amendment, as Yeazell sees it, to apply state law.
305. The book's summary of the York facts contains a brief reference to the equity/law issue in
the case, but none of the Court's discussion of the issue is reproduced. The book revisits the issue
in a textual note following the case, in which it explains the Court's reasoning in greater detail.
See id. at 232-34. This pattern of telling readers what a case means, rather than providing relevant
data from the opinion and allowing readers to come to their own conclusions, is a familiar one in
Yeazell.
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Frankfurter's outcome determination standard as a ferocious and sharp
attack on the proposition that state procedural rules are "not governed by
the rule in Erie," but then criticize other parts of Frankfurter's opinion
for being internally inconsistent with this (criticized) view.3"6 Yeazell
seems to see the unqualified outcome determination test as the final
word on the Decision Act standard, rather than an interim draft in need
of refinement. In addition, the book does not seem to recognize the
connection between York's outcome determination formulation and
Erie's substance/procedure test as variations on the same theme, or parts
of a single doctrinal project, as opposed to free-standing and mutually
exclusive rules. The principal difficulty with Yeazell's treatment of
York, however, as with its earlier discussion of Erie, is not so much the
accuracy of its analytical points as the one-dimensional and argumenta-
tive nature of its discussion. The book simplifies the York decision, both
in the way it edits the Court's opinion for inclusion in the book and in
the comments it makes about the opinion. In the process, it discourages
readers from examining the case in all of its complexity for
themselves. °
Yeazell treats Byrd even more perfunctorily than York. It reduces
the case to two and one-half pages,30 8 making it one of the shortest ver-
sions of Byrd in any of the procedure casebooks, and asks only one
generally phrased30 9 question about the opinion. The book also has a
short, three-sentence note about the case, but the note simply makes the
point that the Court in Byrd "seemed to be going out of its way to find
another [i.e., different from York] analysis by which to approach Erie
problems."31 Then, in a transition paragraph to the Hanna decision,
Yeazell repeats the theme that the "Erie questions" in Byrd are "consti-
tutional matters."31' The book summarizes Byrd in a note after the
306. Id. at 233 n.1.
307. The remaining notes and questions after York provide information on the debate over the
accuracy of Justice Story's understanding of the Decision Act in Swift. They also describe the by
now well-known paper size hypothetical, which many books use to illustrate the over-
inclusiveness of an unqualified outcome determination test. See discussion supra note 24 and
accompanying text. Yeazell summarizes Ragan, Bernhardt, and Woods by asking "whether all -
or any - of [them] are correctly decided" under Erie and Guaranty Trust." Id. at 233-34 n.3. This
last question mixes and matches Enabling Act, Decision Act, and pertinence issues without
providing enough detail to resolve any of these questions with respect to any of the cases.
308. Until the latest edition of Yeazell, the number of pages did not tell the complete story.
The first through fifth editions of the book were printed on nine inch paper and had forty-six lines
of ten-point type to a page, whereas Cound, for example, has always been printed on ten inch
paper and has fifty lines of ten-point type to the page. The sixth edition of Yeazell is now the
same size as Cound and almost every other book.
309. The casebook asks the reader to, "State the holding of Byrd." Id. at 237 n. 1.
310. Id. at 237 n.2.
311. Id. at 237. The fifth edition of the book also made the strange claim that "Erie . . .
rejected the invitation to reach its decision as an interpretation of the Rules Enabling Act rather
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Hanna case in a way that allows a careful reader to see the confusion in
the opinion,3 12 but since this note comes several pages after Byrd in the
casebook it could easily be missed. Yeazell's version of Byrd makes it
difficult for a reader to understand the opinion as a collection of all
previous formulations of the Decision Act standard and to understand
how those various formulations might be fit together into a single,
coherent rule. The underlying purpose of Byrd, to reign in the overin-
clusiveness of an unqualified outcome determination standard, is not
mentioned.
Next, Yeazell takes up Hanna. The decision, according to Yeazell,
"reframes the [Erie] issue as one of statutory rather than constitutional
interpretation." '313 This is misleading, since once the underbrush of fed-
eral general common law was cleared away, Erie was just a statutory
decision, grounded in the Rules of Decision Act; no "reframing" needed
to be done.314 Yeazell reproduces the Hanna decision almost in its
entirety, including Harlan's famous "arguably procedural, ergo constitu-
tional" concurring opinion. Harlan's concurrence is the most eloquent
articulation of the "enclave" theory of the Tenth Amendment and most
casebooks use one example from the opinion to illustrate how Harlan
goes off track. Reproducing the entire concurring opinion suggests that
than the Constitution." YEAZLL (5th ed.), supra note 290, at 284. Yeazell no doubt meant to say
Rules of Decision Act rather than Rules Enabling Act. Apart from its dubious constitutional
status, Erie could not have been an Enabling Act case since no Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
was in dispute. One would expect this type of typographical error to have been corrected long
before the fifth edition of a casebook. The sixth edition has it right. See YEAZELL (6th ed.), supra
note 15, at 237.
312. In Yeazell's words: "The Byrd Court assumes that if [a state practice is bound up with the
definition of rights and obligations], state practice should prevail. The idea seems to be that some
procedural practices are so much a part of the substantive law that they should be followed."
YEAZELL (6th ed.), supra note 15, at 243. Taken literally, this summary of Byrd seems to contain
a non-sequitur. How can a practice be "bound up with the definition of rights and obligations"
and "procedural" at the same time? Being "bound up with the definition of rights and obligations"
is an operational definition of being substantive. However, there is a way to make sense of this
general point. Byrd can be read to say that federal courts must sometimes apply state procedural
rules because the interests served by such rules are weightier than the countervailing interests
served by contrary federal rules. This is one possible outcome of a simple balancing test. If Byrd
meant to say this, the better view is that this interpretation is a mistaken reading of Byrd. The
categories of substance and procedure are mutually exclusive categories, and while many rules
have both substantive and procedural dimensions, they must be categorized as one or the other for
purposes of the Decision Act.
313. Id. at 237. "Byrd is nuanced, 'soft,' and, in many cases, indeterminate - and grounds its
analysis directly in the Constitution. Hanna is hard-edged and more determinate - and insists that
a statute - the Rules Enabling Act - is as important as the Constitution in many Erie cases." Id. at
242.
314. The "refraining" point is misleading in another sense. Hanna was a constitutional
decision as well as a statutory one. It re-introduced the Constitution to Erie doctrine analysis for
the purpose of determining whether the Enabling Act, the source of federal court authority to
promulgate Federal Rule Four, was a valid exercise of congressional power.
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Yeazell either does not understand Harlan's mistake and assumes his
opinion to be essentially correct, or wants to call attention to Harlan's
gaffe as often as it can. The Yeazell book shows no evidence of being
mean-spirited elsewhere, and its views on Erie are compatible with, if
not dependent upon, the enclave theory of the Tenth Amendment, 315 so
it is perhaps fair to conclude that Yeazell thinks Harlan's opinion is
superior to that of the Court's.
Yeazell's summary of Hanna's discussion of the Enabling Act
standard also is somewhat confused. While it is true that the validity of
a Federal Rule is tested against the Enabling Act, it also is true that the
Act has two parts. The first, which Yeazell acknowledges, requires that
a Federal Rule be a rule of "practice and procedure. '"316 The second,
which Yeazell does not mention, requires that the Rule not "abridge,
enlarge or modify substantive rights .' '7 The second half of the stan-
dard has been honored mostly in the breach, but it is still part of the Act
and ought not to pass without mention or explanation.3t 8 In addition, if
a Federal Rule fails either part of the Enabling Act test, so that it is
invalid and cannot be applied by a federal court sitting in diversity, the
court need not automatically apply the equivalent state rule, as Yeazell
says it must.319 Whether the federal court must apply the state rule will
depend upon whether the rule qualifies under the Decision Act. It is
conceivable, though not likely, that both a Federal Rule and the
equivalent state rule would fail validity tests under the Enabling Act and
Decision Act respectively. In that instance a federal court would have to
make federal common law to resolve the issue before it or simply decide
the issue against the person invoking the Rule, yet Yeazell does not dis-
cuss these possibilities.
Yeazell also asks whether a federal court would ever have a duty to
follow a state practice or custom "not dictated by a specific statute or
Rule," and suggests that Byrd and Hanna "approach that question in
315. See, e.g., YEAZELL (6th ed.), supra note 15, at 242 (maintaining that Erie asserts that
"Congress could not constitutionally dictate tort law to the states").
316. Id.
317. For Yeazell, the second half of the Enabling Act test for the validity of a Federal Rule is
"whether the Rule itself if constitutional." Id. However, this standard is applied to the Enabling
Act in its entirety to determine whether it is a valid use of governmental power. A statute is tested
against the Constitution, but a Federal Rule is tested against the statute which authorizes it.
318. Accord Rowe, supra note 22, at 981 ("[T]he REA's substantive-ights proviso should not
today be read as surplusage."). The Court has applied the second half of the Enabling Act
standard after a fashion in cases such as Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 312 U.S. 1, 11 (1941), and
Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445-46 (1946), under the rubric of
allowing Federal Rules to have insubstantial or incidental effects on substantive rights. But these
decisions focus more on the abridgement part of the Act's text than on the substantive rights part.
319. See YEAZELL (6th ed.), supra note 15, at 242.
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different ways. ' 2  This is an easy question to answer if one remembers
that the Decision Act obligates federal courts to apply only the "laws of
the several states." A practice or custom "not dictated by a specific rule
or statute" is not a law within the terms of the Act, and thus need not be
applied. State and federal judicial practices may differ substantially.
This is what makes for different judicial systems. These differences
may have pronounced effects on forum selection choices but this fact, by
itself, has no implications for an Erie analysis. The focus of the Erie
doctrine is on state law, not state judicial practices. In the words of
York, "the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be sub-
stantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a
litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court."321 Byrd and Hanna do
not approach the question of whether a federal court must follow state
practice "in different ways," as Yeazell asserts, because neither Byrd nor
Hanna involved a question of state judicial practice.322
The remainder of the Yeazell book's notes and questions after
Hanna contain a number of familiar errors. For example, the book
points out that "Hanna did not overrule Byrd," '32 3 which is true, but only
if one adds the qualification "explicitly." Hanna repudiated Byrd in
every other conceivable way.324 It also claims that Hanna "cited [Byrd]
with approval," and thus, that either case suggests an appropriate
approach to an Erie/Hanna problem involving a federal practice.325
This is a little disingenuous. It is true that Hanna cites Byrd twice, but
neither reference supports the proposition that Hanna intended to pre-
serve Byrd. The first citation is a "cf" reference in a footnote citing
principally to the Ragan, Woods, and Bernhardt cases for the proposi-
tion that "Erie-type problems [are] not to be solved by reference to any
traditional or common-sense substance-procedure distinction," but
320. Id. at 243.
321. Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (emphasis added).
322. See YEAZELL (6th ed.), supra note 15, at 243 n.4. In Byrd, the state law in question for
Decision Act purposes, was a common law rule created by the South Carolina Supreme Court
providing a procedure for reviewing fact determinations of the South Carolina Industrial
Commission. In Hanna, the state law was a Massachusetts statute providing a special service rule
for executors of estates.
In the same note the book also seems to misunderstand the nature of the Hanna Court's
forum shopping rationale for its refined outcome determination version of the Decision Act test.
Yeazell seems to say that the Court sought to prohibit all kinds of forum shopping, for procedural
and substantive advantages alike. But as York and Hanna make clear, the only kind of forum
shopping the Court wanted to discourage was forum shopping for substantive legal rules that were
likely to affect the character or result of the litigation. Seeing Hanna as a prohibition on forum
shopping generally is the same mistake Harlan made in his concurring opinion.
323. Id. at 244.
324. See discussion supra notes 170-76 and accompanying text.
325. YEAZELL (6th ed.), supra note 15, at 244.
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instead by reference to the question of "does it significantly affect the
result of a litigation for a federal court to disregard a law of a State that
would be controlling in an action upon the same claim by the same par-
ties in a State court?" '326 Here, Byrd is used as authority for the outcome
determination test, a creation of York and not of Byrd. Hanna's second
reference to Byrd is for the statement that "'[o]utcome-determination'
analysis was never intended to serve as a talisman. [citation to Byrd].
Indeed, the message of York itself is that choices between state and fed-
eral law are to be made not by application of any automatic 'litmus
paper' criterion, but rather by reference to the policies underlying the
Erie rule. [citation to York]." '327 Here, Byrd is used to support the so-
called "twin aims" rationale of Erie, again not a idea distinctive to, or
created by, Byrd. To describe these references as an approval of Byrd, is
like describing Erie as an approval of Swift because Swift, like Erie, held
that the Rules of Decision Act controls the question of when a federal
court sitting in diversity must apply state law.
Up until the fifth edition, Yeazell included a note following the
Hanna opinion which cited to, and quoted from, several scholarly dis-
cussions that mirrored Yeazell's mistaken understanding of the Erie!
Hanna doctrine. For example, the note quoted with approval from a
section of Erwin Chemerinsky's treatise on federal jurisdiction describ-
ing the need for a "direct collision" between state and federal law, some-
thing the Court had stopped saying after Stewart.328 The note also
characterized Byrd balancing as still good law but only for state laws
that are outcome determinative,3 29 and summarized Ely's Irrepressible
Myth article in a manner that had Ely agreeing with Yeazell that Erie
was a constitutional decision. Ely, said Yeazell, believed that "the rule
in question - the standard of care owed by the railroad - was in no sense
a procedural matter," and the Constitution "justifies the federal courts in
326. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465-66 (1965).
327. Id. at 466-67 (citations omitted).
328. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
Our cases at times have referred to the question at this stage of the analysis as an
inquiry into whether there is a "direct collision" between state and federal law.
Logic indicates, however, and a careful reading of the relevant passages confirms,
that this language is not meant to mandate that federal law and state law be perfectly
coextensive and equally applicable to the issue at hand; rather, the "direct collision"
language, at least where the applicability of a federal statute is at issue, expresses
the requirement that the federal statute be sufficiently broad to cover the point in
dispute. It would make no sense for the supremacy of federal law to wane precisely
because there is no state law directly on point.
Id. at 26 n.4 (citations omitted).
329. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIvI PROCEDURE 283 (4th ed. 1996) [hereinafter YEAZELL (4th
ed.)] (quoting ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 266-67 (1989)).
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following [federal] rules that are in fact procedural."33 "The Constitu-
tion, however, should stay in the background," said Yeazell again speak-
ing for Ely, "until Congress prescribes a rule of decision in diversity
cases by statute, because the Rules of Decision Act (as interpreted in
Erie and Guaranty Trust [i.e., York]), protects state law to the same
degree as does the Constitution."'33' This summary of Ely is misleading
in several ways, but since the summary no longer appears in the
casebook (Ely is not mentioned in the fifth and subsequent editions), it is
not necessary to dwell on its errors.332  Yeazell's inclusion of Ely
330. Id. at 284.
331. Id. at 284.
332. Taking the Ely article out of the book is a strange move. Not only do many books still
cite to it, but the third edition of Yeazell called the article "incisive," and said it "cast considerable
light on the 'Erie problem,"' see STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, JONATHAN M. LANDERS & JAMES A.
MARTIN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 264 (3d ed. 1992), and the fourth edition, when Professor Yeazell
became the sole author, described the article as a "particularly influential exploration." See
YEAZELL (4th ed.), supra note 329, at 283. It is in the fourth edition however, that one senses a
change of heart with respect to Ely. The book's note on the Irrepressible Myth article is
shortened, the citations to the Chayes and Mishkin responses are omitted, and the book's summary
of the article begins to take on an Erie as constitutional rule theme that is characteristic of
Yeazell's view about Erie, but not Ely's. The only mention in the fifth edition of the possibility
that the Erie/Hanna doctrine may not be a unitary rule, but instead, as Ely pointed out, an
amalgam of "three distinct and rather ordinary problems of statutory and constitutional
interpretation," is in a note on "Determining the Scope of Federal Law: Avoiding and
Accommodating Erie," only part of which survives from the Fourth Edition. See YEAZELL (5th
ed.), supra note 290, at 295-96. Yeazell seems to regret that Erie is just a statutory rule, however,
and either wants to deny it or argue that it should not be so. The fifth edition acknowledges, for
example, that:
Under Hanna's reading of Erie, many 'Erie' questions will not require resort to the
Constitution because Congress by statute will have told federal courts what to do in
the situation. So long as the statute is constitutional and one knows what the statute
requires, the choice of law problem is solved.
Id. at 295. But "this route to the solution of Erie problems" is "too tempting" the book continues,
id., because a federal statute can be "a very thin fig leaf," as the Fourth edition of the book put it,
YEAZELL (4th ed.), supra note 329, at 286 n.2(b), to give federal courts "maximum discretion," id.
at 288 n.4, to deal with problems also regulated by state law. This result, Yeazell concludes,
"would probably induce apoplexy in Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter." Id. Apart from the
medical effects on Brandeis and Frankfurter, it is hard to know what is wrong with this view.
Hanna did not interpret some disembodied phenomenon called Erie. The Erie decision enforced
the Decision Act command to make state substantive law the rule of decision in federal courts. To
the extent Hanna had anything to do with Erie it simply refined its description of what kind of
state law qualifies as substantive under the Decision Act. In actuality, Hanna refined York and
outcome determination more than Erie. Most of Hanna is concerned with the Enabling Act and
the validity of Federal Rule Four. Moreover, if a federal statute is pertinent to an issue before a
court, that is, if the statute by its own terms covers or applies to the issue in dispute, and the statute
is constitutional, what possible basis could exist for arguing that state law is a higher authority?
Certainly not the Tenth Amendment, which grants only residuary power to the states. A pertinent
and constitutional federal statute leaves no residue. What then?
It may be that a judge, determined to expand federal power at all costs, will misinterpret a
federal statute and find it pertinent when the better view would be otherwise. But the Stewart and
Burlington Northern decisions are the only examples Yeazell gives of such federal imperialism,
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always looked grudging at best, more like a mandatory citation to some-
thing too important to be left out, than a report on a truly compatible
view. Anyone familiar with Ely's views would strain to reconcile them
with Yeazell's.
Yeazell's pattern of arguing for particular interpretations of the
Erie/Hanna cases rather than presenting the cases as data for examina-
tion causes the book to differ substantially from Cound. Whether this
difference is explained by substantive or pedagogical reasons is not
clear. Yeazell might think that provoking readers is the best way to
stimulate critical thinking about the cases, and that modern law students
have their best ideas when argued with rather than questioned in an
open-ended or non-directive fashion. Frequently in the modern law
school, the contest rather than the dialogue is the defining metaphor for
instructional interaction and Yeazell may simply have extended the met-
aphor to casebook organization as well. On the other hand, the Yeazell
book may be based on the belief that there are better and worse interpre-
tations of the Erie/Hanna cases (no argument there) and that it has the
better ones figured out (debatable). If this is what is going on, the book
needs to explain its conclusions more clearly and describe their bases in
greater detail.
C. Babcock & Massaro
Civil Procedure: Cases and Problems, by Barbara Babcock and
Toni Massaro (hereinafter Babcock & Massaro), 3 3 3 takes what it
describes as a problem approach to the civil procedure subject matter
334
and they do not make the case. YEAZELL (4th ed.), supra note 329, at 284-86; YEAZELL (6th ed.),
supra note 15, at 244-45. Stewart was a complicated and difficult case, with an embedded Rules
of Decision Act issue the Court did not discuss, see discussion supra notes 188-204 and
accompanying text, but there can be little doubt that the federal transfer statute was pertinent to
the issue before the court in that case. The issue in Stewart was whether the Alabama federal
court should transfer the case to the New York federal court. The transfer statute was the
Alabama court's only source of authority to order such a transfer. To whatever extent the federal
court had to accommodate the Alabama law on forum selection clauses, it had to do so under the
aegis of the transfer statute. In Burlington Northern, the authorization in Rule 38 of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure to assess damages and costs for frivolous appeals was a rule of
practice and procedure, more incompatible with the equivalent Alabama state law than was the
transfer statute in Stewart. Burlington N. RR. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1 (1987). It abridged no
substantive fights though this was a closer question. It is hard to see how the Court had any
choice other than to apply the Rule. If Yeazell's point is the more general one, that federal courts
will act systematically to expand the scope of federal authority and override state law whenever
possible, an alter ego version of the objection raised in Ragan and Walker, the argument is just as
much of a dead end in Burlington Northern as it was in Ragan and Walker.
333. BABCOCK & MASSARO (2d ed.), supra note 204. The book is the successor to PAUL
CARRINGTON & BARBARA BABCOCK, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND COMMENTS ON THE PROCESS
OF ADJUDICATION (3d ed. 1983), but it is a different book in many major respects.
334. BABCOCK & MASSARO (2d ed.), supra note 204, at xxx.
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that is designed to teach about the "practical human significance"
33 5 of
procedural rules and doctrines more than their analytical niceties. The
book devotes fewer pages to the Erie/Hanna doctrine than most of the
other casebooks336 and provides very little information about the devel-
opment of the doctrine outside of the Supreme Court cases themselves.
It reproduces most of the cases, including major cases such as York and
Byrd, in greatly abbreviated form - only Erie, Hanna, and Gasperini
receive relatively complete treatment, and does not distinguish between
the Erie (or Decision Act) and Hanna (or Enabling Act) halves of the
doctrine in the notes following the cases. The authors ask few questions
about the contents of the cases usually in the format of "How will party
A argue for X, and party B argue for not X?", and the questions contrib-
ute little that is original to the cases' presentation of the doctrine. It is as
if the authors thought that studying the doctrine for its own sake was
unimportant and that the cases were useful only insofar as they could be
turned into arguments that would help lawyers convince courts to rule in
their favor. Whatever the reason, in the end, the book does little more
than reduce Erie/Hanna to the soundbite synopses of substance/proce-
dure and outcome determination.
The book's treatment of the Swift doctrine is brief and selective. It
tells the story of Swift through an extended excerpt from Edward Pur-
cell's book on diversity jurisdiction rather than the Swift decision
itself.337 Consistent with its practitioner perspective, it edits the Purcell
excerpt to emphasize the role of strategic litigation maneuvering by
large national corporations and their law firms in opposition to New
Deal programs as a way of explaining Erie's repudiation of Swift. The
role of non-practice factors, such as background intellectual currents evi-
dent in the jurisprudential shift from a brooding omnipresence to com-
mand theory of law, is not mentioned. The Purcell excerpt repeats some
familiar misunderstandings of Erie and in so doing gives a hint of the
approach to the doctrine the Babcock & Massaro book will adopt. For
example, Purcell describes Erie as a Tenth Amendment case announcing
a constitutional rule protecting a fixed enclave of state power forever
335. This language is taken from the introduction to the first edition of the book, but it seems a
fair characterization of the approach of the second edition as well. See BABCOCK & MASSARO (1 st
ed.), supra note 204, at xxxii (citing the inspiration for this approach as EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR.,
LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870-
1958, 249 (1992)).
336. Until its latest edition Yeazell devoted the fewest pages to the doctrine of any major
casebook.
337. BABCOCK & MASSARO (2d ed.), supra note 204, at 813-19. See also PURCELL, supra note
335. at 226-230.
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off-limits to federal intrusion,338 and describes York's unqualified out-
come determination test as the final word on the meaning of the Deci-
sion Act command to apply state law. Purcell, to his credit, does not
shrink from the full implications of this last point, and acknowledges
that under certain circumstances, if effect on outcome is all that matters,
a federal court may be required to apply state procedural rules. 3 39 He
also does not seem to see how this must be wrong. The mistake is more
difficult to understand given that Purcell wrote in 1992, long after the
problem of how to qualify York's outcome determination standard had
been worked out in Hanna and explained by Ely. The Babcock & Mas-
saro book does not provide this missing context, however, or ask the
reader to consider whether Purcell has described the Erie rule correctly.
Babcock & Massaro's edited version of the Erie opinion is as com-
plete as most and has enough in it to support a discussion of every
important feature of the case. It is followed by a short note, perhaps the
briefest post-Erie note in any of the casebooks, which raises the question
of whether Erie announced a constitutional rule. The note makes two
points: that Justice Brandeis suggested in Erie that the outcome of the
case was "constitutionally required," and that "some [unidentified]
scholars" argue that Congress's constitutional power to create a federal
court system includes the power to create substantive law for diversity
cases.34 ° The point about Brandeis does not distinguish between a posi-
tive and a negative constitutional requirement. Brandeis suggested only
that the "course pursued" in Swift was not constitutionally authorized,34'
not that the application of Pennsylvania tort law in Erie was constitu-
tionally required. And the second point describes a straw man argument
that few, if any, constitutional scholars have defended, at least in the
scope adopted by Babcock & Massaro. The argument - that a grant of
power to set up a procedural system is a fortiori a grant of power to
make substantive law for that system to operate with - is hardly compel-
ling. Taken to its logical conclusion, it obliterates all distinctions
between procedure and substance and, as a consequence, collapses on
itself. There is a more limited version of the argument which has greater
force,34 2 but the book does not describe this view.
338. BABCOCK & MASSARO (2d ed.), supra note 204, at 817-18, 825 (quoting PURCELL, supra
note 335, at 226-30).
339. Id. at 818 (quoting PURCELL, supra note 335).
340. Id. at 824.
341. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
342. This is the so-called "Lincoln Mills" argument, which most casebooks discuss. See, e.g.,
COUND, FRIEDENTHAL, MILLER & SEXTON, supra note 24, at 451; HAZARD, TAIT & FLETCHER,
supra note 37, at 580-81; MARCUS, REDISH & SHERMAN, supra note 15, at 1008; YEAZELL (6th
ed.), supra note 15, at 230-3 1. Justice Reed discusses a version of the argument, although not in
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The book resolves the question of whether Erie is a constitutional
case by concluding that the question is unimportant because the
Supreme Court has interpreted "applicable congressional acts" (i.e., "the
Rules of Decision Act,... and the Rules Enabling Act") to require the
application of state law by federal courts sitting in diversity.343 This is a
confusing thing to say in at least two ways. First, it is not clear how the
presence of federal statutes would make the question of Erie's constitu-
tional status unimportant. If federal courts have a constitutional obliga-
tion to apply state substantive law, it is the Constitution and not federal
statutes that must be interpreted to determine the extent of that obliga-
tion. Second, it is not clear why the Enabling Act should be included
along with the Decision Act in the list of federal statutes requiring the
application of state law in federal court. The Enabling Act was not
involved in Erie, and has nothing to say about a federal court's obliga-
tion to apply state law. It simply prevents a federal court from using a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure when that Rule would abridge a sub-
stantive right whether the right is created by state law or otherwise.
Only the Decision Act commands the application of state law, and then
only when the law is outcome determinative in Hanna's refined sense of
the term. The book's mistake here is a familiar one. It does not distin-
guish between the Erie or Decision Act, and Hanna or Enabling Act,
halves of the Erie/Hanna doctrine. Instead, it combines two of Ely's
"three distinct and rather ordinary problems of statutory and constitu-
tional interpretation," into a single, unified (Erie) rule. The book
acknowledges that its account of the Erie/Hanna doctrine is "grossly
simplified," 3 and that counts for something. But perhaps it would be
better to present a more complex account in a book designed for novices
with no prior understanding of the doctrine.
The book's treatment of Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York is
perhaps the most questionable part of its section on the Erie/Hanna doc-
trine. It reproduces the York decision in blurb fashion, which makes it
almost alone among procedure books in not treating York as a principal
case. While it quotes from the York opinion, it quotes only the Court's
reformulation of Erie's substance/procedure standard in outcome deter-
mination terms.34 5 The surrounding contextual information showing
why such a reformulation was necessary - that a substance/procedure
standard does not help categorize an equity rule in which right and rem-
edy are mixed - is omitted. As a result, the York holding is reduced to
"Lincoln Mills" terms of course, in his concurring opinion in Erie. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 91-92
(Reed, J., concurring); see also WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 415.
343. BABCOCK & MASSARO (2d ed.), supra note 204, at 824-25.
344. Id. at 824.
345. Id. at 826.
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an "unworkable bromide" in the book's terms, something the book says
is "inevitable," and York is then criticized for failing to exclude "even
the most relentlessly procedural rules. '3 46 Rather than present York as a
partly successful step in an ongoing analytical project and the foundation
of the modem Erie rule, the book reduces the decision to little more than
an argumentative soundbite, a move in keeping with its practitioner
approach to describing procedure doctrine.
Babcock & Massaro disposes of Byrd in almost as perfunctory a
fashion. Byrd appears just once in the Erie/Hanna section of the book,
among a list of one-paragraph case blurbs used to illustrate the Supreme
Court's struggles with defining the substance/procedure and outcome
determination standards.347 The book quotes parts of four paragraphs
from the Byrd opinion, principally those stating the Court's balancing
and Seventh Amendment rationales, but strangely, it does not ask any
questions about the case or comment on it in any way. Instead, it moves
on immediately to examine Hanna. The Byrd Court's struggle with the
task of synthesizing a coherent Erie rule out of several pre-existing for-
mulations, the laundry list quality of the rationale it eventually adopts,
and the Court's experiment with balancing as a check on the outcome
determination standard, are all ignored. The common analytical concern
which ties Erie, York, and Byrd together, that of formulating a functional
statement of the substance/procedure standard which can be applied with
equal effectiveness to all types of state law, and the way in which the
Court's efforts finally come to fruition in Hanna, also are not men-
tioned. The instructional value of Byrd as a carefully documented fail-
ure is lost on a reader who does not already understand the lesson. The
case is relegated to a kind of pre-historic status, an artifact of the Cohen,
Ragan, and Woods era when the Court's understanding of the difference
between substance and procedure was considerably more primitive.
This treatment of Byrd makes a non-event of a major stage in the devel-
opment of the Erie/Hanna doctrine and without any hint of this being
done.
The book describes Hanna as "clarify[ing] the Erie doctrine by
'establish[ing] a powerful presumption in favor of federal courts' power
to use the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in diversity actions. ' 348
346. Id.
347. Compare this treatment of Byrd with that of HAZARD, TAIT & FLETCHER, and MARCUS,
REDISH & SHERMAN, each of which devotes four and one-half pages to the decision. HAZARD,
TAIT & FLETCHER, supra note 37, at 509-13; MARCUS, REDISH & SHERMAN, supra note 15, at 943-
47.
348. BABCOCK & MASSARO (2d ed.), supra note 204, at 830. It is not clear how a presumption
in favor of the application of the Federal Rules would resolve an Erie problem, since Erie did not
involve a dispute over the application of the Federal Rules or an interpretation of the Enabling
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While not an unfamiliar way to describe Hanna, this description is diffi-
cult to make sense of and even harder to reconcile with the language of
the case itself. First of all, the question of whether a Federal Rule gov-
erns an issue before the court, because of a presumption or otherwise, is
a Hanna or Enabling Act problem and not an Erie or Decision Act prob-
lem. The book continues to conflate these separate and distinct strands
of the Erie/Hanna doctrine and talk about them as if they were two parts
of a single rule.34 9 Hanna itself does not draw on or even mention the
idea of a presumption, either in favor of or against the application of the
Federal Rules. Instead, it discusses only the so-called validity question
of what is required for a Federal Rule to be a legitimate exercise of
Enabling Act authority. It concludes, consistent with the terms of the
Enabling Act, that to be valid a Federal Rule must regulate practice and
procedure, and not abridge, amend or modify substantive rights.
35 0 If
both valid and pertinent to the issue before the court, a Federal Rule
must be applied by a federal court sitting in diversity, not because of
some presumption in favor of its application but because its own terms
require it and because there is and can be no higher law. Since federal
courts honor the second half of the Enabling Act test mostly in the
breach, and the first half is easily complied with, Federal Rules almost
invariably are valid under an Enabling Act analysis. But to say that a
Federal Rule is likely to be valid is not the same thing as to say that
there is a presumption in favor of its application. The idea of presump-
tion adds nothing to understanding Hanna or the Enabling Act and
detracts from the decision's central lesson about determining the validity
of a Federal Rule.
The book's edited version of the Hanna decision, which abbrevi-
ates the Court's discussion of the Enabling Act problem and emphasizes
the Decision Act problem, also reinforces the idea of Erie/Hanna as a
single, undifferentiated legal doctrine.3 ' The notes following the case
reinforce this perspective by running Enabling Act and Decision Act
Act, although some commentators think that Erie created what amounted to a presumption in
favor of the application of federal law generally. See, e.g., John C. McCoid, II, Hanna v. Plumer:
The Erie Doctrine Changes Shape, 51 VA. L. REV. 884 (1965).
349. The first edition of the book omitted most of the Court's Enabling Act analysis, while
reproducing its Decision Act analysis almost verbatim. See BABCOCK & MASSARO (lst ed.),
supra note 204, at 218-22. This made it difficult for a reader unfamiliar with the opinion even to
recognize that there were two distinct parts to the decision. It is fair to say that the Hanna
decision reproduced by the first edition of the book was a different decision from the one
announced by the Court. The second edition of the book corrects this problem to a limited extent
by including parts of the Court's Enabling Act discussion, although significant parts of the
analysis are left out. However, the second edition still fails to distinguish fully between the
different statutory interpretation problems presented by the two statutes.
350. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470-72 (1965).
351. See supra note 349.
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examples and arguments together as if parts of the same state law/fed-
eral law topic. For example, they discuss the issues of effect on out-
come and the procedural quality of a Federal Rule as if they could come
up under the same legal standard, and fail to point out that the two stat-
utes work with different understandings of key, common terms. 35" The
authors seem to get closer to seeing the distinction between the two Acts
in their movement from the first to the second edition of the book. In
the second edition they remove a note on "Choosing Between RDA and
REA Analysis," that described the Enabling Act as "govern[ing] choice
of law issues in cases that involve duly enacted federal rules or statutes,
whereas Erie and the Rules of Decision Act (RDA) govern cases that
involve federal decisional law." '353 This is only partly correct. The Ena-
bling Act authorizes the enactment of Federal Rules but not federal stat-
utes, the Decision Act applies to state law but not federal law, and the
issue of whether to apply a federal statute is governed by the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution. The first edition of the book also confused
pertinence questions with Enabling Act questions in its discussion of
Rule 68, but this discussion has been removed as well.35 4 The first edi-
tion also confused Stewart questions about the applicability of a federal
statute with Erie questions about the applicability of state law, and this
discussion remains in the book.355 In the end, Babcock & Massaro's
treatment of the Erie/Hanna doctrine leaves a thoughtful reader more
confused than comprehending, and with an understanding based more on
terminology than ideas.356
352. BABCOCK & MASSARO (2d ed.), supra note 204, at 839. It is strange that the book would
so consistently run these two separate issues together since the Hanna decision, even as
reproduced in the book, points out that "as [cases] subsequent [to Erie] . .. sharpened the
distinction between substance and procedure, the line of cases following Erie diverged markedly
from the line construing the Enabling Act. Guaranty Trust v. York made it clear the Erie-type
problems were not to be solved by reference to any traditional or common-sense substance-
procedure distinction." Id. at 832 (quoting Hanna, 380 U.S. at 465-66) (citations omitted). The
book's version of Hanna leaves out other language which would have made this point more
clearly. See, e.g., Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471-72. Ely also explains the point in detail. See Ely, supra
note 2, at 721-27.
353. BABCOCK & MASSARO (1st ed.), supra note 204, at 227; see also SUBRIN, M[NOW, BRODIN
& MAIN, supra note 69, at 755 ("In Stewart ... the Court extended the Hanna Fed. R. Civ. P.
friendly approach to federal statutory provisions as well."); Mid-Life Crisis, supra note 135, at
I 15 ("[Blecause a federal statute applied, the case was governed by Hanna.").
354. BABCOCK & MASSARO (1st ed.), supra note 204, at 228.
355. Id. at 227. See BABCOCK & MASSARO (2d ed.), supra note 204, at 840. The Subrin book
also confuses these questions. See SUBRIN, MINOW, BRODIN, & MAIN, supra note 69, at 755.
356. The book's treatment of Gasperini also has undergone a radical shift from the first to the
second edition. The first edition almost ignored the case altogether. It quoted small excerpts from
three paragraphs of the opinion and characterized the decision generally as concluding that "New
York law was not incompatible with the Seventh Amendment . . . . [and] [f]or federal courts
sitting in diversity to ignore the New York law would create substantial variations between state
and federal judgments, in violation of Erie's 'twin aims."' BABCOCK & MASSARO (1 St ed.), supra
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The Cound, Yeazell, and Babcock & Massaro books provide a rep-
resentative picture of the approaches taken in American procedure
casebooks to the presentation of the Erie/Hanna doctrine. All procedure
books combine traditional, advocacy, and practitioner perspectives to
varying extents: sometimes they offer up unencumbered case decisions
as pure data for open-ended analysis, other times they argue for particu-
lar interpretations of the decisions, and still other times, they turn the
cases into black letter law soundbites for use in arguments with other
lawyers. While not every book uses the same approach all of the time,
therefore, each has a distinctive identity which distinguishes it from the
other books in the field. For example, the books differ in their concep-
tions of the procedure subject matter. Some emphasize an understand-
ing of doctrine and the manner in which it is manipulated. These books
test the limits of a decision's core concepts and the flexibility of its
language, usually by asking questions about future hypothetical applica-
tions. Other books emphasize the role of background factors from the
world of ideas generally, including concerns of legal theory and legal
method, in the development of legal doctrine. These books ask readers
to question why and how legal rules change more than to determine the
content of any particular rule regime. Still other books help readers
learn how to think of, store, and retrieve cases in capsule form for mak-
ing arguments in discussions with other lawyers.
Each of these types of books offers up slightly, and sometimes
greatly, different versions of the major opinions, arguing directly or by
implication, for specific, but different, understandings of the Decision
and Enabling Act language, Tenth Amendment, and federal common
law rules. Some of the books see the Erie/Hanna cases as mostly statu-
tory decisions articulating different interpretations of the substance/pro-
cedure standards at the heart of the Decision and Enabling Acts, while
others see the cases as announcing a constitutional doctrine grounded in
the reserved powers clause of the Tenth Amendment. Within this latter
note 204, at 217. It is not clear how literally the book's authors intended this characterization.
The Decision Act does not require an identity of judgments between state and federal courts, just
an identity of substantive legal standards. A federal and state court interpreting the same law
could reach different conclusions about the law's application to a particular case without violating
the Erie/Hanna doctrine. If this was not true we would be back to the so-called ventriloquist
dummy problem, in which the federal court would become "just another court of the state." The
second edition omits this particular characterization of Gasperini, quotes extensively from the
opinion (with a disproportionate emphasis on Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion), and includes
two pages of questions and comments about the case. The questions seem to restate a more
complicated version of the ventriloquist dummy characterization, however, and the comments
merely summarize law review criticisms of the case. The authors now seem to see Gasperini as a
significant case, but don't yet know how they feel about it. Join the club.
2005]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
category, each of the books has different ideas about how the Constitu-
tion defines the relationship between state and federal power. Some
believe that states have a fixed enclave of traditional power forever free
from federal interference, while others believe that state power is only
residuary power left over after the checklist of federal enumerated pow-
ers has been identified fully.
Procedure books also differ with respect to their understanding of
the role of federal common law and the Supremacy Clause in Erie!
Hanna analysis. For some, a valid federal common law rule trumps
state substantive law, notwithstanding the Decision Act command to
apply such law. Others privilege the Decision Act command as superior
to all except a valid federal statute. In some books, Byrd's balancing
test remains a viable standard. For these books the difficult doctrinal
questions include what is balanced (rules, practices, policy interests), if
rules, what types of rules (substantive, procedural, both), whose rules
(federal, state), and how the balancing should be performed. In other
books, Byrd's balancing test is dead in the water. The same is true for
the outcome determination standard of York. Some books describe
York's unqualified outcome determination test as the governing standard
and view a federal court sitting in diversity hearing claims based on state
law as just another court of the state. Others believe that the outcome
determination standard was refined and qualified in Hanna, but disagree
over whether the standard applies to all state judicial practices likely to
have an effect on outcome, such as the promotion of settlement through
mandatory pre-trial conferences, or only to properly enacted state laws.
Finally, the books also differ with respect to their understanding of
the proper boundaries of the Erie/Hanna doctrine. Some view the ques-
tion of whether to apply a federal statute in the face of a contrary state
law as an Erie/Hanna problem. Either they treat the statute as a Federal
Rule and require that it satisfy the two-part Enabling Act test, or they
treat it as a state law and require that it satisfy the outcome determina-
tion standard of the Decision Act. The books also have different views
about the origins and nature of the Erie doctrine. Some see it as a
response to practical exigencies - changing modes of transportation, the
development of interstate commerce, the growth of national law firms
and interstate practice, interest group manipulation of jurisdictional rules
and substantive law for strategic advantage - and provide background
material on these and related subjects. Others see it as principally a
consequence of intellectual and jurisprudential forces - the development
of a professional social science, a movement from natural law to realist
theories of truth, changing attitudes about the nature and source of law -
and provide background information on these subjects. The snarl of sep-
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arate and distinct questions that make up the doctrine, and that Ely so
carefully disentangled, are re-jumbled in these presentations so that any
sense of the doctrine as raising "three distinct and rather ordinary
problems of statutory and constitutional interpretation" is lost. A person
reading every procedure casebook would come away with a thoroughly
confused understanding of the doctrine, while a person reading just one
book would have a substantially different understanding of the doctrine
than a person reading another book. The Erie/Hanna doctrine has taken
on multiple personalities in the casebook world, in other words, and a
person's understanding of it will depend almost wholly upon the book
and teacher from which and whom it was first learned.
IV. WHAT DOES IT MATTER?3 5 7
It remains only to consider the effects of this highly differentiated
presentation of the Erie/Hanna doctrine on lawyer learning and the
development of legal doctrine. Does it matter that procedure casebooks
describe the Erie/Hanna doctrine in different, inconsistent, and even
contradictory ways? One expects legal scholars to have different views
about the meaning of doctrine. Articulating original and idiosyncratic
interpretations of cases and statutes is one of the things legal academics
do to establish their views as distinctive, and in the academy distinction
is often the holy grail. At first, the Erie/Hanna doctrine might seem an
odd place to make an intellectual stand, given Ely's sensible deconstruc-
tion of it in the mid-1970s and the consequent agreement of most every-
one else of note. But legal academics have a difficult time ceding a field
completely, even in the face of knock-down arguments, and the passage
of time can cause the memory of even definitive treatments to fade.
This proclivity to disagree about the meaning of the Erie/Hanna doctrine
makes for interesting law review writing, but its effects are less sanguine
where casebooks are concerned. A casebook is a collection of time-
tested legal puzzles, hypothetical and real, for provoking and shaping
law student engagement with, and study of, the process of legal analysis.
It is useful not so much for the informational detail it provides about
specific legal rules, often it is out of date in that regard,35 8 but more for
the overview it offers of the general policy debates and conceptual struc-
tures that make up a particular area of law. If the law is in flux, con-
fused, contested, or unclear, a casebook is better if it presents the
357. Think of this as the "Alfie" question. See BuRT BACHARACH & HAL DAVID, What's It All
About, Alfie?, (1966) (produced by Brad Wood & Susanna Hoffs 2002).
358. Supplemented yearly but fully updated only about every three or four years, casebooks
inevitably are less current than digests, loose-leaf reporter systems, and on-line data bases, which
update information on a monthly, weekly, daily, or even hourly basis. Being informationally
incomplete or sometimes even wrong, is built into the nature of a casebook.
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material with all of these qualifications. Describing more than one view
of the meaning of a line of cases sometimes is not only a reasonable
undertaking, it is a necessary one as well. A casebook should open up
the realm of interpretive possibilities in a doctrine and help readers see
the different approaches one could take to the subject. When a book
argues for a single view instead, it closes down this interpretive universe
and cuts off further learning. There is nothing wrong with shutting
down learning when there is nothing more to be learned, but in such a
situation it is particularly important that a book present the settled view.
The books arguing for single views of the Erie/Hanna doctrine usually
do the opposite, however, and promote idiosyncratic rather than consen-
sus understandings of the doctrine." 9
All of this would not matter much if casebooks did not play an
important role in the way law students and lawyers understand the Erie!
Hanna doctrine, and in some ways they do not. Students go beyond
casebooks very quickly in their legal careers when they write memo-
randa and briefs about Erie/Hanna issues in moot court exercises, legal
research and writing papers, and law firm work assignments. To do this
work law students need a more sophisticated understanding of the doc-
trine than the skeletal one provided in casebooks, if only to tailor their
discussions to particular jurisdictions, know what other jurisdictions say
about the same point, and bring their analyses up to date. In the course
of developing this more sophisticated understanding students must
reconsider, test, and remake when necessary, the basic conceptual
frameworks they took from their casebooks.36 ° If law students and law-
yers organize and explain the detail of the Erie/Hanna world in terms of
the categories learned from casebooks, however, altering those catego-
359. Perhaps the authors of books with specific views expect law professors to compensate for
the books' narrow perspectives by providing alternative viewpoints on their own, just as authors
who ask only open-ended and non-directive questions inevitably rely on professors to sharpen the
focus with more specifically tailored questions. At one level, both sets of expectations seem
reasonable. Anyone using a casebook should always bring a critical perspective to the task by
updating, amending, and expanding upon the book's material, factually and analytically, to the
extent her or his understanding of the subject permits.. Open-ended and non-directive questioning
about cases forces a professor to do this. However, advocacy books can be taught at face value,
out of ignorance, laziness, insecurity, or whatever, and thus are a risky choice.
360. This risk of a first impression becoming fixed and shaping further study is greater than
ordinary with a doctrine like Erie/Hanna. ErielHanna problems are unusual, both in law school
and practice. Because of this lawyers do not get many opportunities to refine their understanding
of the doctrine. When opportunities do occur, they are usually infrequently and widely spaced.
There is no incentive to keep up incrementally with such a doctrine. The return is not worth the
investment, and there is always other more pressing work to do. So when lawyers read new Eriel
Hanna cases they tend to do so all at once, within a short period of time, separated by long breaks
from the last time they looked at the material. Under such circumstances, it is not unusual to fall
back on default ways of thinking about the doctrine, and the default view of Erie/Hanna for most
lawyers is the one they learned from a procedure casebook.
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ries minimally at the margin when necessary to deal with persistent,
non-conforming data of the legal world at large, casebooks will remain
the single most important influence on their understanding of the doc-
trine. Students who do not understand the doctrine when they leave law
school, therefore, are not much more likely to understand it in practice.
Instead, they are likely to practice their mistakes.
Casebook presentations of the Erie/Hanna doctrine may even con-
tribute to the general confusion about the doctrine manifest in the opin-
ions of lower federal courts. Commentators have long criticized federal
court Erie/Hanna opinions for failings that resemble the misunderstand-
ings one finds in the casebooks. These failings include describing Erie
as a constitutional rule, treating Byrd balancing as still viable, and
believing that the outcome determination test must be applied to all
types of state laws, procedural as well as substantive.36' While this sim-
ilarity of misunderstandings may be coincidental - federal judges may
independently misread Supreme Court Erie/Hanna opinions in the same
fashion as casebook authors - there is a way in which the two phenom-
ena could be related. Clerks to federal judges might draft Erie/Hanna
opinions based upon casebook views of the doctrine and judges might
publish these drafts fundamentally unchanged, because they have noth-
ing better to substitute. Federal judges do not get much practice at Erie!
Hanna issues. The issues come up infrequently, and when they do
judges rarely have the time to study the doctrine in detail, as other mat-
ters are usually more pressing. It is natural in such a situation for a
judge to trust a clerk's thinking more than usual, since the clerk will
have just come from law school where he or she presumably studied the
doctrine in its most up-to-date form. We now know, however, that there
is no such thing as a single up-to-date understanding of the Erie/Hanna
doctrine. When clerks draft Erie/Hanna opinions they do so from a con-
tested point of view and take sides in an ongoing doctrinal debate,
whether they know it or not.
3 62
361. See, e.g., Braman & Neumann, supra note 20, at 467-74; see also Ely, supra note 2, at
717 n.130.
When the Rules of Decision Act is interpreted in light of . . . a desire . . . to
minimize forum shopping ... it becomes clear that there is no place in the analysis
for the sort of balancing of federal and state interests contemplated by the Byrd
opinion .... The Fourth Circuit seems not to have gotten the message, however.
See Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 435 F.2d 527 (4th Cir. 1970); Wratchford v. S.J.
Groves & Sons Co., 405 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1969); Szantay v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965).
Id.
362. It is not clear how one could prove a direct link between federal court Erie/Hanna
opinions and casebook presentations of the doctrine. First person accounts by judges and law
clerks of the drafting of Erie/Hanna opinions might be convincing evidence for some, but for
many reasons, such accounts are not likely to be forthcoming. One might prove the point
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What then, if anything, is to be done about the confusing mess
made of the Erie/Hanna doctrine in procedure casebooks? The burden
of straightening everything out inevitably must fall on individual proce-
dure professors, if only because casebook authors have too much
invested in the present configuration of their respective views to take the
lead in any such undertaking. Like expert witnesses at trial, authors who
change their minds about their understanding of the Erie/Hanna doctrine
change their "testimony," in effect, and if they do this, also like wit-
nesses at trial, they can expect to pay at least a short-term cost in lost
credibility, which can mean lost sales. But the burden falls on the indi-
vidual professor for another, more structural, reason. Practitioners, in
this case, law professors, must always add nuance and qualification to
received theory if the theory is to explain past events and help resolve
future problems. This is the relationship of theory to practice. Practi-
tioners fill in the "last twenty feet" above the ground, in Charles Fried's
apt phrase.3 63 They insure that theory is "seated firmly and concretely,
[so that it is able to] shelter[ ] real human beings against the storms of
passion and conflict. ' '36 If students are to understand the full range of
perspectives on the Erie/Hanna doctrine, therefore, it will be because
individual law professors introduce these perspectives into their teach-
ing, either by shaping the open-ended and non-leading questions of
traditional procedure books, or by proposing competing interpretations
to those presented in advocacy books.
Books with extensive notes and comments, including those with
references to multiple viewpoints, may help in this process, particularly
if the references are balanced and representative. But no book presents
all of the noteworthy perspectives on the doctrine, so law professors
must supplement casebook discussions with additional readings and lec-
ture. Students could read The Irrepressible Myth of Erie until they
understood it - I have suggested this to students in the past and a few
have taken the suggestion - but the article is difficult and does not give
up its insights easily. Law professors have been known to complain
about the difficulties of understanding Ely as well. If law professors do
circumstantially, by showing a correspondence between the language of Erie/Hanna opinions and
that of casebook presentations that is too close to be coincidental, but that would be a complicated
undertaking requiring an article in its own right. Casebooks must play some role in the elaborate
telephone game that produces a decision like Gasperini. It is improbable that a major source of
influence on the way lawyers and judges form their first impressions of the Erie/Hanna doctrine
would have no effect on the way the doctrine is developed in court opinions. Identifying the
nature of that effect is work for another day. Here, I wish to suggest only that the conditions for
such an effect are all in place.
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not provide supplementary instruction, and do not round out casebook
coverage of the doctrine with additional readings and discussion, they
will add to, if not harden, the confusion surrounding the doctrine, and
make this esoteric, but important, area of the law even more difficult to
deal with. This may happen no matter what individual law professors
do, but I choose to be an optimist. As Churchill asked, "What other
choice is there?"
V. CONCLUSION
It is a common stereotype of academics, and this includes legal
academics, that they are spectators rather than participants in the great
moral and political controversies of their day. As facsimiles of
Roosevelt's "cold and timid souls," they are at their best when pointing
out how others have stumbled, and because they avoid the arena, they
"know neither victory nor defeat." '365 Law professors as a class often
reinforce this stereotype because most of them devote their public
energy to commenting on rather than making or enforcing law.36 6 A few
participate directly in the lawmaking process when they serve on com-
missions, study groups, task forces, and committees charged with draft-
ing and proposing legislation.367 Others help make law by representing
parties in public interest litigation or by developing theories of legal
interpretation that judges use to give meaning to legal rules. 368  But
these are the unusual cases. Most in the legal academy lead relatively
365. It is not the critic who counts: not the man who points out how the strong man
stumbles or where the doer of deeds could have done better. The credit belongs to
the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and
blood, who strives valiantly, who errs and comes up short again and again, because
there is no effort without error or shortcoming, but who knows the great
enthusiasms, the great devotions, who spends himself for a worthy cause; who, at
the best, knows, in the end, the triumph of high achievement, and who, at the worst,
if he fails, at least he fails while daring greatly, so that his place shall never be with
those cold and timid souls who knew neither victory nor defeat.
Theodore Roosevelt, Citizenship in a Republic, Speech at the Sorbonne, Paris (Apr. 23, 1910),
available at http://www.theodoreroosevelt.org/life/quotes.htm; see also THEODORE ROOSEVELT &
BRIAN THOMSEN, THE MAN IN THE ARENA: SELECTED WRITINGS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT: A
READER 11 (2004). This familiar piece of Roosevelt wisdom has become somewhat hackneyed,
and yet it expresses remarkably admirable and important sentiments. It says, among other things,
that it is not possible to create a society out of critics - that one would have all parasites and no
hosts - and this point in particular seems to have been lost in our country sometime during the last
thirty years. Parasites serve a function in life, of course, but they don't create it.
366. See, e.g., the "experts" who pronounce each night on network and cable news and talk
shows, about the day's Warholian "case of the century." The lawyer gene pool for public
intellectuals seems to have run nearly dry.
367. On occasion, some even take the initiative and propose legislation of their own, or
represent groups that do, writing op-ed pieces to mobilize public support and lobbying elected
representatives and officials to make the legislation a reality.
368. Cf Robert R. Kuehn, A Normative Analysis of the Rights and Duties of Law Professors to
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quiet and cloistered lives, far from the rancor and boisterousness of con-
tested elections, political logrolling, back room deal-making, courtroom
argument, and even radio talk-shows. They exert their influence over
the domain of the classroom, faculty lounge, learned society, and aca-
demic journal. When they speak on behalf of moral and political princi-
ples, as often they do, usually it is to other academics or students, in
lectures, books, articles, speeches, and conversations. 369 For better or
worse, it is the role of most legal academics to comment on and transmit
law, rather than make or enforce it.
There are instances, however, when the distinction between trans-
mitting and making breaks down, and casebook presentation of the Erie!
Hanna doctrine is one of those instances. As we have seen, law is
formed and put into operation in complicated and multi-faceted ways. It
is promulgated by authoritative sources to be sure, or it does not exist,
but it also is applied by thousands of individuals who understand those
promulgations in a wide variety of ways. The content of these under-
standings, particularly for a doctrine as esoteric as Erie/Hanna, comes in
major part from materials studied in law school. In a sense, law schools,
for something like the Erie/Hanna doctrine, are an American form of the
playing fields of Eton, where interpretive character and doctrinal under-
standing are set for generations to come. Control over this understand-
ing is largely in the hands of a small group of individuals who construct
the analytical frameworks within which the Erie/Hanna doctrine is stud-
ied, and the hundreds of law professors who direct this study. Without
too much exaggeration, it is accurate to say that law professors, both as
casebook authors and classroom interpreters, shape the contours of the
Erie/Hanna doctrine for most legal actors. They do not write on a clean
slate, of course, for there are the Supreme Court cases to contend with.
But they influence how students understand those cases and the students
in turn, first as clerks to judges, and then ultimately, as judges them-
selves, determine the form the doctrine takes in court decisions. In this
process, and without being fully aware of it, lawyers and judges take
sides in a longstanding competition between various contested versions
of what the Erie/Hanna doctrine is really all about, and because
casebook authors are vicariously implicated in this contest, they are
Speak Out, 55 So. CAR. L. REV. 253, 254-56 (2003) (describing law reform efforts of lawyers and
arguing that law professors should be similarly engaged).
369. This is not to denigrate the power of pure academic thought. Holmes, better than anyone,
described the "subtile [sic] rapture of a postponed power.., more real than that which commands
an army" in the "secret isolated joy of the thinker, who knows that, a hundred years after he is
dead and forgotten, men who never heard of him will be moving to the measure of his thought."
See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Profession of the Law, in SPEECHES BY OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES 24-25 (1934). It is unlikely, however, that he had every academic conversation in mind.
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every bit as much Roosevelt's men and women of action as those who
participate more directly. It might be better if this process was more of a
shared enterprise and less of a contest, but perhaps that is not possible,
given the times.
